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


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
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
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BY

BECKLES WILLSON

"If you have an Empire you will have an Emperor, not perhaps in the Old World form of a man crowned and sceptred, yet in the shape of a centralized and practically autocratic power."—GOLDWIN SMITH.

"Continual sweeping changes cannot but be disastrous; where needs shift rapidly as they do here, where we often live in one world what Europe does in ten, we need respiration of established principles in changed conditions."—THEODORE ROOSEVELT, *September 22nd, 1902.*

'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ εἰς ἰχάνους γασόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην ταύτ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ οὖν ἀπιστούμενα.—PLATO, *Rep. VI.*



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PREFACE

IN these pages it will be my aim to point out broadly some of the new conditions and tendencies which appear to me to prevail in the United States of America, in its external and domestic politics, in its commerce, its society, its literature.

Commentaries on conditions which pertained a decade or two ago bear an almost ludicrous disparity to the facts of 1902; and no recent writer has been more keenly conscious of this embarrassing mutability than Mr. Bryce, who declared, in the opening chapter of his "American Commonwealth," that "America changes so fast that every few years a new crop of books is needed to describe the new face which things have put on, the new problems that have appeared, the new ideas germinating among the people, the new and unexpected developments for evil as well as for good of which her established institutions have been found capable."

Enormous popular migration following on increased railway facilities ; reform in politics and in the Civil Service ; restriction upon free alien immigration ; the growth of the system of commercial Trusts ; the revival of the Monroe doctrine ; the war with Spain ; territorial expansion ; an increased Army and Navy ; the growing power of the federal administration ; an enormous material prosperity ; and a wholesale participation in the world's markets ;—all these causes have, as may easily be believed, altered greatly the whole character of American society. Indeed, for the first time in her history, America shows a united front to the world which it were disingenuous for us not to acknowledge.

Ten years ago the republic was split up into sections of opinion, each having little sympathy with the other ; now the "solid South" is shattered ; State rights are fast dwindling into the rights possessed by English counties, or at most, Crown Colonies ; a standing army of 80,000 men has arisen, and a great fleet and mercantile marine are materializing.

Briefly, it may be said that the States have been a century in labour, and have put forth a nation.

In 1892 to have adumbrated the present rôle of America in *Welt politik* would have excited derision. Since that date, we have, however, seen an American


PREFACE

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Empire arise; alien and distant races now bow the knee to an American ruler. America's accents, though brusque and untrained, are beginning to be heard respectfully in the concert of nations.

Perhaps little apology, then, is needed for the matter contained in this book. It is written from the standpoint of a Canadian (and therefore British) observer, who has passed several years across the southern boundary of his country.

September 25th, 1902.



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THE NEW AMERICA

CHAPTER I

THE UNITED STATE

IN the beginning, like the kingdom of England,¹ and the kingdom c. Israel,² the American republic was in the possession of thirteen tribes. We see, in reviewing the political histories of these countries, that the process of integration follows certain laws; that the capital, whether it be Jerusalem or London or Washington, draws to itself power and authority for the whole; that the centripetal and synthetic forces which are at work in every such State, pause only when they have achieved a unit, or, as sometimes happens, met with a revolution. Here, developing in a theatre of operations relatively small, the scattered island realms from Kent

¹ "Thus, after a century and a half, was gradually established in Britain what has been called the Heptarchy. But this term is incorrect . . . if the smaller and dependent ones are reckoned, the number must be considerably increased." In 827 the States were thirteen in number and "were nominally united into one State."—*v. Hume, "History of England."*

² "The entire country was divided into thirteen lots, the descendants of Joseph governing the two tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh had each a portion assigned to them, while the tribes of Levi were given the forty-eight cities and the tribes of the whole land for a maintenance."—*E. Ledrain, "Histoire d'Israel."*

to Connaught become united kingdoms, and, finally, the United Kingdom of to-day.¹

Again, the great nation which has, in recent times, risen to note under the title of Germany, consisted in the eighteenth century of nearly three hundred small and despotic states. Any national sentiment was less encouraged by the loose bonds of German Empiro than by a national literaturo then in its birth-throes. As far as the general politics of Europe were concerned the petty German States were a negligiblo quantity.² Compare their condition with the modern united State of Germany.

The ease of America, therefore, is only peculiar in this: that it shows on a larger scale than ever before witnessed on the globe, human nature and inherent tendencies battling with hard and fast political theories; struggling, and not unavailingly, against a written National Constitution which it has outgrown.

It is peculiar and it is of universal interest because we see here human nature, which craves ornament and prestige and expansion and centralization, and abhors rigidity, is slowly but surely winning the battle against the eighteenth-century doctrinaires and the demagogues.

After the war of separation from the mother State

¹ "Although England was not firmly cemented into ono State under Egbert, as is usually represented, yet the power of this monarch and the union of so many provinces opened the prospect of futuro tranquillity; and it appeared more probable that the Anglo-Saxons would thonceforth become formidable to their neighbours, than be exposed to their inroads and devastations."—Hume, chap. iii. A passage of modern applicability.

² "The union of the Germans has produced, under the name of an empire, a great system of a federative republic. In the frequent and at last the perpetual institution of diets the national spirit was kept alive and the powers of a common legislature are still exercised by the three branches or colleges of the electors, the provinces and the free and imperial cities."—Gibben.

and prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 there were thirteen small republics scattered along the Atlantic seaboard, each with distinct possibilities of nationhood, each with the germs within it of a separate North American race.¹ How widely the colonies differed has often been described. Bear in mind that communication was rendered difficult by distance and bad roads or no roads. It took as long to travel from Boston to Charleston as it would then take a European to go from Paris to St. Petersburg or from London to New York. What a field for speculation is thus afforded to the historical student by a contemplation of these states in embryo. While homogeneity now seems to be the law and destiny of those peoples sprung originally from the same ethnic stock, it may be retarded for centuries by the creation of national frontiers, by difference of language, of climate, of diet, of occupation, of chance conditions of existence. Differences far greater than those which could ever have distinguished the Angles from the Jutes, the Saxons from the Mercians, could they have maintained their petty boundaries for five hundred years, were inevitable for the Virginians, the New Yorkers, and the men of Massachusetts.

It is hard not to let the fancy dwell on the Virginian or Carolinian planter, with his high spirit, his feudal interests, his slaves, and his estates, gradually building up a form of government closely resembling that which was just then developing in the kingdom from which he had emigrated. There were boisterous demagogic spirits in Massachusetts, but the leaders, such as John

¹ In 1777, the form was "The United States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island," etc.

Adams, were not of this type. They were monarchists, as Washington was, and knew nothing and cared less about republics. But it was an unfortunate juncture for the conservative spirit in America. We do not need to be told now that it was not the fault of George III. and his ministers that the colonies revolted. If the king and Lord North of that day had been as wise and prudent as King Edward VII. and Mr. Chamberlain in our own time, human nature would have had its way. The colouist was baffled in his desire for power, he was cut off from England by slow sailing ships, he had lost touch with the old land, and the sentiment of loyalty languished. There were no fast ocean steamers, no electric telegraphs, no cheap international postal system, there was not even any popular press or popular literature to foster understanding between the old land and the new. But, above all, human nature in America wanted change, it wanted excitement, it wanted war. People who cannot understand this kind of doctrine, may be helped to it by a contemplation of the quickened sense of community in Australia and Canada since their participation in the hostilities in Africa—of increased contentment with political relationship, more self-reliance, a wider outlook, more local spirit.

The question for a long time before the people of the former colonies was whether they would be a united State or a set of separate commonwealths. They long tried to be both; but the issue has now been settled politically and economically by the unity and cohesion of the people, by their new responsibilities and possessions, by their international relations, by their commercial

prosperity, by the astounding growth of the federal power.¹

Look at the embryo republic; it was divided into the nation makers and the nation doubters, between the advocates of consolidation and the advocates of State sovereignty.² It was urged that a strong central government endangered both the rights of the States and the liberties of the individual citizen. Massachusetts and New York, in particular, were jealous of national power which might belittle their own pretensions. Indeed, it is the opinion of historians that had the decision been left to the people voting at a plebiscite, the principle of consolidating the States into a nation would have been defeated. Probably the real impelling power which carried the federal constitution was the dread of foreign powers, *i.e.* Spain and England. France, which had lately held territories to the north of them in Canada, and to the south and west of the Mississippi, was no longer feared.³

¹ "The confederation ought to be settled before the declaration of Independence," said Dickinson "of Pennsylvania in 1776."

"Foreigners will think it most regular; the weaker States will not be in so much danger of having disadvantageous terms imposed upon them by the stronger. . . . Upon the whole when things shall be thus deliberately rendered firm at home and favourable abroad, then let America, 'At tollens humeris fomomet fata nepotum,' bearing up her glory to the destiny of her descendants, advance with majestic steps to assume her station among the sovereigns of the world."

² "Instead of feeling as a nation, a State is our country. We look with indifference, often with hatred, fear, and aversion to the other States."—Fisher Ames, 1782.

³ The fear of foreign interference, the sense of weakness both on sea and on land against the military monarchies of Europe, was constantly before the mind of American statesmen, and made them anxious to secure at all hazards a national government capable of raising an army and navy, and of speaking with authority on behalf of the new Republic.—Bryce, "American Commonwealth."

Washington having boldly given it as his opinion that the ill-made league of States was "no better than anarchy," a convention therefore met in 1787, and after five months' labour and much diversity of opinion, natural amongst a people so heterogeneous, produced a Constitution which 31 out of the 55 delegates signed.¹

Well, the Constitution was presented, and, in spite of much opposition, endorsed by the people of the States. But there was yet no strong nation born: it was more a federal pact, a league of neighbour commonwealths. There was nothing, for instance, in the Constitution to prevent any State withdrawing from the Union. A bloody war was to establish solidarity.

At the outset of the Republic's career we see the two forces; the forces which are at play in every government amongst every people in the world, even amongst the Chinese. Alexander Hamilton, statesman and an aristocrat by choice, represented the desire for nationhood, for power; the monarchical tendency; Thomas Jefferson, a great thinker and a greater demagogue, stood for decentralization, State sovereignty and futility.²

How clearly it is seen now that to the Jeffersonian doctrine was immediately due the secession of South

¹ "By adopting this Constitution," urged the delegate from Pennsylvania, "we shall become a nation; we are not now one. We shall form a national character: we are now too dependent on others."

² "To balance," declared Hume, "a large State or society, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great a difficulty that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of reason and reflection to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labour; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconvenience must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first trials and experiments."—Essays, "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."

Carolina and its sister States in 1860, which plunged the country into civil strife. What more interesting feature of the history of the American Republic than this internal struggle of the forces making for nationality and solidarity against opposing tendencies?

The two movements are for ever warring, the impetus in either direction being furnished by events.¹ After Washington's death the band between the States becomes loosened; the novelty of the federal pact has gone;² Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, New York and Virginia have but little in common. The States have no literature; there are no national politics; there is no national purpose. What happened in 1860 would have happened a decade sooner if the principles of Jefferson and disintegration had not been suddenly checked by the war of 1812. There was only one rallying point for all the States, and that was hatred of England, "a good robust family hatred." The cry of war brought the States together again: the federal power was exalted for a time, and the States were duly depressed.

On the heels of this war, which produced pride in the Army and Navy, followed boastfulness and State-consciousness. Again the aggregation of States yearned

¹ Mr. Bryce reminds us that a large part of the history of Europe consists of a struggle, often involving the use of force, to make the peoples give up their local prejudices and privileges for the sake of national requirements.

² "Sir, I confess it," said Josiah Quincy in Congress in 1811, "the first public love of my heart is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. There is my fireside; there are the tombs of my ancestors."—Putnam's "American Orations," i. p. 168. A majority of the people, we are told by Mr. Cabot Lodge, at the outset "turned longingly back towards the days of a shattered confederacy and sovereign states, and looked with morbid suspicion on everything, no matter what, which tended to lend strength or dignity to the Central Government."

for nationhood and international prestige. They were tired of standing aloof and inert; and the Monroe doctrine, of which our British statesman, Canning, made them a free gift, they seized upon with pleased alacrity. Again were the national tendencies in the growth of a central power checked in 1823 by Jackson; but they broke out anew in 1848 with the war with Mexico. This war was, however, in the interests of the South; and the southern planters, having tasted of the sweets of power, were not long in wishing it for themselves.

For by this time the artificial ties which kept the sections of America together had grown irksome. At the outbreak of the Civil War there was really little in common between the people of the northern and southern States; or between East and West. But the federal bond and federal power, which had grown weak, was strengthened in the majority of States by the war. Now we shall see how it has been strengthened to such a pitch in all the States that the term State really suggests little except a geographical boundary. To speak of America, as Mr. Bryce does somewhere, as a union of partially sovereign States is to cite an historical, but not an actual, fact.¹ We might as well speak of United Cantons of Switzerland, or the United Counties of England, or the United Departments of France, as of the United States of America, otherwise than in a purely official and nominal sense² (see Appendix A).

¹ Mr. Bryce makes clear elsewhere, however, that the "political importance of the States is no longer what it was." "The truth is that the State has shrivelled up."—"American Commonwealth," vol. ii. p. 189.

² All this was prophesied in the Convention. "The destruction of the

After the war there came what is inevitable in public opinion, reaction.

The centrifugal forces broke out anew from 1876 to 1888, with a brief lapse or two, covering a portion of Mr. Arthur's administration. It must be understood that manifold causes and incidents which do not affect the laws or the Constitution play their part in influencing public opinion. Thus Mr. Garfield's long illness by arousing universal sympathy kept the eye of the nation focussed on the dial-plate of national power. The country is so vast and the population so scattered, local politics so turbulent, the passion for money-getting so absorbing, that it needed these factitious aids to keep the public eye on the Federal capital. An era of peace, an unepisodic administration—such as that of Grant or Hayes, and the centripetal forces waver and weaken. The egregious Venezuelan manifesto of President Cleveland was certainly a factor in national unification. The whole country thrilled at finding itself through the action of its chief executive shaking its fist at Great Britain. But the most dramatic of all these unifying factors has been the recent war with Spain. The most dramatic—not, perhaps, the greatest. There are many causes for America's rapid, political, social, economic, and intellectual homogeneity within the present generation. Chief amongst these I am inclined to place the marvellously increased means of communication.

States as commonwealths is assured. The Central Government will gradually encroach upon their powers; it will use the federal army to overcome their resistance; will supplant them in the respect of their citizens; will at last swallow them up." "The creation of a despot in the person of the President" was also confidently predicted (see "Elliott's Debates").

Consider the following passage from Sir John Seeley in its application to America :—

“Perhaps,” he wrote, “we are hardly alive to the vast results which are flowing in politics from modern mechanism. Throughout the greater part of human history the process of State-building has been governed by strict conditions of space. For a long time no high organization was possible, except in very small states. In antiquity the good States were usually cities, and Rome herself, when she became an empire, was obliged to adopt a lower organization. In medieval Europe states sprang up which were on a larger scale than those of antiquity, but for a long time these, too, were lower organisms, and looked up to Athens and Rome with reverence as to the homes of political greatness; but through the invention of the representative system these states have risen to a higher level. We now see States with vivid political consciousness on territories of 200,000 square miles, and with populations of thirty millions. A further advance is now being made. The Federal system has been added to the representative system, and at the same time steam and electricity have been introduced. From these improvements has resulted the possibility of highly organized States on a yet larger scale. Thus Russia in Europe has already a population of nearly eighty millions on a territory of more than two millions of square miles, and the United States will have by the end of the century a population as large for a territory of four millions of square miles.”¹

We must not blind ourselves to the possibility of reaction, of repeated vacillations, of haltings, of retrocessions on the part of the American nation in its movement towards integration, solidarity, and world-power. Centralization certainly means one-man power: but even in America the political economists seem agreed that this is by no means an unmixed evil. Nowhere in the universe has one-man power attained, at least in

¹ “Expansion of England,” Lecture VIII.

party politics, in commerce and industry, to such heights as it presents in America. But whether the theorists agree to disagree with Jefferson and his fellow-democrats or not, it is none the less certain that human nature, its needs and aspirations, will have its way. Even that arch-radical Leigh Hunt, who was himself half an American, and was sent to prison for his passing freedom of speech, had this to say at the close of a long life—

“May royalty exist as long as reasonableness can outlive envy, and ornament be known to be one of nature’s desires. . . . Peaceful and reasonable provision for the progress of mankind towards all the good possible to their nature, from orderly good manners up to disinterestedness sentiments, is the great desideratum in government; and thinking this more securely and handsomely maintained in monarchies than republics, I am for English permanence, in this respect, in preference to French mutability and American electiveness.”

But, after all, the fact is obvious, America has altered her front to the world. There is scarcely any department of her national life which has not been metamorphozed. Whether we read the literary remains of the early Americans, or the comments and descriptions of foreigners, such as De Tocqueville, the Trollopes (mother and son), even of Mr. Bryce, we are equally astonished at the changes which are revealed to-day.

Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, and the rest thought they were laying the foundation of a fabric, the like of which had never been contemplated by man since Eden. Its simplicity, its sanity, its purity, its quiet, sober strength, its aloofness and loftiness were to shame the effete countries of Europe. How ridiculous now sounds Benjamin Franklin’s phrases to Lord Howe: “Britain’s

pride and unwisdom, her fondness for conquest, her lust of dominion, her thirst of monopoly," etc. Is it any wonder Europe laughs? And yet Franklin was a wise man—fit for Plato's republic; but hardly for the one in the middle regions of North America.

Then take Jefferson's tiresome platitudes about the people, his view of the Presidency, his view even of the Federal Government. Jefferson said that the Federal Government would never be anything "more than the American department of foreign affairs."

"Many considerations," said Madison,¹ "seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States." They were all wrong, these men: all but a handful of scers like Washington and Hamilton; but they might have been right if America had continued to be the United States of their day, if America had even continued to be the Massachusetts of young Emerson's and Thoreau's day—before the shrieking Abolitionites came to set everybody by the ears, and the Irish came to replac the New England husbandmen and mechanics, and to manage their politics.

After all, the fabric as designed by the architects of the Constitution has not stood as they meant it to stand: it has not kept to the original plan. The building has gone on, and the work, as so far completed in this year of grace 1902, seems to us to bear a very strong resemblance to other and older institutions of the kind. More and more, faster and faster, does the process and assimilation go on until we now rub our astonished eyes and behold an American empire arisen,

¹ *Federalist*, No. XLIII.

with alien races, bowing the knee to a ruler who sits at Washington, lacking the crown and sceptre it is true, because the wisdom of symbols, although dimly grasped, is not yet practised in the newer state. All the old theories are flung to the winds; all the old pretensions to simplicity. Such luxury as was never heard of in Imperial Rome is practised universally in America: the luxury and improvidence of carelessly gained wealth. An aristocracy, not as ungenerously charged, merely of money, but of manners and culture, is growing, and class distinctions are widely and properly recognized. Slowly a National Church arises from the dead level of Baptistery and Methodism. Poverty as hideous as any in the old world slinks in the slums of the great cities. Homicide and crime is commoner than in Europe. Yet, side by side with these conditions, there are the correlatives of highly organized states: scholarship, munificence, art and letters, a widespread desire for leisure and moral culture.

Briefly, then, after a long period of backwoods seclusion, of introspection—of quarantine, shall we say?—America emerges more tolerant and to us more tolerable. The rough edges are being worn from her character; fifty years ago she spurned the cup as an unholy thing, but now she drinks deep of the draught of Europe, and gives the old lands that flattery which is the sincerest of all flattery, and promises us—the other nations of the earth—a boon companionship.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

"If," Mr. Goldwin Smith tells the Americans, "you have an empire, you will have an emperor, not perhaps, in the Old World form of a man crowned and sceptred, yet in the shape of centralized and practically autocratic power." "There are only two absolute monarchies in the modern world," remarks M. Bourget, "Russia and America."¹

Let us look into this matter of the growth of Presidential power. We are all of us to-day—democrats and aristocrats—bound hand and foot by those feudal definitions. An *emperor* means merely the ruler of an empire: a *king* (according to Professor Skcat) is only the elected chief of a people: a *monarch* is the supreme ruler. May not *president*, so simple, so innocent in its origin, yet come to signify arbitrary power?²

¹ The base wretch who murdered President McKinley declared, "I shot him because he was the ruler, and held such power as I do not think any man should have."

² Boundless power is not incompatible with the absence of personal pomp and even of titular distinction. The Americans are only following the example of the Romans. "The kingly power in the United States of Australia," remarks Sir Robert Stout, "is less than the President's power in the United States of America. Practically, the kingly power is a mere name. It has no actuality . . . practically the Parliament of the Commonwealth in its limited legislative sphere is supreme. It is true there is a veto power in the

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When the founders of the republic divided what Jefferson held to be a necessary evil, the national government, into the three branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial, they intended that while each of these three branches should be independent of each other, in Congress, as representing the people, was to reside the major power.

How little they would have credited the prophet who should have told them that the President would become the most important factor in the government!¹

Yet slowly, but surely, the powers of the executive have evolved, until the President has for some time had ascendancy over the legislative and judicial. Now the office and its occupant have taken a stride further. Let us see what the President's position is at present based upon—

1. His command of the Army and Navy.
2. His command of the administrative system, including control of the offices and the initiative of administrative work.
3. His veto power.
4. The fact that by the elimination of any independent

Governor-General: but the Governor-General must act even in vetoing a Bill, as he is advised by his ministers." On the other hand, "The kingly power of the United States of America is very much in evidence, and this has been recognized by Americans." See "Abolition of the Presidency," by H. C. Lockwood.

¹ "A king for the United States when they first established themselves was impossible. A total rupture from the Old World and all the habits became necessary for them. The name of a king, or monarch, or sovereign had become horrible in their ears. Even to this day they have not learned the difference between arbitrary power retained in the hand of one man, such as that now held by the Emperor over the French, and such hereditary hardship in the States as that which belongs to the Crown in Great Britain."
—Anthony Trollope, *North America*.

action by the presidential electors he has become the direct agent of the national popular will.

It is worthy of note that in none of the wars in which America has been engaged, has the President been so directly concerned with the movements of the armies and fleets as in the conflict with Spain. In that war, for the first time in American history, the President realized in practice the constitutional provision that the President shall actually lead and command in war. At all times, throughout the few brief weeks of hostilities, the President was in telegraphic touch of both land and naval forces. In the concentration of war-ships and transports, and mobilization of armed battalions at points on the sea-board or in the disembarkation of American troops on foreign soil, both were never beyond his instant control. Although these facilities for immediate communication between the Commander-in-Chief of the active fighting force were not absolutely new or novel, since they have been applied by Great Britain in many of her colonial wars, yet the practice awakened the rapturous enthusiasm of the Americans.¹

By virtue of what is termed the war-powers of the Constitution, the President has become as powerful as any living monarch, the autocratic ruler of hundreds of thousands of people in Cuba and of millions of people

¹ "The great Cæsar at the head of his invincible legions tramped over most of the known world of his day in his career of conquest. The great Bonaparte from his snow-white battle-steed surveyed the field and met and delivered the wager of conflict. The foremost citizen of this republic, McKinley, from his official residence at the American capital, at the touch of a button put in motion fleets which in a few brief hours changed the maps of two continents, and placed a nation, for centuries the foremost in the world, prostrate and powerless at his feet!" I extract this gem of rhetoric from the pages of a popular American magazine.

in the Spanish possessions of the Orient. To paraphrase those invidious personal charges contained in the Declaration of Independence concerning George III.—

He has appointed and removed officials without asking the co-operation of the Senate.

He has framed tariff schedules independently of Congressional action.

He has established Governments at his own will and pleasure.

He has exerted undue pressure upon the people's representatives to force them to do his will.

He has issued public mandates "By the authority of the President" contrary to the Constitution, etc.

In brief, "the pivot," exclaims one patriot, "upon which we as a nation revolve is no longer the Capitol, where the people's representatives assemble, but the White House, where one man sits in almost supreme power."¹

Congress seems to have abdicated. The laws promulgated by the American authorities² in the Philippine Islands declared that they were enacted "by the authority of the President of the United States," a phrase up to then unknown in American History.

In 1898 the President declared that no privateering would be resorted to by the nation. Whence did the President derive his authority? not from the Constitution, which declared that Congress alone has the power "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and sea."

Two years earlier President Cleveland called upon

¹ H. L. West, *The Forum*, March, 1901.

² Report of the Taft Commission.

Congress to provide at once for an independent American Commission to fix the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. From what source did the President derive his power to induce Congress to comply with his demand? Not from the Constitution.

The growing power of the President is a thing long foreshadowed. Even Jefferson, who feared Washington might desire to be made King, and who believed in always following the initiative of the people, achieved a very bold and arbitrary thing in purchasing Louisiana. But after its purchase he did not attempt to govern the newly acquired territory without a delegation of authority from Congress. With this precedent in view, it was suggested in 1898-99 that similar legislation be enacted to legalize the action of President McKinley; but the suggestion was promptly quashed by the friends of the executive; and it was not until the burden of governing became onerous that the President felt compelled to ask Congress for relief.

Yet subsequently Congress "refused to restrain the importation of liquor into those islands"—a traffic then assuming enormous proportions—because the executive authority was admitted to be supreme.

But in the case of war abnormal conditions arise. The people, in the present case, more than ever absorbed in commercial affairs, and more than ever disposed to place confidence in the President, acquiesced without a murmur. The results of the war with Spain may, without exaggeration, be said to have intoxicated the nation, to have opened such a new and brilliant vista of world-power before their eyes that they would not have protested had the executive gone to even greater lengths.

Nay, they would have taken pride in it.

It is already, as we shall see, a recognized axiom in Congress, and particularly in the Senate, "that it is futile to oppose a President and his administration."¹

But it must not be supposed by the inquirer into the phenomena of the New America, that the increased power of the ruler is an abnormal condition, that it is wholly confined to the rare periods of war. The domination of the President has extended and is extending by reason of causes which operate daily in times of peace.

It has been remarked that the lines along which the legislative, executive, and judicial divisions of the Government were laid down are no longer equal to themselves or parallel to each other. The legislative and judicial are merging towards the executive. I am strongly inclined to think that those who have diagnosed the situation, while enumerating some of the causes, have not been at pains to seek out the chief cause, which I have already hinted at and desire to make plainer later on in this chapter.

But, at the same time, it is as well to capitulate some of the popular and more obvious factors in the executive power. The first of these is the recourse which the President has to the national treasury. Nothing is clearer than that the hand which is able to distribute thousands of offices, involving millions of pounds sterling, is the hand of power. The lavish distribution of places for which President Jackson's

¹ As one journalist puts it: "The pathway of national politics is strewn with the corpses of men who have attempted the fatal task of opposing a President of the United States."

administration became notorious was but trivial in comparison with the patronage in the gift of a President to-day.

To the President of the United States is given the opportunity to divert this stream where and whither he will—into the pockets generally of his personal friends, but invariably to the financial benefit of his political supporters. If money is the lever that rules the world, the President can dispense it with a largesse that is startling.

"Picture, for instance, the President standing beside the public vaults, with one arm plunged elbow-deep into the overflowing treasury, while the other is distributing the golden store to a greedy horde of eager men!" For this dazzling image, I hasten to add that I am indebted to Mr. Litchfield West, a personal friend of the late President McKinley, whose admiration for the man did not, he assures us, make him less alive to the fearful terrors of one-man power. Postmasters, collectors of custom, revenue officials, marshals, attorneys, consuls, foreign ministers—all these and more are among the recipients of the President's bounty. That we may not be accused of dealing in loose generalities, if we turn to the records of the various administrative departments at Washington, we may ascertain the actual number of offices which are directly filled by the President, with the amount of the annual salaries attached thereto.

<i>State, Department</i> , 318 consular and diplomatic appointments	\$1,000,000
<i>Treasury Department</i> , 743 customs, revenue, marine, hospital, etc.	617,355

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Post Office Department, 4015 postmasters	...	\$6,931,000
Interior Department, 747 pension officials, land office agents, etc.	1,997,640
Department of Justice, judges, attorneys, marshals, etc.	1,126,000

With regard to the latter, it deserves to be noted that the appointment of the federal judiciary is entirely in the hands of the President, but, what is more to the purpose, instances abound of late where the tenor of a forthcoming legal decision has been accurately predicted through a knowledge of the political complexion of the Court.

In 1901 the Senate did not scruple to confirm the appointment of a son of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court as Attorney-General of Porto Rico, at a time when the Court had under consideration a decision of vital concern to the administration. At the same time the son of another Justice of the Supreme Court found little difficulty in obtaining his promotion in the Army over the heads of many of his fellow-officers. Is it surprising to be told that these favours yield their fruit? We in monarchical countries are accustomed to instances of family patronage: we do not observe any flagrant public disadvantage arising from the practice; but in America the fact that it is unusual creates a conscious condition of its usefulness, and its very novelty disturbs the morale of the public service. Such a condition will naturally tend to adjust itself, until the rule that the son of a minister has greater claims than other men to office, will obtain tacit recognition. *Noblesse oblige* is a motto not yet understood in America.

To return to the President's patronage. The total sum involved for departments named is between \$11,000,000 and \$12,000,000 annually, the whole of which goes into the pockets of the persons whom the ruler personally selects, or whose appointment, solicited by senators and representatives, he approves. But how insufficient is this sum when we have as yet omitted entirely the war and navy departments, which offer fewer opportunities for obtaining the precise figures. It will be enough to say that, within the last few years, the President has been authorized to make enormous additions to the list of army and navy officers whose pay will reach into the millions of dollars. On the whole, a moderate estimate—taking into consideration the \$12,000,000 above specified and added thereto the military and naval list (for the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Forces), the unclassified appointments and new offices created annually—of the total distribution effected by the President would reach the sum of \$20,000,000. I have seen it given as \$30,000,000; but, in any case, the total distribution during his term of office would not fall short of \$80,000,000, or £16,000,000 sterling.

Patronage, it need hardly be urged, on such a scale is an engine of tremendous political power. Whether this engine has been or could be employed to achieve definite results desired by an American President I will leave the student of recent history in the republic to decide for himself. It is alleged that certain definite results have been achieved, certain exhibitions of personal power which an English king or Prime Minister might envy. When, for example, President Cleveland took

office in 1893 he found that Congress had passed a law which provided for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver each month. The President took it into his head to secure the repeal of this Statute. He did not confine his interests in this repeal to the message which he delivered to Congress at an opening of the extraordinary session of that body which he convened. That, it was observed, was his constitutional limitation; but on this occasion the President seemed determined to illustrate how much greater is the individual power of the executive than that of the representatives of the nation. He therefore brought to bear upon the legislative branch of the Government an amount of personal pressure unequalled, in time of peace, in the history of the republic.

It was well known to the readers of the newspapers at that juncture how the emissaries of the President thronged the Halls of the Congress, stories were told of "strange and remarkable conversions" which were wrought through "influences which emanated from the White House." Neither the President nor any of his Cabinet have seats in Congress: they could not personally and verbally urge there the repeal. But the Bill passed and went to a hostile Senate, who had resolved not to pass the measure. Here, again, the power of the President proved too strong; and there then arose the maxim, "It is futile to oppose the President."

Since this episode there have occurred others, not less striking, as, for instance, the power exerted by the President in favour of the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain; while the history of the passage

of the Porto Rican Tariff Bill exhibits clearly the spectacle of Congress bending its will at the behest of the ruler.

All this increased power was not among the things written down by the men who framed the Constitution.

It belongs to the unwritten Constitution of America, which, as we shall see, is growing up and covering the naked framework of the eighteenth-century instrument. It cannot be denied that the President's new power owes something to patronage reposed in him. Men whose political life depends upon the distribution of federal offices to themselves or their friends, will naturally defer to the man who is able adroitly to dangle the golden prizes just above their heads.

This may be deplorable, but it is only human nature after all. The fault lies with the system which renders it necessary for the President occasionally to use this lever. England has long since abolished the system; America must do so. It is this which enables a President to secure his renomination to office, notwithstanding the hostility of a strong minority in his party. At the Minneapolis National Convention of 1892, Mr. Harrison (himself an illustration of the increased respect manifested for hereditary claims) was renominated through the efforts and votes of office-holders appointed by him.

Granted that the President's power is partly due to his bounty, I believe it to be still more largely attributable to the spirit of centralization which characterizes the New America in a marked degree. The centripetal forces arise in the smallest and most remote villages, in the smallest and remotest States, and go to

swell the quotient of power which is being consolidated at Washington.

Communities need a figure-head; human nature dislikes an oligarchy. How much a democracy is capable of being dominated by a demagogue possessing eloquence and a personality is shown in the dramatic nomination of Mr. Bryan for the Presidency in 1896. With the lowering of the prestige of the States comes the necessity for a National leader, and in the President the people find one ready made. Their representatives in Congress are only representative when they leave the bosom of the electors. It is in the power of a President to disregard them by placing himself instantly *en rapport* with the whole people, who instantly respond to his hegemony.¹

We are, by the way, witnessing the same phenomenon in the British Empire, where the power of the Crown has within the last few years enormously increased by reason of the personal influence which it is able to exert, especially in the Kingdoms over-seas, over public opinion, which it would be rash for any British statesmen to disregard. More and more do the Colonies grow impatient of any restraint imposed upon them by the British Parliament, more and more do they tender their allegiance to the Imperial Crown. It is the symbol—no matter who the wearer—of their Imperial Unity. Americans are less impersonal; they are only in the infancy of symbolism; they expend their stock of loyalty in other ways. Womanhood in the

¹ It is certain that the election of a politician to the exalted office of President invests him with a sense of national responsibility which is superior to party. That there have been a few instances when the President has elevated party above country only proves the rule.

abstract—a symbol; the national flag—another symbol. Yet the Presidential chair is gradually coming to be the centre and cynosure, the badge and the revered emblem of American world-power.

The late President's progress through California equalled that of any crowned head in the old world. It was a continuous ovation. The pathway of the chief of the New American Empire was, we are assured by an eye witness, literally strewn with roses, and all sorts and conditions of men and women united in doing him honour.

Curious illustrations of the increased respect and consideration for the ruler are to be found in the proposition to rebuild the executive mansion on a scale of great magnificence. In furnishing his Excellency with a body-guard and liveried out-riders, we see merely a return to Washingtonian practice. Did not the first President ride to open Congress in a coach-and-six, "like an English King?"¹ I cannot forbear to cite one other instance, of still more recent occurrence.

The yacht *Mayflower*, which was purchased by the American Government at the time of the war with Spain, has just been refitted and refurnished, and put in commission for the use of President Roosevelt.

The despatch-boat *Dolphin* had hitherto been used as a Presidential yacht, but the *Mayflower* is a much larger and finer vessel, her displacement being 2690 tons, while the *Dolphin's* is only 1486 tons.

¹ The Federalist suggestion that the image and symbols on the coinage might be made to have an educational bearing led in the early days of the republic to a proposal to stamp the head of the President on the coins. This proposal led to a heated debate. The suggestion has since been adopted with regard to the postage, although the head is not that of the reigning President.

There was a great public outcry when President Cleveland took the *Dolphin* for his private use, and the fact that public money was voted for a new Presidential yacht shows the great change in public opinion in ten years in America.

More power will come: a government with ever-increasing interests and responsibilities cannot be "carried on by negatives." It is absurd to expect that the head of an administrative system should sit with folded hands waiting upon the pleasure of a body made up of persons not responsible in any way for that administration, and each acting under strong pressure from local and private interests.

The Americans are great time-savers, and the President can prepare and promulgate laws more promptly than Congress, which occupies too much time in adjusting conflicting questions. He can, in the same manner, instantly remedy any defects—a process which could not be achieved by Congress without tedious delay.

"It is easy to foresee the result," says Mr. Gamaliel Bradford,¹ speaking of a noisy and intriguing Congress. "A military Dictator will arise and sweep it away." "Our one hope of escape," he adds, "is by strengthening the executive."

If only the executive could realize, in times of crisis, that the greater evil to the commonwealth lies in the non-exercise of the power reposed in him by the people!

¹ "American Politics" vol. ii. p. 522.



CHAPTER III

EXPANSION AND IMPERIALISM

THE year 1898 was one of the epoch-marking years in the history of America.

In that *annus mirabilis* was decided the momentous question whether the United States were to continue their policy of political isolation, or were, as a united State, to take up a position amongst the world-powers, and, in the language of one native writer, "assume the unselfish obligations and responsibilities demanded by the enlightened civilization of the age."¹

Prestige, we do not need to be told, is as highly valued by nations as by individuals. It was absurd to suppose that the inherited racial instincts, the restless activities and the aggressive enterprise of the American

¹ During that fateful year the introspectiveness of Americans and the appeals of the articulate ones, such as politicians and editors, became pathetic. Take, at random, such a *cri du cœur* as this, which I call from a prominent organ of public opinion: "Will our own people never learn that we are a nation? Have we shed vast quantities of blood and spent countless treasure in vain? Are we still to stand manacled before the world by the doctrine that we are a confederacy of sovereign states?" The writer then proceeds to quote the Supreme Court's dictum that "the United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective."

people would for ever remain content with political and commercial isolation.¹

As to the war with Spain, it was, beyond all question, sprung on the nation at large with dramatic suddenness. In the first instance, the Senate, according to Senator Platt, was evidently bent on bringing about a war; that body was backed up by the politicians who anticipated the usual effect on the coming elections; then there was the Yellow Press, and lastly, and perhaps the most important factor, the destruction of the *Maine*.² This lamentable episode fired the popular heart and precipitated a conflict. The cry: "To hell with Spain! Remember the Maine!" swept through the land. The rest was inevitable.

It has been said that when the Revolutionary War broke out men did not dream of independence; that at

¹ Mere expansionism, however, is hardly a new policy with America. She has been acquiring new territory ever since the first Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, when we renounced all jurisdiction over what afterwards became the North-West Territory. In 1803, Napoleon ceded, for twelve million dollars, the Territory of Louisiana. Spain ceded Florida in 1819. Oregon was claimed by discovery, and Spain acknowledged the claim in the last-mentioned year. Texas was annexed in 1845, and three years later, California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and parts of Arizona were forcibly acquired from Mexico. Horse-shoe Reef in Lake Erie was weakly ceded by Great Britain in 1850. The Navassas and other Guano islands in the Pacific were occupied by discovery. Alaska was acquired by purchase from Russia in 1867, and Hawaii was annexed in 1898.

² Mr. Goldwin Smith, who enumerates these causes, thinks the De Lome letter may also have played a part.

Yet one cannot justify America's conduct in the long struggle before the war. Spain failed to put down the rebellion in Cuba, because the insurgents were liberally supplied with money and armaments from America. That distinguished diplomat, Mr. E. J. Phelps, said: "The rebellion in Cuba would long ago have perished from exhaustion had it not been supported and supplied by continual expeditions from this country in violation of our own neutrality laws and treaty obligations."

the beginning of the Civil War no man thought of abolishing slavery. Wars rarely keep within projected bounds. Personal ambition, national self-seeking, are the factors which control the issue of events.

Dewey's victory at Manilla changed the attitude of America before the world. The Americans had, as we have seen, entered into the war blindly; they had worked themselves up into a furious anger against Spain, or certain of their newspapers¹ had done it for them, and they resolved to put an end to the Cuban "atrocities." But they had no apprehension of whither their declaration of war would lead them. In the chaste language of one of their backwoods philosophers, they had "hitten off more than they could chew." For a moment, when the realization of their achievement came, the nation was embarrassed. But he who knows the American character will hardly need to be told that the embarrassment was of brief duration. The mastication was begun, but, alas! mastication is followed by another and more difficult process: digestion.

It is said that after the signing of the Treaty which ceded the Philippine Islands to America, Senor Sagasta, the Spanish Premier, exclaimed, "Now is Spain avenged." The remark was significant.

The Philippines have already cost America nearly 500,000,000 dollars.²

¹ Mr. C. F. Adams, a leading American publicist, admits that the discussion of vital, national questions has been left almost wholly to "the professional journalist and the professional politician." He adds that in the Congressional debates for nearly fifty years, which he remembers, it is impossible to recall "a single utterance which has stood the test of time, as marking a distinct addition to mankind's intellectual belongings." This is a severe indictment: but is it not true?—See "Lee at Appomatox," 1902.

² The expansions and dominations, now almost encircling the globe,

The numerous seaboard cities cannot be fortified under 30,000,000 dollars. The army of occupation distributed throughout the island cannot safely be reduced to less than 30,000 men, costing 45,000,000 dollars per annum.¹

All this was costly, both in money and men, but it was nothing to the moral shock given to the country by the adoption of "Imperialism."

Let us have a few home definitions of Imperialism at random from both sides of public opinion :

1. A theory of national policy in accordance with which the United States is to add to its territorial possessions for the purpose of extending American trade and American political influence.

2. We are to change our traditional policy of independence and non-participation in the general politics of the world, and to adopt a policy of territorial expansion, of wide contact and control.

entored upon by Congress have cost the people of America a very great expenditure of blood and treasure, and a severe shock to the ideas of liberty, self-government, and equality, which used to be thought fundamental, and which we professed (sincerely, it is to be hoped) when we declared war against Spain."—Senator Edmunds.

¹ "There is but slight encouragement to believe that the actual force of about 45,000 men now there can be soon materially reduced, and none to hope that the resources of the country, so greatly impoverished by many years of war, will ever be adequate to do more than support its own Civil list and constabulary. Therefore, there is entailed on the United States the heavy burden of about 67,500,000 dollars per year, merely for police purposes in a country which evidently cannot become more than self-supporting."—Major J. H. Parker, Civil Administrator in the Philippines.

"Doubtless the American people will be sorry to be assured that a permanent army of 40,000 soldiers will be required to hold the Philippines; but conservative officers on the spot are convinced that this view of the situation is correct."—General Wesley Merritt.

The Governor-General, Judge Taft, told the Senate that it "would have been better had we never gone there."

3. We are to have colonies and dependencies, coaling-stations and "keys."¹ We are to acquire military and naval influence and a reputation for physical prowess.

4. Imperialism means political tyranny and meddlingness; greedy scrambling for territory, offensive and defensive alliances, and a stultification of the principles upon which the republic was founded.

So far Imperialism. But, first of all, had America the right, under her constitution, to acquire and govern territory beyond her borders? There is certainly no constitutional provision such as Jefferson wished to create,² but in its absence there is ample precedent. America obtained Louisiana and Alaska by purchase, occupied Florida by force, took California and New Mexico as spoils of war, and annexed Texas and Hawaii.

Yet this is to be noted; it has always been distinctly understood that a territorial government was preliminary to statehood, it was to be replaced by a state organization directly the size of the population warranted such a step. The idea of a permanent territory, with no prospect of ultimate recognition as a

¹ The favourite theory of the American strategists is that the next great war in which America will be involved must be fought in the Caribbean Sea, and that Hayti and San Domingo will then be valuable naval bases, more important even than Porto Rico, Cuba, or the Danish West Indies, owing to their proximity to the Panama Canal.

The recent trouble in San Domingo and the revolution in Hayti have led to a renewed discussion at Washington of the question of annexation by America, but no movement has been initiated officially towards that end.

² "Jefferson sought to quiet his strict constructionist conscience (after purchasing Louisiana) by empty talk about a suitable constitutional amendment; but nothing came of it, nor has the matter been at any time seriously considered."—Wm. MacDonald.

State, and subject indefinitely to the immediate control of Congress, is foreign both to American theory and practice. It therefore follows that the chief danger of the new Imperialism lay in the inevitable demand from the new acquisitions for admission to the union as States, which America will be obliged to grant if she is to obey her present constitution, and to continue her historic national policy. If she refuse, and she will refuse, a new era in that policy commences, and a new constitutional amendment is foreshadowed. For the objections to the admission of Hawaii, or the Philippines, or any other region, as a State, with senators and representatives in Congress, participation in presidential elections, and an equal voice in the conduct of national affairs, could not be tolerated. Not even the foremost advocates of an Imperial America have espoused such a doctrine. Therefore there were two courses to be followed, either the relinquishment of the new possessions, or the permanent government of outlying districts as colonies in fact, if not in name.

The Philippine Act of March 2nd, 1901, provided that—

“All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippines acquired from Spain by the treaties concluded at Paris on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety eight, and at Washington on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for the establishment of Civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.”

In other words, any and all laws deemed necessary by the President were to be set up and executed ; Congress deposited all power in the agents of the President.

According to the old American formula the necessary foundation of government is the consent of the governed.¹ But of course this principle must be abandoned in the face of the Philippines which America has acquired by the sword, and which it may either retain, hand over to another power, or perhaps, barter for the West Indies at its pleasure without reference to the wishes of the people.

This, of course, implies that the old theories of equality and of universal suffrage are flung openly to the winds. The denial of suffrage to the blacks, previous to their manumission, was constitutionally explained. The Supreme Court had decided that they were not men, but chattels and real estate, they were not persons within the meaning of the constitution. When the emancipated slaves were given votes, this doctrine of universal suffrage was strained to the utmost, and now, as we shall see, shows signs of breaking down in practice throughout the Southern States. Its most ardent votaries are now aware of its weakness ; it is in the last degree likely they would seek to extend the doctrine to the horde of dark-skinned Sandwich or Philippine islanders, or to the fanatical blacks of the Antilles.

This is common sense, yet even common sense some-

¹ "The Almighty," as Lincoln expressed it, "never made a people good enough to rule over another people."

"Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than possible government of Filipinos by Americans," declares Mr. Schurman, Chairman of the Philippine Commission.

times spells inconsistency. It means an abandonment of old principles and ancient ideals. The attempt to deal with the people of the new possessions on terms less liberal than America has hitherto accorded to the lowest elements of her own cosmopolitan population, must be construed by foreign nations as a withdrawal from its previous advanced position. Not merely this, but it must likewise operate as a powerful argument in favour of the restriction of the suffrage of negroes and illiterates at home.

This proposition the anti-Imperialists deride: universal suffrage, they say, for continental Americans, no matter however ignorant and degraded, and restricted suffrage for Hawaiian or Philippine Americans, is a combination whose reactionary effect is to be dreaded.

The way such an argument is met is this: Had the founders of the republic attempted to apply the doctrines of equality which they proclaimed, the whole social fabric would very quickly have gone to pieces. But they one and all shrank from applying them. The very men upon whose lips were oftenest those phrases about the inalienable rights of man, went carefully to work and established State government in which these inalienable rights were accorded scant respect, in which manhood suffrage was disregarded. The ballot was bestowed upon property-owners, office-holding being confined to those citizens who owned lands and houses and possessed a sectarian qualification.

When territorial government was first set up by Congress, the broad principle existed that there was one kind of government for the States and another for the territories; that the just powers of the latter need not

be derived from the consent of the governed; that only such men as own land were fit to vote, and that only the select class who owned a great deal of land were fit to legislate: that the constitution limited the power of the federal government over the States; but that the will of Congress was supreme over the territories.

According to this principle, Congress was free to govern the dependencies of the United States as it pleased. The form of government of the territories need not even be republican: the people thereof might be taxed without any representation in the taxing body. They might be, and were, stripped absolutely of the franchise, and ruled by officials not of their own choice.

It is a curious fact, but America has had all these arguments on the subject of Imperialism threshed out before in her history. A century ago, criticism of the administration took almost an exactly similar form to that which it has recently taken concerning the government of the Philippines. And whatever the form of rule the President and his advisers have in store for the Philippines, it will probably be freer and more liberal than Jefferson gave to the people of Louisiana, and Monroe to Florida.

"The President proposes," said the *New York Herald*, of March 7, 1804, "to erect a government about as despotic as that of Turkey in Asia." The same journal a week or two later, contained the following, which is extraordinarily like some of the recent indictments against the administration:—

"The folly which supposes that the people of Louisiana are not so well qualified to enjoy political liberty as those hordes of

aliens and strangers who are continually intermeddling with our public concerns, will not always pass current with the people of America. Nor is it possible that any part of our empire can be long held in a state of vassalage even under the philosophic Jefferson. We revolted from Great Britain because her parliament taxed us without consent. Our colonies may adopt our principles. Even the limited monarchy proposed in the bill now under discussion in the House of Representatives, will not probably be established, and it is next to a certainty that the session will terminate leaving Mr. Jefferson in complete possession of all the despotic power which were lately acquired by the Spanish monarchy."

A fair idea, by the way, of America's historic government of dependencies can be gained without even venturing beyond her borders.

In the case of the Indian we have the abject failure of a democracy really trying to act fairly by the savage races—its precursors on the soil.

The result is to be ascribed in this instance to bad policy in its dealings with the Indians, in the second to the greed and corruption of the officials appointed to deal with the aborigines.

The state of the Indian territory which boasts half a million inhabitants, has long been a scandal; but it was made much worse by the appointment, in 1893, of the Dawes Commission. This body consists of four members who employ about a hundred clerks and servants. Its sole original mission was to effect new treaties with the five tribes of Indians occupying the country. Increased jurisdiction has been given to it by succeeding Congresses, and a new and increased appropriation. It did nothing except muddle matters, and for ten years has been popularly known as the "The Rock of Ages for shipwrecked politicians."

Up to the close of 1901, America was appropriating ten to fourteen million dollars a year to the Indians, and thousands of people were contributing largely to Indian education and missions. Yet the result of this system is not at all satisfactory. The education of generations of young Indians in well-equipped boarding schools had little or no effect upon the Indians on the reserves, where in many cases they were as savage as in the days of Pocahontas, and quite as incapable of maintaining themselves, leaving the Government to suffer through their idleness and poverty.¹

In the case of Cuba, America has, after much external pressure, literally redeemed her promise given before the war, to bestow self-government on the island.

But sovereignty is sometimes none the less real because judiciously veiled. Americans have surrendered much, but not everything; they still retain a right of veto and of intervention that practically makes of Cuba a vassal State. The foreign relations of the republic

¹ In 1902, America adopted a new policy, set out by President Roosevelt in his first message to Congress in December, 1901. The policy consisted in breaking up the tribal funds, giving to each man his individual allotment, and as rapidly as possible making the Indians citizens of America, instead of as formerly under tribal government, separate minor nations under the wardship under the United States Government. The President said—"In the schools the education should be elementary and largely industrial. The need of higher education among the Indians is very very limited. On the reservations care should be taken to try to suit the teaching to the needs of the particular Indians.

"There is no use in attempting to induce agriculture in a country suited only for cattle raising, where the Indian should be made a stock-grower."

The President strongly condemned the ration system which "promotes beggary, pauperism, and stifles industry," and he pointed the way to the passing of the Indian problem when he said, "The Indian should be treated as an individual—like the white man."

If this policy be continued, Indian reservations, Indian customs and habits will soon be something of the past.

are absolutely in the hands of the Washington Government, which have also a veto power over legislation increasing the Cuban debt, while it reserves to itself the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." Naval and coaling stations, too, have been demanded and ceded. Cuba, in short, while virtually a sovereign State in the management of its domestic affairs, is for all other purposes under a very strict American suzerainty. Such arrangements are seldom satisfactory. Sooner or later the desire to be all one thing or all the other is almost sure to upset them, and though there may be reasons of geography and relative strength why what has happened between us and the Boers need not necessarily be repeated between the Americans and the Cubans, still it will be surprising if their present relations continued indefinitely or even for any considerable period.

The Free Cuba, an independent and sovereign State, which was the dream of her revolutionary leaders, has been definitely abandoned, and a Cuba of limited powers—an American Protectorate—has arisen, not dissimilar to the protectorate which England exercises over Egypt.

It rests mainly with the Americans themselves to say whether the experiment will succeed. The United States are the obvious market for Cuban produce. In the old days, Spain provided an outlet, but that outlet has now been stopped by the action of the United States in releasing the island from Spanish rule. All the more reason why Americans should make up the deficiency by admitting Cuban sugar and tobacco at

reduced rates. President Roosevelt has urged this course upon Congress with all his force and earnestness, as a policy to which the country stands committed by every consideration of duty and honour. He has pressed for fifty per cent. reduction of the Dingley tariff in favour of Cuba. Governor Wood has certified that a reduction of 33½ per cent. is the very least that will benefit the island. Yet the Senate, at the bidding of the beet-sugar and other "interests," has refused to vote a remission of more than 20 per cent. This is a most ominous and significant step; it shows that the Senate has yet to learn the true spirit of empire. It is trying to govern Cuba in the interest of Americans instead of in the interests of Cubans. The consequence is that in its general commercial position the island is little better off to-day than it was under Spanish rule: and unless Americans speedily make some substantial concessions, the first President of the Cuban Republic may also be the last.

President Roosevelt's Cuban policy by no means commends itself to all his supporters. Nevertheless, it were strange if his power and influence, backed by his Cabinet and the House of Representation were not able to prevail over the Senate and open the gates of the tariff to Cuba. Curiously enough the Democrats unanimously support the President in his insistence that America is bound in honour to give commercial assistance to Cuba. Consequently there may be some foundation for the widespread belief that the Sugar Trust is the cause of the deadlock; but it is much more likely to be the Senate's desire to display his power over a President whom they cannot control, and whose sudden

exaltation the party leaders of Hannatype view with dismay. If so, they are making a dangerous experiment: the President's steadfastness in the Cuban policy has already won him the regard of the nation at large, with whom the Upper Chamber is not, to put it mildly, popular.

Cuba's annexation is a foregone conclusion, if the capitalists and jingoes have their way, and it will not be the worst thing that could happen to the island. The wonder is that it has not fallen long before into the hands of the Great Republic. John Quincy Adams, in 1823, when Secretary of State, predicted an annexation within fifty years.

"From a multitude of considerations," he wrote—"Cuba has become an object of transcendent importance to commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, the nature of its productions and of its wants, give it an importance in the sun of our national interests with which that of no foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of the Union together. Also, if it be not annexed, what is to be feared, and doubtless on good grounds, are the periodical revolts and miserable *pronunciamientos* which have distinguished the political history of all the other Latin-American republics. Why should Cuba be exempt from these? Her origin, her history, her people, her climate are the same."

On the other hand, I am ready to admit that, if the President's policy fail, Cuba, assured of the support of the other Latin nations of the Western hemisphere, who distrust and dislike America, *may* drift away, first commercially, and then politically, from the latter's domination.

CHAPTER IV

IMPERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

THREE years elapsed after the war with Spain, and America still found herself in the dilemma regarding the status of the annexed peoples. When we come to consider the antiquated constitution and the modern Supreme Court, we will see how inevitable it was that the latter body should come to the rescue and relieve the country from its embarrassment.

The constitution was made for the United States, not the United States for the constitution. It had been pointed out that to hang the entire administration of colonial possessions upon the single grant of power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory" of the United States, is to suspend an empire by a very slender thread.

In a letter addressed to Gallatin on the proposed purchase of Louisiana, Jefferson wrote—

"There is no constitutional difficulty as to the acquisition of territory, and whether, when acquired, it may be taken into the Union by the Constitution *as it now stands* will become a question of expediency."

Up to 1901 the great check on America's expansion beyond her geographical boundaries, or her power of conquering feebler States, was the general belief that

such territory, whenever annexed, was a potential State, and must ultimately be included within the Union.

It was thought that the constitution offered no alternative, and this being so, the American people regarded the admission of millions of coloured voters, or Catholic voters, or voters disaffected towards democracy, with alarm. How to get out of the difficulty?

They did not know the elastic nature of their constitution, its adaptability in the hands of clever men to any situation which may conceivably arise.

Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court came to alter completely the fundamental relations, of President and Congress, to the people of the American transmarine dependencies, so well to the inhabitants of the territories.

The first of these was that in the case of *De Lima v. Bidwell* (collector of the port of New York), in which it was ruled that instantly upon the cession of Porto Rico by Spain to the United States that island became part of America, and that duties could not be lawfully exacted upon merchandise coming thence after the cession and prior to special legislation on the part of Congress.

In the second case, *Downes v. Bidwell*, it was held that Congress could constitutionally impose duties not uniform but discriminative, throughout the United States, upon merchandise coming from Porto Rico after such legislation, because the latter was "not part of the United States within the meaning of the revenue clauses of the constitution."¹

¹ *I.e.* "that all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States."

However paradoxical these two decisions may appear they practically determine the powers of Congress over the people of all the American dependencies, until they are overruled by a differently organized court. Thus, it is declared that ceded territories become a part of the United States, but that their inhabitants are *not* entitled to the rights of American citizenship.¹

Judging by the first decision, the "uniformity" clause in the constitution applied to the territory, and this was probably the opinion of the majority of the members of the Supreme Court.

The second case dealt with a matter happening after the passage of the act creating a territorial government in Porto Rico. A legislative body, consisting of two branches, was provided for, and the appointment of a Governor and Attorney-General authorized, Courts were established, and leave given to litigants to appeal to the American Supreme Court. At the same time a duty was levied upon Porto Rican products brought into America, and the question now arose as to the validity of such a duty. If Porto Rico were part and parcel of America, the imposition of a duty was unconstitutional. One of the members, Mr. Justice Brown, settled the whole vexed question in his own mind, and, without the concurrence of any of his colleagues, delivered himself of an argument which rendered him at once famous. He maintained that "the constitution of the United States was formed by the thirteen States, and

¹ The first decision assumed this form: "We are therefore of opinion that at the time these duties were levied, Porto Rico was not a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff laws, but a territory of the United States, that the duties were illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover them back."

that its scope and authority were limited to the thirteen States, and to such States as might from time to time be added thereto." Furthermore, said he, the constitution did not, by its own force, extend to the possessions of the United States, whether created into territories with a regular form of government, or whether they were outlying unorganized possessions. There is no doubt that Mr. Justice Brown was historically correct in this opinion, because this was really the idea pervading the minds of the men who made the constitution. But American State policy and the spirit of Supreme Court rulings for three parts of a century have diverged from such a theory, until it came to be axiomatic that the territories, when organized, are *ipso facto*, brought within the scope of the constitution. In other words, that a territorial organization constitutes a pledge to the inhabitants that a territory will normally develop into a State of the Union.

Now, although a majority of the Supreme Court bench voted with Mr. Justice Brown against the legality of the customs exactions, they by no means agreed with his proposition that Porto Rico was a mere possession and not a potential State. They merely held that the constitution did not apply to the island, and consequently that the assessment of duties was illegal, in as much as under the constitution the uniformity clause was applicable to territories created by Act of Congress and duly organized. Nevertheless, their colleague's opinion is, in reality, sounder, and, in the long run, a safer doctrine. For while he voted for the appellants in the De Lima case, he only did so because Congress had not yet legislated for Porto Rico. Had Congress done

so, he was prepared to say that the act of imposing a duty of fifteen per cent. of the duties imposed under the Dingley tariff was perfectly legal. Porto Rico was not a foreign country, nor was it an integral part of America; but Congress could legislate, at its own discretion, for the tariff system of any dependency.¹

I am of opinion that Mr. Justice Brown's views have obtained very wide acceptance, and that he has made converts of his own colleagues. Yet there are some who believe that if a case should again arise, Porto Rico will be declared a territory, subject to the constitution, and therefore a potential State. And if Porto Rico, so also the Philippino Islands, so that it would follow that every dependency which America has acquired from Spain will be organized as a territorial government, and the constitution made applicable to them.

England's doubtful example in Canada will be no precedent in the case of America's treatment of her new possessions in the Philippines. Her chief object is to Americanize the former Spanish possessions as soon as possible, and to this end American political and judicial systems, American material civilization, and American education is to be introduced. One of the first steps is to make the learning of English obligatory in the schools, and to abolish as speedily as possible all Spanish. In official life and in the law courts, however, Spanish is to be permitted for five years, on account of past commission having had a free hand in reorganizing the government of the island.

¹ "Assuming always," remarks ex-Congressman Boutell, "what is not by every one admitted, that Congress has power to legislate beyond the scope of the constitution, from which its own authority to legislate is derived."

After five years English will be substituted, and it is thought that the undertaking will be facilitated because Spanish has never been the uniform language of the islands, neither has there been any uniform native tongues. Near Manilla a large proportion of the residents speak dialects of the Malay tongue, and know nothing of Spanish. The Philippines are divided into numerous tribes, each having a language of its own quite dissimilar and mutually incomprehensible. The Taft commission has revised the school system, and the teaching taken out of the hands of the religious orders which control it under the Spanish supremacy.

Congress will probably allow the President to continue his present quasi-military control, through the commission now at Manilla. It seems to be generally agreed that self-government cannot be established until the Filipinos shall have become more civilized; and Congress will probably wait until the future is more assured before enacting experimental legislation. Meanwhile the President holds out scant hope to the "equal rights" men with regard to the new American possessions.

"Peace and freedom," Mr. Roosevelt said, "are the objects for which they are fighting. Military power is used to secure peace, in order that it may be supplanted by civil governments. Other nations have conquered to create irresponsible military rule. We conquer to bring just and responsible civil government to the conquered. When the Filipinos have shown capacity to real freedom by their power of self-government, then, and not till then, it will be possible to decide whether they are to exist independently of us, or to be knit to us by the ties of common friendship and interest. When that day may come, it is not in human wisdom now to foretell."

"In this case," says Major Parker, "distance is so great, and

the alien character of these people so distinct, that it is worse than folly to hold out to them the idea of proximate Statehood. Should they ever become fitted for it, the result can be obtained only in the course of many generations."

Yet if we are to take Admiral Dewey's opinion, recently given before the Senate Committee on the Philippines, the inhabitants of those American possessions are better fitted for self-government than the Cubans. This would seem to point to inconsistency, for the Cubans are free and independent. The exact political status of the Filipino, which was long a matter of doubt, has now been settled by an official statement issued by Mr. Knox the American Attorney-General.

The case was that of a Filipino who desired to become an American citizen by the usual process of naturalization. Congress not having yet fixed permanently the political standing of the civil rights of the natives, the Government holds that they cannot take out naturalization papers any more than can the Chinese in America, but must retain the nationality of the Philippines.

This is certainly ambiguous. What is that nationality? One of the late insurgents now loyal to America, Bueneamino by name, warmly demanded an answer to this question when he stood before the Philippine committee. "Are we, or are we not," he asked, "American citizens?" He is now assured that in the opinion of the American Government, the Filipinos are simply inhabitants of a conquered country held by force of arms, subjects of the Imperial republic. No matter how intelligent, or well-behaved, or loyal, they cannot obtain rights which are granted freely to the most

doubtful and disreputable of Turks, Russians, or Africans.¹

General MacArthur told the Senate Committee that there is no question of the power of the Filipinos to attain any standard of excellence. They have a large representation in all the artisan employments. They have a deft touch; they are great in wood-carving; they are artists; they are natural musicians. General Merritt testified also to their good conduct and aptitude.

An American army officer but lately returned from the Philippines says the native women are imitating the American women—school teachers and wives of Army officers—in the matter of dress, personal adornment, and manners. During the last year a great change of this nature has been observed among the native women who have been thrown into contact with the "Americanos." The Philippine women now insist not only upon having more clothes, but better clothes, and the result is a marked improvement in their average personal appearance.

A year and a half ago this officer passed through a village in Luzon. In the house where he lodged was a girl of ten or twelve years who smoked big cigars and apparently enjoyed them. Visiting the same village a few months ago, the officer called to see his friends the native family. He found the girl now a little larger, of course, and also very much better dressed. "You are not smoking, I see," he said to her. "No, señor."

¹ A very significant sign of the times was the prohibition last fourth of July of the reading in the Philippines of the American Declaration of Independence, that greatly cherished but blatantly thrasonical document.

"Well, try one of these," he said, offering her his cigar-case. "No, thank you, senor," replied the girl in fair English. "Me no smoke now. Americano woman no smoke." The moral of this story is covious.

There are 150,000 children in the schools, and the Americans have sent them 3000 teachers, so that in the words of the Senator Depew, "they may learn English, the Declaration of Independence, 'the Star-spangled Banner,' and 'Yankee Doodle.'" Happy Filipinos!

When Spain had control of Porto Rico, travel and transportation were made very difficult by the conditions of the roads. There was only one main road from San Jnan to Ponse, a distance of eighty-five miles, besides this one road there were only about one hundred and sixty miles of main roads in the islands. The usual method of travelling was on horseback, with pack animals for freight, but only in a few places could the bull-carts be used, and then under very irksome conditions. When the Americans came into possession, their first work was upon the roads of the island, building new roads, constructing railroads, and instituting the electric street-car system, and the telegraph. The Porto Ricans are good workers, and are further encouraged by a large increase in wages, 9*d.* a day to 2*s.* 1*d.* But they have the fault common to warm climates of working only as long as necessity demands, then idling and squandering their earnings. They appreciate, however, the benefits of the change, for the old clumsy bull-cart is disappearing, and its place is being taken by waggons drawn by horses, and whereas formerly the cost of the transportation of the coffee to the sea was 3*s.* 4*d.* a hundred pounds, now under the

new conditions the charge is 5*d.* The aim of the Americans is to bring the standard of this island to the level of an American State. Let us hope their object may one day be accomplished.

Yet it must be admitted America lacks the necessary apparatus for the government of dependencies. It has been pointed out that Great Britain in the government of her dependencies is still a monarchy, although at home she has become practically a republic.¹ As a monarchy the nation boasts an Imperial service entirely detached from home parties or political influence. Will it be possible for America to acquire and maintain such a service, free from home politics, without the exaltation of the executive and the exercise of his direct authority?

As we have just seen, the country already finds that an Imperial policy is an expensive one. It involves large drafts on the home treasury, not merely in outright grants for necessary internal improvements, but also in financial concessions not less expensive. It involves fortifications, troops, a large and effective navy, and the cost of territorial administration. She will be obliged to find Government houses, prisons and court-houses, improve rivers and harbours, subsidize railways, survey public lands, and pay numerous official salaries.

In brief, the colonial system means the adoption of a new scale of national taxation and expenditure, and

¹ "Republic" is a facile term. Gibbon speaks of "The republic of Europe, with the Pope and Emperor at its head." Elsewhere he says that Charles IV. was "the temporal head of the great republic of the West."—"Decline and Fall," chap. xlix.

opens the way to administrative outlays far exceeding those to which the country has been accustomed.

Nevertheless, on the whole, and in spite of these warnings, the bulk of the people of America are prepared to make these sacrifices. They are weary of standing aloof among the nations; while conscious of the theoretical wisdom of such a policy of abstention. But their practice has left the old theories far behind. The wealth, the luxury, the ambition of the individuals has permeated the body politic. If America were still a nation of husbandmen, the primeval simplicity, the lofty ideals, the sacrificial seclusion which marked the fathers of the commonwealth, would still have served. But these virtues have long been supplanted by other traits; the husbandman has been pushed aside to toil for the race of capitalists, the land is invaded by a cosmopolitan horde eager for sudden wealth, the stress of living has vastly increased; in short, the national character has been tinctured by its pursuits, just as the national body has outgrown its old clothes.

America (at least in the East and manufacturing districts) is well able to pay much higher taxes than she now pays. But the sources of revenue provided by the Constitution have already begun to show significant limitations. The duties imposed by the Protection tariff are now about as high as they are ever likely to reach. The scale of duties as now levied would have astonished the Protectionists of a generation ago.

To tax the people further it is plain a new system will have to be devised. At present, the Supreme Court holds that an income-tax is unconstitutional; at the

same time, the Constitution expressly prohibits the levying of any direct tax not susceptible of apportionment among the States in accordance with their population. Consequently, the only two remaining resources are indirect internal taxation and increase of the National Debt, upon both of which the war with Spain obliged the Government to draw heavily. For some time to come it is clear there will be no further lowering of the National Debt, and internal taxation will be made heavier.

The few fat years which have so astonished Europe, will be followed by the lean ones; but, despite the stress of domestic trials, America must continue to shoulder her Imperial responsibilities.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND LAWS

"A CONSTITUTION," said Walter Bagehot, "is a collection of political means for political ends, and if you admit that any part of a Constitution does no business, or that a simpler machine would do equally well what it does, you admit that this part of the Constitution, however dignified or awful it may be, is nevertheless in truth useless."¹

In 1901 Mr. Justice Brown drew the attention of his American compatriots to "the manifest danger to the future of the country which lurks in the inflexibility of the Federal Constitution."²

For the people of America have for nearly a century agreed to consider themselves ruled by an inflexible Constitution, not to be amended or modified except by the method set forth in the instrument itself.

¹ "The English Constitution," p. 4.

² In a remarkable letter of Hamilton's, dated February, 1802, he despairs of the Constitution, which, however, he was "still labouring to prop," but which was "a frail and worthless fabric. Yet Hamilton was the first to seize on the convenient doctrine of the implied power of the Constitution. The growth of nationality, and the conversion of the agreement of thirteen States into the character of a nation, have been largely the development of the implied powers. This, remarks Senator Lodge, is the central point of Hamilton's whole policy, and in his bold declaration of the implied powers of the Constitution he laid bare his one predominant purpose of building up a powerful national government.

This is, of course, a delusion: the unwritten and flexible American Constitution promises in time to be the greater power of the two; the other destined, perhaps, to bear a similar relation to the whole as the unwritten portions of the British Constitution, such as Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement.

America is, *par excellence*, a judge-governed country, because in no other on earth is the power of the courts of justice comparable to that wielded here. The common phrase "a judicial ruling" has in America, as we shall see, a very literal signification. An executive edict or a legislative act appears to be powerless for good or evil if the court of last resort, after due argument and consideration, shall pronounce it contrary to the fundamental law contained in the Constitution.

All depends, therefore, on the interpretation of the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Marshall, in 1803, declared that the written Constitution was supreme, and that any Act of Congress not in accord with it was void.¹ But since Marshall's time the written Constitution has been steadily losing force. It has been repeatedly amended by decisions of the Supreme Court which have often overruled previous judgments. This was inevitable; the garments made for the Republic of 1789 were beginning to be outgrown. How much less would they have fitted the nation of 1903? Certain State Governments have lately complained that their legislation had not a free hand by

¹ During Marshall's time the attitude of the Supreme Court was one of absolute independence as a co-ordinate department; the government and fundamental principle of constitutional law were formulated in opposition often to the administration and often to public sentiment.—Pingrey.

reason of the intervention and "greed of jurisdiction" of the Federal Supreme Court.

The famous Dred Scott decision in 1856 marked the change, so that the doctrine actually carried into effect approximates the prevailing public sentiment or the pronounced party policy of the current administration. In brief, the Constitution can be changed not necessarily by amendment, but by "judicial construction."¹

One of the most interesting examples is the decision in the legal tender cases of 1869-70, showing clearly how subservient to administrative necessity the American Supreme Court may be. A previous interpretation of the Constitution was reversed, and it was held that the power to make the notes of the National Government legal tender in discharge of private debts was one of the inherent rights of sovereignty in all civilized nations, and that as the Constitution did not expressly withhold it from Congress, that body had the power so to legislate for the United States. In other words, the *jus gentium*, or law of nations, recognizes such authority, and therefore America ought to follow suit, notwithstanding her peculiar federal structure. But this certainly clashes with the doctrine that Congress can exercise no power by virtue of any supposed inherent sovereignty in the general government, inasmuch as sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise only such powers

¹ A sound constitutional lawyer has recently shown clearly that Congress has under the Constitution the power which was not previously believed to make all attempts upon the life of the President or other high officials punishable by death. This was supposed to require a special constitutional amendment. It has also the power to prevent the importation into America of persons known to hold anarchistic sentiments, whose presence would be dangerous to national peace and security. More "judicial construction"!

as have been given to it by the people. This decision thus marks an interesting stage in American national evolution and emancipation from the original Constitution.

Again, in 1876, the decisions in the Granger and Munn cases held that persons and corporations engaged in public trades may be placed under restrictive legislation without remuneration—a finding as to vested rights antagonistic to the interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall, but in accordance with the public opinion of the later day, which is against monopolies and the powers of corporations.

Another striking instance of the persuasive power of public opinion on the interpretations rendered by the Supreme Court is afforded by the income-tax case of 1895. The law imposing a graded income-tax was at first upheld as constitutional by a majority of one; but on a second hearing the majority changed to the other side, causing the former opinion to be overruled.

Forty odd years ago the Chief Justice decided that there was no power vested in the National Government under the Constitution for the establishment and maintenance of colonies; that—

“a power in the general Government to obtain and hold colonies and dependent territories for which it might legislate without any restriction would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present form; that a people of the United States would give the general Government power to organize and maintain colonies; and that to do so would be unconstitutional, and inconsistent with our Republican form of Government.”¹

¹ Yet, on the other hand, Professor J. B. McMaster has recently written a review of the history of suffrage in the territories seeking to show that foreign soil acquired by Congress is the property of and not part of the United States; that the territories formed from it are without, and not under

But times have changed—public opinion in America has changed—and in 1901 a new interpretation was grafted upon the old Constitution. The doctrine of 1856 was swept aside as anachronistic, and the decision of the Supremo Court, in the De Lima and the Downes case, authorized America to enter upon a colonial policy.

Contrast public opinion now with public opinion in the same direction in 1764, and we see how America has evolved. Here we find the American Supremo Court affirming the very doctrine Lord North insisted upon at the time the thirteen American Colonies were talking of separating from Britain, viz. that Parliament possessed plenary power to govern the Colonies, that, even though unrepresented in Parliament, they might be taxed and duties levied upon their commerce. Congress is now affirmed to be in the position of the same unlimited power over the Dependencies of America, and what we call the American Colony of Porto Rico is compelled to pay such import and export duties as Congress may be pleased to levy.

“Lord North,” says Professor Macmaster, “was wrong in the eighteenth century as the American Revolution demonstrated, but his doctrine is right in the beginning of the twentieth century, as the Supremo Court has decided.”

America, we see, then, is really little inconvenienced the Constitution; and that, in providing them with government, Congress is at liberty to establish just such kind as it pleases, with little or no regard for the principles of self-government; that in the past it has set up whatever sort was in the opinion best suited to meet the needs of the people, never stopping to ask how far the Government so created derived its just powers from the consent of the Government; and that it is under no obligation to grant even a restricted suffrage to the inhabitants of any new soil we may acquire, unless they are fit to use it properly.

by her obsolete Constitution, because the Supreme Court is its "living voice." If the Constitutional mutation goes on for another fifty years, the old written Constitution will be merely a legal fiction. Not even the British Constitution has undergone greater changes in its spirit and mode of operation than the American Constitution from the ideas and intentions of its makers. It is only too obvious that the Court is most sensitive to the political currents of the day. For example, in the case of the proposed income-tax in 1880, the Court decided in favour of its legality. Fifteen years later, when its composition had altered and popular influences were different, it pronounced against the constitutionality of the tax.

It is true these reversals are often obtained by a bare majority, in the last-named by one only, as also in the German's insular cases, where, if one justice had changed his mind, the present Government policy in the Philippines and Porto Rico would have been denounced. Yet these bare majorities furnish a safeguard; public opinion welcomes the lack of finality; there is "the hope that the bare minority of to-day may ultimately become a majority."

The Supreme Court has been of late steadily gaining ground. The nation looks to them in many of the new controversies which have arisen. These nine men have adroitly to pull, and stretch, and manipulate a Constitution which is commonly regarded as inflexible so as to cover the needs and aspirations and the grievances of the people. It is a burdensome task—it exacts mighty wisdom. The tendencies of the era are socialistic and anti-capitalistic: the diets of the Constitution are plain

as to sanetity of contrast and equality of taxation. "I admire," writes an English jurist, "tho ingenuity with which the nine open sluices and dig side-duets and find outlets when tho head of waters presses dangerously on the dam. But against some sudden freshets of opinion," he adds, "these devices may be futile."¹

But the Constitution is uot always obeyed, nor do its glaring omissions always embarrass the nation. There was no Constitutional authority for the creation of the electoral Commission of 1877—composed of five senators, five representatives, and five Supreme Court Justices in order to settle the electoral votes of Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and Oregon. It was a proceeding which would have been impossible in Marshall's day. The Constitution provides for a uniform customs tariff, but reciprocity has nevertheless been adopted. The American Government has made compensation for the murder of Italian and Chinese aliens within State jurisdiction, a clear eneroachment upon State sovereignty as defined by the Constitution. It has lately exeluded a member from Congress without Constitutional sanction. It has more than once invaded a State and settled its private affairs, a proceeding which ought to have caused Jefferson to have turned in his grave. The Constitution provides that all money bills shall originate in the Lower House, as with us, and that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury save by reason of appropriation made by law. But have we not lately seen the President and

¹ The Supreme Court is appealed to for multifarious decisions relating to the Constitutionality of Acts passed either by Congress or by the State legislatures. It may, it has been said, at one moment be asked to determine the proper assessment of the cost of a municipal sewer, and at another to say who is to be the Governor of a State.

Senate agreeing to pay Spain the sum of \$20,000,000 for the Philippine islands without the consent of the Lower House. All of which implies a want of adherence to the laws of the Constitution.

"The question arises," says Professor Pingrey, "is the Constitution of such a nature that it must be construed and interpreted to meet the exigencies of the time in a manner subservient to popular sentiment and progressive history?" Has the Supreme Court plenary powers to modify its Constitution by construction and interpretation, to meet the demands of civilization? Have the executive and the legislative departments potentiality to ignore the Constitution when expediency seems to require it?¹

To get at the inner opinion held by the most intelligent Americans of to-day, with regard to the limitations of their Constitution, we cannot do better than turn to remarks by General Wallace, and Senator Proctor, both very conservative and rational Americans.

"There are," says one, "a great many things to-day, things good and things bad, which were not in the knowledge of our forefathers, wise as they were; but because they were ignorant of the good, shall we not enjoy them? Because they did not anticipate the bad, shall we go on submitting to them? They discerned their conditions and were faithful to them; why should we not study ours?"

"Many of our statesmen," asserts Senator Proctor, "wrongly imagine we can remain satisfied, as are the Chinese, to be guided in questions of immediate and world-wide importance by

¹ "Even those of our people who are neither readers of history nor students of the science of politics are beginning to understand that the silent and irresistible law of growth, which expands the girdle of the oak, is an equally irresistible law of our national life, which neither legislators, jurists, nor sentimentalists, can suspend or control."—Prof. H. Taylor.

quotations from obsolete texts from the wise sayings of remote ancestors."

So we see that not even a rigid Constitution, not even a solemn counsel of the Father and first ruler of his country, can fetter for ever the aspirations of the people.

That the American rigid Constitution does not like the British unwritten Constitution run everywhere, many instances may be cited to prove. The Constitution declares that no American citizen shall be tried except by a jury of his peers. Such jury is held to consist of twelve men; but Americans are daily tried in China by a Consul and two assessors. Men accused of murder are tried by a Consul and four assessors: the American Minister approving the death sentence. The Constitution provides that all civil cases involving more than \$20 shall be tried by a jury. In China the Consul hears such cases and gives judgment above, and the Supreme Court upholds him. For instance, an adventurous American in Shanghai refused to pay his city taxes because he had no right to vote, not holding real estate. The American appealed to the American Law and Constitution, but in vain. The Consul General held that the Constitution was not operative, and the man had to pay. Another American was sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder committed off Japan in an American ship. He sought a *habeas corpus*, not having been tried by a jury. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was legal: as it had in cases of America elsewhere, notably in Turkey. "In civil as in criminal matters, laws made in pursuance of the treaties to govern Americans in the East need not comply

with the provisions of the Constitution." The American Constitution therefore is not always supreme for Americans.

As the Constitution is capable of varied interpretation to assist the federal power, so of itself the federal authority of the country develops unexpectedly, as we may see in the railway strikes of 1891. Congress had then recently assumed the power of regulating interstate commerce, and thereby rendered the federal Government responsible for maintaining the interstate railways as international highways. But the country remained in complete ignorance of the far-reaching consequences of this action, until an armed mob appeared, and, to defend its authority, a body of national soldiers had to be despatched to the scene of riot and disorder.

When the American army appeared on the spot the State authorities were much astounded at the invasion; but State power is now futile, and the State military retired to the background.

Congress, however, does not always consider the Constitution when it wishes to act in any special manner, and it is often too late for the Supreme Court to declare the strict illegality of any of its acts under the Constitution, even were it advisable to do so, as it rarely or never is. It was an entirely new right claimed by Congress when it determined the validity of the electoral vote of any State in a Presidential election. But although Congress can empower the President to do this or that, the House of Representatives has been reduced perhaps not to a negligible quantity, yet, at any rate, it is now a very small factor in the affairs

of the nation, and it is growing less. The Senate is the real master. Of its new predominance and ambition I will tell the reader in the next chapter.

Turning from the Constitution and Congress, let us note what progress has been made in law-making.

It has been observed that the law of the American people, however novel and fantastic, and apparently in some instances unjust, bear a very close and intimate relation to their life. They are made by the people themselves, and are not imposed by external authority or by an aristocratic class. Otherwise, if enforced, they would be condemned by the whole civilized world. At present it does not follow that this legislation is enforced; its mere passage is significant. Perhaps its purpose is then served, and the future historian may consult the tomes of repealed statutes for illustration of the ethical sentiment and the peculiar characteristics of American civilization at this epoch.

One very conspicuous stride toward a United State of America has of late years been witnessed in the movement for securing uniformity of laws relating to trade, commerce, marriage and divorce, citizenship, and the treatment of insanity and disease throughout the Union.

By the Bankruptcy Act of 1897, Congress superimposed upon the forty-five diverse systems of commercial laws represented by as many States, each having its own mysterious local influences "for the bewilderment," as some one said, "of non-resident creditors and the undoing of small and experienced ones," one great uniform system of jurisprudence covering the entire field of business transactions, and impartially affecting

commercial dealings of every description in every part of the Commonwealth. Now that the latter has enjoyed the advantages of this national act—its thoroughness, economy, and fairness—it is highly improbable that there will ever be a return to the old order of things, or, rather, to the old disorder, the old chaos.

In America divorce has been sought with avidity by countless persons who ought to have continued their marital relation, and who would have done so if the opportunities for easy divorce had not presented themselves on every hand, and so tempted them in a rash moment to destroy their homes and what should have been a lifelong alliance. Moreover, need for uniform legislation is self-evident. The absurd validity of a marriage in one State which is invalid in another, or the granting of a divorce in one part of America which is not recognized in another part of the same country is another evil which should be abolished. Children are legitimate in one State and are illegitimate in another. All this justifies the growing demand for uniform marriage and divorce laws enacted by the various States, or as an alternative the relegation to Congress of the power to deal with this subject. It is monstrous, that an absolute divorce granted in one State—say, Massachusetts—should not have force in another State, as New York; and that the same couple, living in lawful wedlock in the one State, are leading a criminal life in the other by the mere continuance of the identical relationship.

While the State of New York has some stringent laws applicable to anarchists who threaten society, Illinois has practically none at all. Consequently Chicago

has long been an anarchist centre. This condition of affairs is really worse than would be the entire absence of restrictive laws in all States, because it keeps up the corporate spirit and zeal of the anarchists to be perpetually defying the authorities of one State by the simple process of moving across the border and carrying on their propaganda on the other side. National legislation would thus seem to be a stern necessity.

But as under the Constitution these matters can only be dealt with by the separate States, complete uniformity of State legislation can only be secured by their legislatures passing laws which shall be essentially identical. The difficulties in the way are very great, as may be supposed ; but it would be possible for all these difficulties to disappear through the force of public opinion, if it were ever strongly aroused in this direction.¹ Already the States of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and New York have annually appointed Commissioners during the past decade to devise a scheme for securing uniform State legislation. At some of the meetings of these Commissioners as many as thirty-one States have been represented.

If their efforts have not yet been crowned with success, we must reflect upon the obstacles they have to face. The fantastic diversity of opinion entertained by the petty members of forty-six petty States legislatures is, *prima facie*, an appalling condition to alter. To animate these with a common zeal and a common

¹ It is worth recalling that the German Code of Commerce, drawn under a resolution of the Frankfort Diet., some years ago, was made general law by the action of the legislative bodies of the various German States.

purpose, they must be confronted with a very great issue indeed. They feel their insignificance, the supererogatory nature of their functions, and it is only perhaps natural that they should cling to their dwindling powers and their futile privileges : even if both be for evil, as retarding national solidarity.

Consequently, there has arisen in America a demand for such amendments of the Constitution as will enable Congress to legislate upon these subjects, absurdly forbidden to it by the jealousies and intercolonial distrust of 1789. But, in order to secure an amendment to the Constitution, a measure must be proposed by both Houses of Congress by a two-thirds majority, or by a convention called on application of legislatures of two-thirds of the States, and after being so proposed must be introduced into the legislatures of all the States, and be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. At present, it must be confessed, a large number of the States, of at least two-thirds, would be opposed to any constitutional amendment increasing federal power.

Nevertheless, already Congress possesses much more power under the Constitution than it commonly exercises. Emergencies may conceivably arise when it may exert this power, or any degree of power of which a modern interpretation of the Constitution is capable, and if this were in the public and national interest it would be universally applauded, just as the President's incursions into the legislative domain have been received with approval.

A great deal of the time of the various State legislatures has of late years been occupied in considering

schemes of a more or less socialistic character, but so far the champions of even those measures which have been approved in England have met with scant success. The paternalism of the local governments has evinced itself more in petty legislation of the "curfew," anti-barmaids and anti-bacillus-in-the-razors type; the establishment of Government breweries and bakeries would require a stronger pressure of opinion than now exists.

Municipal trading and municipal ownership has never obtained much footing in America, nor is it likely to do so. The reasons urged against the practice are chiefly, as stated by Mr. R. P. Porter, the injurious effect upon the work strictly within the municipal sphere of operation; the fact that in giving attention to trading operations the "unproductive" work is almost certain to be neglected; the tendency to discourage improvement or development; the engendering of ill-feeling which is sure to arise when the taxpayer finds himself obliged to help defray the cost of competing with himself, the difficulty in adjusting the burden of a trading undertaking on the right shoulders, and such an equitable regulation of the charge as will not put a burden on those who derive no benefit; the impossibility of drawing a line as to which industries shall be taken up by the municipalities, and which shall be left to individual enterprise.¹

¹ "How is it," once asked Lord Goschen, "that while the increasing democracy at home is insisting, with such growing eagerness, on more control by the State, we see so small a corresponding development of the same principle in the United States? It is clearly not simply the democratic spirit which demands so much central regulation. Otherwise, we should find the same conditions in the Anglo-Saxon democracies across the sea."—Address at Edinburgh, 1883.

It is true that early in the last century the various State Governments of America did enter into financial partnership with the promoters of canals; and later, when steam railways were introduced, States and cities and towns and counties alike were appealed to for assistance in building railways. Nor was the appeal unheeded, for in the forties and fifties an epidemic, very similar to the present fever for municipal trading in England swept over the country, and ended in bankruptcy and ruin, not only of cities and towns, but of important States. Bonds issued by State and local authorities for the promotion of railways went in default. These and kindred experiences taught them the useful lesson that there was a limit to State and municipal credit. The taxpayers of those times, who saw their property practically confiscated to pay for enterprises which should have been left to individual endeavour or private speculators, invented a device known as "the Debt-limit Clause," and this clause, in some form or other, had been inserted in nearly every State Constitution drawn and adopted since those days of financial disaster and destruction of State and local credit. Partly owing to debt limitation and partly because private enterprise had been allowed a freer headway in such undertakings as the supply of gas, electric lighting, tramways, and telephones, there is to-day in America no city owning and operating its own tramways and street railways, probably less than half a dozen manufacturing gas, a very few engaged in supplying electric light, and not one in the telephone business.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

WE pass now from America's territorial expansion and domestic law-making to consider her new foreign relations.

America has somewhat blindly and naïvely entered the international arena. Her advantages are her wealth and rude strength;¹ her disadvantages are those inseparable from democracy, from the peculiar formation of her Government, from ignorance of usage, want of political continuity, and from a too-exalted conception of her own position and destiny. Thus hampered, it is inevitable she must make in this new business more enemies than friends. It is the chief purpose and the truest province of diplomacy to make friends. Friends mean good-will, good-will means markets, markets prosperity, prosperity domestic peace and more intellectual and spiritual expansion. Let us now see if American policy is calculated to encompass these great ends.

Diplomacy—respect for another nation's rights—regard for legality; comity, the *jus gentium*—is all so new to Americans that it is small wonder they stumble.

¹ Signor Bonamico has said that America will necessarily become an aggressive military power, and anticipates its eventual solidarity with the Dual Alliance.

"What have we to do with foreigners and treaties?" once asked the eminent Senator Matthews.¹

Washington's Farewell Address is commonly summarized as "advice to steer clear of European entanglements." Consequently, without reading that document, a large body of Americans conceive that it recommends national isolation and advises against alliances of any sort with any European nation. But, as a matter of fact, Washington merely considered as entangling any European alliance which should make America the vassal of any other; any alliance in which his country should be an unequal partner and dependant. He contemplated temporary alliances on a footing of equality, but counselled against permanent ones, because the relative strength of nations is not a fixed equality, but constantly fluctuates. "It is," said he, "our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world . . . we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

"Again," he says, "It must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her (Europe's) politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities," clearly implying that time might bring ties

¹ To show what a *quantité négligeable* America was in international matters before the war, we need only refer to the experience of their Minister to China so recently as 1894.

"So far did the idea that we ought to take no part in foreign questions extend," says Mr. Denby, "that some of my colleagues at Peking, when I undertook to make peace for China and Japan, deprecated any intervention whatever of the United States in the affairs of the Far East." He proceeds, "We hold our heads higher now. We are coming to our own. We are stretching out our hands for what nature meant should be ours. We are taking our proper rank among the nations of the world; we are after markets—the greatest markets now existing in the world," etc., etc.

that were not artificial, but natural and politic. He even believed also that America might wisely become a member of a European coalition, and this doctrine of his is accentuated by the recent discovery of certain omitted words in the original draft of the famous address. Speaking of neutrality, he says that one of the results would be that "belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation." In the first draft the sentence continues "*to throw our weight into the opposite scale,*" which, although subsequently erased, shows what was in Washington's mind, viz. that armed intervention in Europe was a future possibility for his nation.

Furthermore, writing to La Fayette, he says that "these United States shall one day have a weight in the scale of Empire." He also describes himself as "a member of an infant empire."

The dramatic collapse of Spain under American blows startled the Continental nations of Europe, who for at least three centuries had regarded the Spanish Court with a respect hardly justified by its real modern weakness. The apparition of the new power was likened to the descent of a brigade from the planet Mars—"a force singularly potent, absolutely new and not quite accountable, had suddenly put itself in evidence."

In Asia we have for some years witnessed the spectacle of the European powers striving to obtain concessions which would end in territorial acquisition, with the avowed intention of closing the ports of such acquired territories to the world's commerce in favour of its own, by the imposition of exorbitant customs

duties. But it is not to the interest of two countries, Britain and America, to conform to such policy. They are enabled by their resources, the industry and the inventiveness of their peoples, and their facilities for reaching foreign markets, to compete on equal terms. Both possess a large and increasing population, and large and increasing surplus production, dependent on foreign markets for an outlet.

It is clear that the interests of these countries demand that no combination of Powers be permitted to close the ports of Asia to their commerce.

But although it was equally to America's interest, she long stood by inert, lending no aid to Britain in her efforts to avert the impending danger. She was fettered by her historic policy of isolation, a policy enunciated by most of her leading statesmen from Washington to Cleveland. In spite of the interests she had at stake, she remained silent, while France acquired Madagascar and abrogated American treaty rights by imposing discriminating duties in favour of French products. No word came from President or Foreign Secretary or Senate when the Chinese territory was occupied by Russia, Germany, and France, threatening dismemberment of the ancient Empire.

Yet Russia and Germany, by means of their protective policy, were shutting America off the northern coast of Asia from territories which might readily become large markets.

The general partition of China would mean placing American goods at a disadvantage. On the other hand, what is the good of the "open door" to Germans who are seeking protection for their manufactures. The

open door benefits only England and America. America undoubtedly has in China a splendid market for her native products, her timber, her locomotives, her steel rails, her petroleum, her cotton goods, her mining plants. She enjoys greater proximity to the Flowery Kingdom than any other commercial country, except Japan, for we cannot yet take Canada's young commerce into account. Why, therefore, should not the Pacific become as important as the Atlantic? San Francisco, Seattle, and Tacoma may be destined to rival on the western seaboard New York, Boston, and Philadelphia in the East.

Mr. Hay's action in the Chinese drama of 1900 seemed then logical. Here the republic really entered the field of international politics, and her presence was, to all but ourselves, by no means welcome.¹

When the Boxer insurrection came with such bewildering suddenness, public opinion throughout the civilized world was in a fluid state. No power appeared to own any definite policy: none dared to take any steps out of concert: all secretly hoped that the long-expected opportunity for the partition of China had arrived.

Such was the critical juncture chosen for America's *début* on the stage of international diplomacy.

¹ When the International Peace Convention met at the Hague in 1899, and convention was signed by the American delegates, in the course of it they announced that, "Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in, the political questions of internal administration of any foreign State; nor shall anything contained in the said Convention be construed to imply a relinquishment, by the United States of America, of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

Never was an appearance better timed: never was an ambitious statesman given a fairer opportunity. On July 3rd Secretary Hay despatched to the Powers the celebrated Circular Note, in which he stated that the American Government regarded the situation in China as one of anarchy rather than as war, to be met by a declaration of war; that America would treat the friendly viceroys as the representatives of the Chinese people, with whom she desired to remain at peace; that she would act concurrently with the other Powers in rescuing the legations, in protecting foreign life and property, and in preventing a spread of the disorders; that America's general policy was to seek a solution which might "bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

This circular note took the Chancelleries of the world by surprise, but it did effect a healthy clearing of the atmosphere. It did quicken the international conscience: it did certainly serve to crystallize public opinion.

It was wise, unselfish, and humane: and lent America a position of moral ascendancy which she did not soon lose.

We can hardly yet fully realize all the responsibility which Mr. Hay assumed. A British admiral who had attempted to advance had been repulsed. The European Governments were in a state of indecision. Most of the officers on the spot, except the Japanese, judge that a very



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large force would be needed to make victory tolerably sure, and in case of defeat the most serious consequences were certain. Mr. Hay, we are told, never flinched; his first anxiety was to open communications with the legations in order to have public opinion behind him in the risk he had resolved to run. In this he succeeded. Then, as soon as General Chaffee took command, Mr. Hay advised an advance, though the Americans marched alone. Mr. McKinley agreed, and the public knows the rest. The legations were relieved; Peking was occupied, and the campaign ended precisely as our Cabinet could have wished. Afterward it only remained to dissolve the European concert, and facilitate an evacuation to achieve all that America desired. Gradually Mr. Hay succeeded in detaching first one power and then another from the coalition, until only the Germans and English remained. In this predicament the emperor found the cost of the expedition rolling up, the chance of collecting damages from the Chinese dwindling away: together with the prospect of permanent occupation a financial panic raged in Berlin. The dream of industrial expansion departed, and Germany accepted the inevitable.

But what was there behind Mr. Hay in all this work? Nothing. He was copying the methods of Europe; but Europe, had she known it, could have afforded the indulgent smile now grown habitual.

Mr. Hay is a diplomatist; but it is the Senate who is his master, and it did not care two straws about China. In the case of an ordinary Power we naturally identify the minister with the country he represents: it is not so easy to do so here. Mr. Hay is not

America: his achievement found little sympathy in the body of the nation or with the statesmen. America shuddered at her foreign minister's temerity. It was a brilliant piece of diplomacy: the exception that proves the rule. But America was so impatient to get free of China, and free herself from an association with Europe, as novel to her as it was embarrassing, that she did not even pause to insist that the principle to govern the assessment of the indemnity should be agreed on in advance.

A similar piece of diplomacy was tried again, in the despatch of an identical note to Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Russia, France, and Italy, on behalf of the Jews in Roumania. All these Governments were signatory to the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which created the independent Balkan States, and under which there was to be no discrimination against any residents of Roumania on account of religious belief.

Said Mr. Hay in his Note---

"The teachings of history and the experience of our nation show that the Jews possess in a high degree the mental and moral qualifications for citizenship, and no class is more welcome here when coming equipped in mind and body for citizenship. But this Government cannot be a tacit party to an international wrong. It is constrained to protest against treatment to which the Jews of Roumania are subjected, not alone because it has unimpeachable ground to remonstrate against resultant injury to itself, but in the name of humanity. The United States may not authoritatively appeal to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, to which it was not and cannot become a signatory, but it does earnestly appeal to the principles contained therein, because they are the principles of international law and eternal justice, advocating the broad toleration which that solemn compact enjoins, and standing ready to lend its

moral support to the fulfilment thereof by its co-signatories, for the act of Roumania itself has effectively joined the United States to them as an interested party in this regard."

It was, of course, the success of the China note which induced Mr. Hay to make this further essay, but it is to be feared that Europe is wiser now. If America thus claims a right to mingle in and adjust the affairs of Europe she must pay the price. America has no *locus standi* whatever. No wonder, therefore, that the general opinion on the Continent was that the note was as *naïve* as it was unusual.

"European States do not, however, need American instruction in matters of religious freedom and of civilization. We do not believe that the Note will make the slightest impression on the Treaty Powers. It will be taken as being merely an action on the part of President Roosevelt to improve his chances of reelection, and there is not the least reason why the European States should allow themselves to be used for such an object."¹

But this is not the true meaning of the note, any more than the pretext of Jewish oppression. It means that Mr. Hay is a diplomatist, with an itch for diplomacy. He cannot see his country shouldered outside the concert of nations without an occasional endeavour to make her voice heard, and her position, founded upon wealth and population, universally recognized. But this is hardly a motive which can find sympathy abroad. Back of diplomacy must be power and influence, and, alas! Mr. Hay is speaking only for himself and a little group of his friends who would not like to confess, even amongst themselves, how weak they are.

Thus, when America, through her Senate, came to

¹ *Kreuz Zeitung*, Berlin, September 20, 1902.

act, she scuttled out of China post-haste. The Senate is the real master when the matter is not a vital one.¹ It has recently taken to regarding a treaty made between the executive and a foreign power as simply a tentative arrangement—"a project." In a letter which Senator Lodge wrote to the *Boston Transcript* of December 29, 1900, defending the position of the Senate, he said: "The Senate is part of the treaty-making power, and treaties sent to it for ratification are not strictly treaties, but projects for treaties, they are still inchoate." This statement, Mr. Lodge observes, is a "constitutional truism."

Only last year, 1901, the Senate ratified a treaty with Great Britain (The Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property) providing for the disposition of real estate, and giving any British Colony the right to adhere to the convention or notice from the British Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State; and, similarly, any possession in America beyond the seas were to be included in the compact upon notice "being given by the representative of the United States at London, by direction of the President." The Senate amended this to read "by direction of the treaty-making

¹ The opponents of the Constitution in 1787, predicted as follows: "The Senate will become an oligarchy. Sitting for six years, and not directly elected by the people, it must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the Government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy (see *The Federalist*, No. lxii.).

James Wilson prophesied the power of the Senate. Jefferson said, "It will be no alleviation of despot egoist that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. If," said Smythe (1811), "there results to America a grand calamity and failure of the whole it can only accrue from the friends of liberty not venturing to render the executive power sufficiently effective—the common mistake of all popular Governments."

power of the United States." This signified that the Senate has assumed to itself the right to conduct foreign relations, an assumption for which no justification is to be discovered in the Constitution.

This is not the first time that the Senate has sought to get the upper hand of the Executive. They tried it with Jackson; but he promptly vetoed their act as "in my judgment inconsistent, but with a division of powers in the Constitution, as it is obviously founded on the assumption that an act of Congress can give power to the executive or to the head of one of the departments to negotiate with a foreign Government.

"The Executive has competent authority to negotiate . . . with a foreign government—an authority Congress cannot constitutionally abridge or increase."

At a later period President Grant, in returning to Congress a joint resolution on an international matter, took that body to task. "The President," said he, "is the agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers and in all official communications from them. . . . The Secretary of State conducts such correspondence exclusively under the orders and instruction of the President."

President Cleveland also gave Congress to understand that he would countenance no interference in his conduct of foreign affairs. But Mr. McKinley was not inclined to stand upon his prerogative, and we thus see the Senate advancing with impudent strides forward towards a share of power.

Treaties negotiated by the President are merely "projects for treaties," and, furthermore, it now claims to know the details of a treaty while in process of

negotiation and before the treaty is submitted to it for ratification, wherefore they actually compelled President McKinley and Secretary Hay so to amend the Hay-Pauncefote treaty as to make its acceptance by the British Government impossible. Thus we see that this new doctrine makes the President simply the agent of the Senate in framing a treaty.¹

There have been numerous instances lately illustrating the desire of the Senate to pose as the real "treaty-making power." It has been guilty of trivial and absurd emendations to treaties which it has not opposed merely in order to exercise its power.²

In 1899 Mr. Kasson, a "Reciprocity commissioner" provided by the President, arranged a treaty with France, which went beyond the limits of what the Senate was prepared to allow, because it provided for a reduction of duties on products of other nations competing with similar products of America.

We here get an idea of the crude diplomatic provisions of the Government, also the relations existing between the President's commissioner and the Senate. Mr. Kasson is addressing a committee of the latter body.

"I am holding back from any fresh negotiations under the Fourth section of the tariff act, in order to get the judgment of

¹ "The State Department in its negotiations with foreign Governments has one hand tied behind its back and a ball-and-chain about its leg," was the comment of an American who had practical experience of his country's diplomacy.

² "An examination made by me," writes Mr. Maurice Low, "of original treaties in the archives of the Department of State shows that in the early days the State exercised the right of amendment very sparingly and with great discretion, but of recent years, especially during the last decade, it has exercised its power with the greatest freedom, until now the treaty that is ratified without amendment is the exception."

the Senate upon this plan of reciprocity, because I have put my best efforts into this French treaty, and if it is not to be ratified, of course there is no propriety in my going and making Government embarrassments in this respect. If this highly advantageous treaty cannot be approved, I consider it vain to attempt any other in Europe."

"Government embarrassment!" indeed; not merely involving his own Government but the unlucky foreigner who has been devoting his time and thought in all good faith to the negotiation of a treaty, which, after being signed, sealed, and delivered, he finds to his surprise and indignation, is not worth the paper it is written on! Who would be an American diplomatist? How exhausting must be those explanations to European Powers who believe that a treaty between two foreign ministers is a treaty and not merely a *pourparler* or a protocol!¹

It is hardly necessary to recall here all the incidents of the regrettable attempts to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

It affected the American imagination as something grand and heroic to stand at the mouth of the canal, sword and pistol in hand, and defy the nations of the earth to attack it. But a simple agreement with the Powers to refrain from attacking it was too tame and pacific to afford them any interest.

The absolute impossibility of inducing certain Americans to look at any international subject on the basis of international usages is shown conclusively by

¹ Hamilton predicted the future "instability in foreign policy, due to changes in the executive and in public sentiment, and rendering necessary the participation of a comparatively small council or senate in the management of this department."

one writer in speaking of "brutal British obstruction of the Isthmian canal."

That continuity of policy and the identification of the nation with itself throughout all epochs fails of comprehension by the masses, and of commendation by many Americans who ought to know something of international honour, is only too clear. Take such a recent utterance of Mr. Josiah Quincy, a Massachusetts statesman, as the following, concerning Cuba, not delivered, be it known, in the haste of platform speaking or to a newspaper reporter, but penned soberly in black and white in the pages of a leading review:—

"In spite of the solemn resolution, we are not bound to exclude any policy which may be found for the best interest both of the people, of the island, and of *ourselves*. If annexation is the outcome indicated by every dictate of statesmanship, and of mutual interest, the *dead hand of the Fifty-fifth Congress cannot hold us back from it.*"

What, we may ask this scion of an honourable name, what do the nations of the earth know about the *Fifty-fifth Congress*? What do Cuba and the Cubans know of the *Fifty-fifth Congress*? What is the *Fifty-fourth Congress*? or the *Twenty-fourth*? or the *Eighty-sixth*? It was not the *Fifty-fifth Congress* that bound itself by solemn bond and covenant, but the American people, through its assembled representatives. Covenants may be broken, resolutions may be annulled, but this is worse than cynicism.

Indeed, we may very well question whether the political habits of Americans fit them for success in the sphere of world-politics. Their long freedom from

"entangling alliances;" their irresponsibility for the moral effect of their own words; their reckless contempt for foreign Powers, who are not on their own scale of prosperity or population, have been a bad training-school of diplomaey. And at home the same spirit is witnessed in the popular indifference to purity and effectiveness in official administration. As we shall see in another chapter, the idea of a trained service of strict business methods, and the absence of personal or party favouritism in the administration of government, is only in embryo in America.

If America is to be a world-power, it is obvious that she must exercise her powers as these are exercised by other nations.

She must, as one of her citizens advises, "wheel into line, and follow the *droit commun*, the common law of all civilized peoples." The day of experiments in general government is past; let America reserve her ingenuity for legislation. She must acquiesce in the *jus gentium*, or law of nations.

Naturally after the Chinese episode all Europe was anxious to see America continue her international policy so auspiciously begun. They seek to egg on to Quixotic feats of arms in which she would surely be out of her element. Look at this strain from the redoubtable M. Urbain Gohier. He wants America to interfere in Turkey, and as he declaims every Chancellerie in Europe shrieks with ribald laughter.

"The American Navy is powerful, while a Turkish Navy scarcely exists. Where is the possibility of war? There must be two to make a fight. To show the blood-stained Sultan a few battle-ships, and warn him that every human head that

falls with the knives of his assassins will be paid for by the destruction of one of his palaces, this would not be the work of a conqueror, but the action of a noble heart.

"For the great American Nation the rush would be *nil*, the cost insignificant, and the glory infinite. It would show that its prodigious material wealth has not stifled its feeling of chivalry; it would," etc.

Come on, America; come on, and mingle with us, fight with us, sink with us. Our caudal appendages have been incontinently severed; say, why should yours wag pendant?

Mr. Hay, as we have just seen, was ill-advised enough to take up the challenge.

Imperialism will inevitably demand that Congress shall support the policy of the Executive, and the latter must possess large powers of initiative. Otherwise it would be impossible to maintain the secrecy and reserve frequently indispensable to diplomatic success. Lack of continuity in America's foreign policy must place her at a disadvantage when dealing with other Powers whose diplomacy suffer no such arbitrary breaks.

The goal towards which the Expansionists are leading America is the Cabinet system of Government, which is inevitable for the country if she is to have wide-spread international relations.

But although American diplomacy is operative under great difficulties, there are now many Americans who are piously ready to cry, "Better a thousand times the perils of intimacy with other nations, and with the race at large, than the perils of isolation or of detachment from the race at large."

CHAPTER VII

THE MONROE POLICY

HAVING displayed Mr. Hay and his well-meant struggles to establish the New Diplomacy, let us now turn to a grave inconsistency in America's foreign relations which, if persisted in, threatens danger to the republic.

The Continent of Europe has a deep cause of offence against America in her dog-in-the-manger policy towards South America.

They see from afar a vast continent, thinly peopled, suitable to Europeans, full of natural resources, in short, one of the prizes of colonization in the world, which America coolly announces she will neither occupy herself nor let anybody else occupy.

Now, Germany is already a powerful physical factor in Brazil, and would like political paramountcy; Italy, whose sons are already settled in vast numbers in Argentina, casts longing eyes on that country; France desires ardently the control of Guiana; Austria-Hungary wishes Uruguay. Not for selfish purposes; not in order to press the yoke of tyranny upon the necks of the people, but in order to find an outlet for their surplus population and energies, in obedience to that normal twentieth-century law of which I have spoken.

Is it, then, surprising that certain statesmen should

have adumbrated the league of Europe against America as "a necessity of civilization"?

The Monroe policy was a preventive measure designed to ward off the thrust of the Holy Alliance, which seemed to threaten the political existence of America. Monroe and his advisers saw the danger from afar, as did the British minister Canning, but it was the latter alone who suggested the policy.

The world moves, and the world ages. The Western Hemisphere in 1903 is not as it appeared to Canning and Monroe in 1824. The "republics" of Spanish origin grow more unlike the rest of the nations, more unlike each other.

In the first place, although the Latin republics of the Western Hemisphere have taken America as their model, the peculiar qualities inherent in the people prevent them from following the spirit of Anglo-Saxon laws and theory of government.

In half a century Mexico has had eight Constitutions, twenty revolutions, and fifty pronunciamientos. She has had a succession of petty tyrants, under the names of emperor or president, who have arrogated supreme authority by means of force, and each has in turn been overthrown by force. If to-day the Mexicans seem to enjoy a period of tranquillity it is by reason of their prudent concession to a dictatorship, however it be veiled under Constitutional forms.

As for the other five republics of Southern North

¹ Long ago, Bismarck, instead of seeing in the Great Republic the halo-crowned pioneer of liberty and progress, could see in it only an "incendiary republic of evil repute—where a brutal and hypocritical democracy has the lead, where the venality of officials, the fraudulent appropriation of public money, and the terrors of lynch law are the order of the day!"

America, they are periodically subject to revolts and mutinies, and are without any secure foundation.

In fact, with the exception of Brazil and Chili, all the Latin nations of the Western Hemisphere have exhibited profound political incapacity. In Colombia, tyrannies succeed tyrannies as constitution follows constitution. Force and violence seem to be in the blood of the body politic. In Venezuela, the pronouncement of the victorious upstart is the only method of obtaining power, and has grown to be a veritable, and almost venerable, institution of State. As for Ecuador, it has been called "a fragment of the Europe of the Middle Ages," secluded between the Pacific and the summits of the Andes, "an immense monastery with the honours of a nation." This is no longer its plight, but the advance has not been very marked. Within the past quarter of a century, a foreign war has robbed Peru of her two richest provinces, and more than ten civil wars have helped to bring her to her present state of bankruptcy.

In brief, the Spanish colonies in both North America and South America had not at the time of their revolt from Spain been educated for liberty and self-government, but rather for dependency and servitude.

If Germany were to invade and conquer Argentina, America would not be menaced any more than if Germany were to conquer Greece or Portugal. Argentina is 5000 miles from Washington.

It is probably a fact that the Kaiser views with secret and strong approbation the plans for securing a German colony in the South American continent. The only obstacle in his way—for we would hardly be so

foolish as to object—is the Monroe policy. But Germany does not recognize the Monroe policy, and America, as Mr. Roosevelt has said, needs a fleet of great battle-ships if she intends to live up to that policy. Has she got them?

But can the American people seriously intend to stultify themselves, jeopardize the lives of their soldiers and sailors, and sacrifice the prosperity of the Southern Continent by perpetual adhesion to a mere dogma—which served its turn when it was enunciated in 1823, but can hardly be a weapon for national defence in 1903? Look at the case broadly—look at it from a humanitarian standpoint—not the narrow humanity which sees only the present, but that which encompasses the future well-being of mankind. That is the way Americans as well as Englishmen have been looking at the wars undertaken in the Philippines and South Africa; it is progress *versus* barbarism, intelligence *versus* ignorance; so that the point of view is sufficiently familiar. Assuming that Germany, highly civilized, efficient, capable, and honest, desires to plant a German colony in the Southern Continent. Does any but a prating dunce or parish bigot suppose that this would not redound to the advantage of the whole district where German institutions rose, German thrift spread, or German laws ran? Would not German methods of colonization be modelled precisely on those of the English, which the Americans themselves are never tired of praising?

“If,” asks one American, Mr. Walter Wellman, “a new Prussia or Bavaria were set up in Brazil, a new Italy in Argentina, another Holland in Patagonia, a

new Brittany in Guiana, who can say that the result would constitute a menace to the United States?"

President Roosevelt, in a speech delivered recently in Vermont, thus referred to the Monroe policy or "doctrine." He disclaims any "aggression."

"We believe in the doctrine, not as a means of aggression at all. It does not mean that we are aggressive towards any Power. It means merely that, as the biggest Power on this Continent, we remain steadfastly true to the principle first formulated under the presidency of Monroe, that this Continent must not be treated as a subject for political colonization by any European Power. It is a doctrine of peace, a doctrine to secure a change of this Continent, for the United States here to develop peaceably along their own lines. How have we formulated that doctrine? If our formulation consists simply in statements on the stump, or on paper, they are not worth the breath that utters them, or the paper on which they are written. The doctrine will be respected as long as we have a first-class efficient Navy, not very much longer.¹

"In private life, the asserter of something that he is going to do, and does not back it up is always a contemptible creature, and as a nation, the last thing we can afford to do is to take up a position which we do not intend to make good. Bragging and boasting in private life are almost always signs of a weak

¹ It is declared that high officers on the Naval Board of Construction have not hesitated to state that "An American Navy should exceed that of Germany if the country is to be safe." But there could be no attempt to invade the territory of either Power. The probable way of carrying on such a war would be in the Baltic or the English Channel.

Nevertheless, each nation might shrink less if occasion arose, from trying conclusions at sea, and the Atlantic itself might be the theatre of war. Germany's navy will be superior in size and effectiveness to that of America in 1906, according to the naval programmes, and with a larger fleet, can she not safely plant her colonies where she chooses on the South-American Continent. The truth is, America herself would greatly benefit from Germany's colonizing labours in the Southern Continent. She has far more bond with a great cultured Protestant Germany than with the horde of semi-Spanish, semi-civilized Peruvians and Argentinians.

man, and a nation that is strong need not have its public men boast and brag on its account. Least of all does a self-respecting nation wish its public representatives to threaten, menace, or insult any other Power. Our attitude towards all Powers must be one of such dignified courtesy and respect as we intend they shall show to us. In return, they must be willing to give us the friendly regard we exact from them.

"We must no more wrong them than we must submit to wrong-doing by them. When we take up a position, let us remember that our holding it depends on ourselves, depends on our showing that we have the ability to hold it. Shame to us if we assert the Monroe doctrine, and then, if our assertion shall be called in question, show only that we made an idle boast, and that we are unprepared to back our words by deeds."

Fine words! but they cannot disguise the fact that America, by the Monroe doctrine, seeks to put a barrier, and prevent the world-movement reaching the shores of a distant continent. She sets up an arbitrary, immutable, unvarying rule that not only may she interfere where right and liberty are concerned, but that she must and shall interfere in any and every case whatsoever, regardless of the circumstances, where native control is threatened from without.

The fundamental error of America is in asserting, as it must be our fundamental error in acquiescing in such assertion, that because it is at present the chief country of a hemisphere which was discovered a trifle of only four centuries ago, it occupies the position of champion of that half against the supposed aggressions of the other half. It is a self-elected champion.

The Monroe doctrine has indeed been called the one example now surviving of a first-class Power setting its strength against progress. It is opposing the principle

of the "constantly increasing responsibility of the superior and competent nations and the constantly lessening sway, influence, and territory of the inferior and the incompetent," which is to-day one of the mightiest forces in the world. It is telling Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, Columbia, and the rest, that they shall be protected in their degraded policy and incompetence, and it is telling the great trustees of Africa and Asia, and the islands of the sea that they must cease their work of morality and civilization in the Western Hemisphere, because in 1823 Mr. Monroe dreaded the Holy Alliance!

The feebleness and falsity of the Monroe doctrine is that it concerns not only countries adjacent to America, but the whole of the Western Hemisphere, parts where it has not and may never have any interest whatever, and where other and equally civilized Powers have already a great actual interest. It would be hard for any American to say what interest his country possesses in middle and lower South America to justify it in claiming any exclusive privilege. It can hardly be the preservation of a republican form of government, especially when he sees that nowadays the *name* does not exactly define the *thing*, and the chief European nations whose possible activities America seeks to restrain, are purer democracies than any of the South American republics.

Moreover, Monroeism applied to Brazil when it was (as until a dozen years ago) a monarchy.

Canada, with an area greater than America's, stands to stultify eternally the Monroe doctrine. That doctrine declared eighty years ago that European presence

in this hemisphere would be a menace to the United States. Canada in the sense then implied is European. Canada is British. Is Canada less free, are her people less happy, less enlightened, than her neighbours?

"Hemisphere" is rather a "large order." Then there is Mexico.

Less than forty years ago, Mexico's position seemed doubtful. To-day Mexico has few equals in the rapidity of her progress, and, led by a really great constructive statesman, she is developing a strong and brilliant individuality.

What does Mexico think of the Monroe doctrine? Says the exiled but patriotic Prince Yturbié—

"The Monroe doctrine of the twentieth century is not at variance with the theory to which more or less frequent expression has been given in the United States, that the mission of that country is one of conquest. Indeed, in the light of circumstances, it is as nearly the announcement of a mission of conquest as could be given in indirect words. The countries of Spanish-America¹ are not afraid of being conquered; but they are averse to entangling alliances with a great Power whose people wish continually to hear that they have missions of conquest, seeing that arrangements of that kind are calculated to brew trouble under almost any circumstances."

This settles the Monroe doctrine as far as the Spanish races are concerned. "Every barrier," says this Mexican, further, "of race, of language, of religion, of traditions, of habit, of thought, and even of geographical distance, stands between these people."

The retention by America of a permanent Asiatic dependency must vitally menace the principles of the

¹ A cumbersome and ambiguous term, implying those portions of the continents of North America and South America, excepting California, Arizona, New Mexico, Florida, and such as have been incorporated into the republic of America, which were settled and ruled by Spain and also by Portugal.

Monroe doctrine. As long as she adheres consistently to the ideal of a political domination of the Western Hemisphere, the principle of the non-interference therein by any other Power, may be logically maintained against the assumed "rapacity" of Eastern Powers. But the logic of the position disappears when America invades the Eastern Hemisphere, where she has less apparent right than any European nation has in South America.

"If," says an American writer, "it be accepted that the Monroe doctrine is a fundamental one in our foreign relations, we are bound to respect the implied limitations. If we seek a field for the expansion of Anglo-Saxon ideas, we have a broad one in our own Continent, not yet fallow-ploughed."

A leading British organ—the *Spectator*—believes, nevertheless, that—

"It would be wise policy for us formally to notify to America our recognition of the true Monroe doctrine, for, while admitting that we had no wish to expand, we should obtain something approaching an insurance of our possessions in North America, in the West Indies, and in South America."

It is not difficult for those of us who seek to ascertain the real opinion of Europe concerning America. The American is already, indeed, an *amer-eikon* (bitter image) to the Latin, the Slav, and the Teuton. Take the recent utterance of Count Canevaro, late Italian Foreign Minister, and a clear-headed statesman. He is convinced that the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance jointly have given Europe twenty years of peace, and that this fact would perhaps "lead the European nations to consider the possibility and the necessity of uniting against America and Asia, as the future civilization would require them to do." This deliverance plainly

coincides with that of Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Chancellor, and other able interpreters of the signs and needs of the times. In brief, America is regarded by Europe as a dangerous obstacle to the accomplishment of its designs, and as an impertinent intruder into the field of *welt politik*. Nor can it be supposed that the Vatican views the crippling by America of the most Catholic nation with anything but resentment, and this opinion of the Papacy is sure to yield results in the uttermost corner of Europe.

Europe—and by Europe we mean always the Continental nations—is harassed by the fear—which is almost a belief—that commercial competition with America is out of the question. Her wealth and energy are exaggerated unreasonably, and she stands before Europe as a monster seeking to monopolize trade and control all the wealth of the universe. Its tentacles are the giant Trusts, actuated by a Protectionist Government, quick to make reprisals if their victims endeavour to escape. When trade is crushed and their industrial classes are idle, socialism will arise at home to aid in the devastating process. Is it any wonder, then, that America's action regarding the exploitation of Asia and South America is bitterly resented, as an additional outrage?

At one of the greatest meetings ever held in Vienna,¹ attended by the great Austrian aristocrats and leading economists, and approved by the Austrian Premier, America was roundly denounced as the grand "peril" of the future. She was aiming, said Dr. Peez, at "universal economic supremacy," and must be fought by strict protection. Count Buquoy thought her

¹ October 23, 1901.

internal economic policy revealed "a series of crimes which were associated with an unparalleled ruthlessness in the conduct of business." The meeting unanimously passed resolutions demanding a "union of Central Europe against transoceanic competition." This means the beginning of an attempt at an economical boycott of America.

As for ourselves, we are told by our great and good British newspapers that, in spite of commercial emulation and the strongly-marked variations of character and mind, produced by lapse of time, difference of environment, and the effect of a polyglot emigration, since the separation of the race, Britain and America "are, after all, nearer in language, institutions, and national temper, as well as more closely knitted together by their economic interests, than any other two countries not under the same Government that history has known."

This is not quite correct, because Austria and Prussia were much more allied in language, and institutions, and national temper; but that did not prevent them from hating each other with a deep hatred, and finally separating, never to reunite. What is true is that no other two nations in the world are so manifestly each other's commercial rivals as Britain and America. One is Protectionist, the other Free Trade. One is a manufacturing and agricultural country, the other is forced to be manufacturing alone. Diplomatic co-operation is rendered difficult by the difference between their administrative systems. America has no permanent under-secretary, and there are no ex-Ministers in her Parliament. Surely, these things obstruct perfect union.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW COMMERCE

THE rapid change in America's trade conditions has been a fruitful theme of discussion of late. She is to-day a manufacturing exporter, instead of chiefly an importer; and is now in a fair way of becoming a creditor, instead of remaining a debtor, to Europe.¹

The gross value of manufactures in America in 1870 was \$3,385,000,000, an increase of 75 per cent. over 1860. Ten years later, in 1880, when the population had increased 30·6 per cent., the increase in the gross value of manufactures was 58 per cent., or a total of \$5,349,000,000. In 1890, with a gain in population of 24·86 per cent., the increase in manufactures was 69 per cent., the total being \$9,056,000,000. In 1900 the increase in population has been 21 per cent., and

¹ With all the recent stir concerning things American it is somewhat diverting to read in the *Edinburgh Review* of 1820, such a series of interrogations as the following:—

“In the four quarters of the globe who reads an American book? or goes to an American play? or looks at an American picture or statue? What does the world yet owe to American physicians or surgeons? What new substances have their chemists discovered? or what old ones have they analyzed? What new constellations have been discovered by the telescopes of Americans? What have they done in mathematics? Who drinks out of American glasses? or eats from American plates? or wears American coats or gowns? or sleeps in American blankets?”

the gross value of manufactures about 54 per cent. increase, or about 13 billions of dollars.¹

Thus in a paragraph we may take note of America's stupendous growth of national production. During the period that the population increased 98·54 per cent., the value of her manufactures increased 260 per cent. Domestic consumption has more than proportionately increased, but is destined to be far in the rear of production. Consequently, it is clear that America must have foreign markets wherein to dispose of her surplus.

American supremacy in the iron trade has been built up in a decade by hard work; unbounded self-confidence, unquestioned boldness in speculation, has brought the mechanism of iron-production, from the mining of ore to the handling of the finished product, to an efficiency almost marvellous. Between 1890 and 1899 the output of iron ore rose from 14½ to 24½ million tons, that of pig-iron from less than 8½ to over 13¾ million tons, and that of steel from under 4 to 10¾ million tons. At the same time mechanical appliances have been brought to such a pitch of perfection that, whilst the average production per annum per man employed at blast furnaces in 1890 was 275 tons, it had risen to 354 in 1900. In shipbuilding alone, England retains supremacy; but even here she is warned that the New York Shipbuilding Company's yard "is in all respects the most modern and the most

¹ In addition, the American flour mills are able to grind all the wheat annually grown in the entire country in eight months, and this, although over 100 millions of bushels were exported last year. It is the same with cotton; the cotton mills working only eight months in the year would produce all the cotton goods America consumes annually.

remarkable in the world," and Mr. Nixon, shipbuilder and ex-Tammany Hall leader, has announced that "notice is served upon Europe that, even in shipbuilding, we propose to go to the front."

This significant result, brought about within so brief a space of time, has not been due more to national policy than to huge natural resources and sheer hard work added to the extraordinary resourcefulness and business activity of American merchants and manufacturers in exploiting the products of American toil and ingenuity.

Many years ago, America was described by "Sam Slick" as "a land of hard work, with two kinds of slaves—the niggers and the white slaves. . . . An idle fellow who runs away to us is clapped into harness before he knows where he bees. . . . He must either draw or be dragged to death."

I have seen this inordinate passion for hard work ascribed to the climate.¹ But, whatever the cause, America's achievements in commerce are certainly the result of downright industry.

Youth is everywhere evident—in commerce, in industry, in journalism, in literature—and, almost for the first time in American history, in politics. One natural explanation of this is, that under the new

¹ "Residence in the neighbourhood of Chicago," remarks the London *Speaker*, "must be equivalent to taking a drug." Yet the Americans have not always been characterized for excessive industry. Mr. Henry Bradshaw Fearon, who visited America in 1817, says that it afforded "decided evidence of the prosperity of that country, which could admit so large a body of its citizens to waste in idleness three-fourths of their lives, and would also appear to hold out encouragement to Englishmen with English habits, who could retain their industry amid a nation of idleness, and have sufficient firmness to live in America, and yet bid defiance to the example of its natives."

strenuous *régime*, there are no old men. To our eyes it is the great drawback of the American system, which throws, with reckless disregard, men as well as machines upon the scrap-heap. At Vandergrift, a model village attached to one of the most successful ironworks in America, we are told that "hardly a dozen persons can be found over fifty years of age." Wages are high, but hours are long. Philanthropy is building model villages, but no wage-earner may dispute conditions of labour with his employer. No consideration is shown to a man because he has become skilled. One of the main aims of American workshop practice is "to reduce by every possible means the number of highly skilled men employed, and more and more to establish the general wage on the basis of common and unskilled labour." Matching and doubling in the mill, they say, can be learnt in a few weeks. A heater can be made in six months, and it took a man who had been working previously on a locomotive, from October to the following June to pass through the various stages before he arrived at the position of roller.¹

The master spares neither his men nor himself. The American business man sacrifices his life to his business. He has no companions out of business. "The American system," says Mr. Jeans, "does not provide either opportunities or a stimulus to cultivate the artistic, the literary, and the beautiful." The master comes with the men, and leaves after they have gone. No wonder is it that Allegheny City, a suburb of Pittsburg, is known as "Suicide City." Prosperity may be bought too dear, and America is paying more for her industrial

¹ Iron Commission's Report, 1902.

success than we would care to pay; more, indeed, than humanity can afford.

To illustrate how the national intensity invades every walk and calling of life, from the bank president to the bootblack, we may take the case of the cotton-mill hand. How is it, it has often been asked, that American mills, paying larger wages than are paid in Europe, can afford to compete with the European mills in the sale of cotton cloth? The industry is supposed to be conducted everywhere on the same principles. Looms can be run in one way only, that is, by superintending the movement of the shuttle by the operation. Take the case of a certain kind of print cloth: the case of labour per hundred yards is in Switzerland 2s. 6d.; in England, 2s. 0d.; in America, 1s. 8d. Yet the daily average was: in Switzerland, 2s. 0½d.; in England, 2s. 8½d.; in America, 3s. 6½d. What is the solution of the mystery? It is this: the average number of looms attended by one weaver in the mills of Switzerland and Germany was about two and half; in England, about three and a half; and in America, about six and a half. The larger number of looms worked by a single operative explains the higher wages by the day and the lower cost of labour by the piece. The larger number of looms run by one hand, the closer the attention required.

"The American worker's high earnings are," remarks a recent close observer,¹ "realized at an expense of nerve power, which the European operative is not required to expend on her work. For every unit of pay received the American operatives are obliged to turn out more yarn, pounds or pieces, than the operatives in England; the English more than the German; and the German more than the Austrian."

¹ Mr. Jacob Schoenhof.

Two years ago it seemed as if America were going to swamp European markets with production of pig-iron, and be not only the largest producer, but also controller of the world's supply. In 1900 she sent Britain 94,282 tons, and took from her only 45,000 tons of special brands. This year a constant stream is flowing the other way. Every liner from the Clyde and Mersey is taking as much pig-iron to the United States as she cares to carry, and steamer after steamer is being successfully chartered to take full cargoes from the Tees, the Clyde, and west coast ports to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other points. The latest movement is, perhaps, the most striking. It is for tonnage to convey pig-iron from our shores to New Orleans, Pensacola, and other of the gulf ports. This is remarkable because there has been no reported interruption in the output of the furnaces of the Southern States, and it was from the Southern States that Britain received her first parcels of American iron, coming at nominal freights for the ballasting of cotton ships. It is, of course, well understood that the strike of the anthracite miners of Pennsylvania has affected the output of foundry pig-iron in the Eastern State. But, then, against this we have the facts that the total output of pig-iron in America is larger than ever it was, notwithstanding the strike, and that it is not foundry iron alone that America is importing. One notable feature is the large quantity of steel-making iron, of unwrought steel, and, latterly, of finished steel, she is now drawing from Britain or from Germany.¹

¹ The growth in the importation of manufacturers' materials during the last twenty years has advanced from one-third to nearly one-half of the total.

America's lead as a manufacturing exporter was of brief duration. There came in 1901-2 a sudden and unexpected reduction in outward shipments to the extent of no less than twenty million sterling, and Britain was once more restored thereby to her premier place as an exporting nation.¹

But this does not mean that the bugbear of American competition has disappeared. The decrease in American exports has been due to two factors—the deficiency in the maize crop, a temporary condition—and next to a decline in metal manufactures. This is, however, accompanied by no decline in actual production, nor in actual

While the imports of these materials have practically doubled during this period, those of other articles have increased only about twelve per cent. A comparison for the last ten years shows an increase of fifty per cent. in the manufacturers' materials, and a decrease of ten per cent. in other imports. The contrast would be even more striking if, instead of value, quantity were taken as the basis.

¹ The decline in American exports may be seen from the following statement published by the British Board of Trade.

The imports of the four principal trading nations for the six months ending with June were—

	1900	1901	1902
United Kingdom ...	£255,657,000	£262,417,000	£262,740,000
Germany ...	146,542,000	134,069,000	139,037,000
United States ...	91,546,000	90,300,000	94,986,000
France ...	99,927,000	88,864,000	90,073,000

During the same years the exports of these countries were as under:—

	1900	1901	1902
United Kingdom ...	£144,377,000	£138,580,000	£135,376,000
United States ...	148,340,000	150,386,000	133,023,000
Germany ...	111,589,000	104,886,000	112,415,000
France ...	80,688,000	80,588,000	83,328,000

This fall has been accounted for by the fact that American manufacturers, and especially the Trusts, frequently by lowering their prices force their products into the foreign market whenever there is an over-production at home. But the truth seems to be that the decrease occurred in a few articles, such as copper, iron, and steel goods, and refined illuminating oil.

sales and consumption. It means that the American manufacturers, even with the employment of the prodigious forces at full pressure temporarily, cannot keep pace with domestic needs.

That the tide must turn is of course inevitable; the fat years must be followed by the lean. Even now American trade prosperity is not exempt from the shadow of coming trouble. For instance, the labour outlook is far from reassuring; the increasing frequency of strikes and lockouts is a factor which must retard development. But supposing this trouble to be in the main surmounted by the capitalists, the huge internal activity, added to the scientific process of improvement and remodelling in America's industrial apparatus—a process the British ironmasters and manufacturers yet shrink from—must tell in America's favour. Railways are extending their facilities; factories are reuovating their plants; the prime cost of manufacture is everywhere being reduced to a minimum.¹

High wages necessarily precipitate cheap production. They form the great inducement for the introduction of improvements in machinery, which would not be undertaken in countries where a low wage standard obtains.

No mill-owner or manufacturer would condemn still sound machinery to the junk-heap unless results commensurate with the monetary outlay were in sight.

¹ The efficiency of American machinery has been secured at enormous cost—waste, the English ironmaster would call it.

At one of the best known and most successful Bessemer shops, writes Mr. Enoch James in the Iron Trade Commission report, it was stated that the whole plant had been reconstructed four times during the last twenty-five years down to the very foundations, and this, too, under the supervision of the same engineer.

Improvements mean a lower piece rate to the operative, and he would resist the change unless he saw a prospect of better earnings. An American not long ago exchanged notes with the manager of a Swiss cotton-mill. He found that the cost of management and equipment per spindle and per loom was about three times as high as in England. Expressing his surprise, he was told that it was true that their equipment was more expensive, but that it was "so much better and lasted so much longer."

This was, in American eyes, a poor policy. There mills are undergoing perpetual change through the introduction of newly invented devices.

The mills in the South are, for the most part, new mills, with new machinery of the latest type, especially the new automatic loom.

As to the new scale of wages in America, the last report of Mr. Bell, the British commercial agent, contains some interesting information. The United States Steel Corporation caused considerable sensation when, a short time ago, the working men in all branches of the steel works had their wages increased without having asked for it. Present prosperity, of course, fully justifies these increases in wages. Not only are the manufacturers and transportation companies making large profits, but the cost of living has gone up enormously during the last few years. Wage earners were never before so fully occupied nor so well paid.

"Probably a number of factors have contributed to this result. While it is true, no doubt, that prices have advanced faster than wages, the hardship to the wage-earner has unquestionably been in considerable measure off-set by steadier

employment. For some years past the industries of the nation, as a whole, have been kept so busy as to necessitate the steady employment of a maximum working force. In some former periods, when the disparity between prices and wages was less striking than it is to-day, such was not the case. At such times the wage-earner was frequently in danger of having to tide himself over long intervals of enforced idleness. Though a dollar then would, at any given time, procure for him more of the necessaries of life than it will now, he did not have the dollars coming to him month after month and year after year with the regularity that has been the case in the last few years."¹

For the moment, then, the great forces of American production are in abeyance, they are absorbed by domestic prosperity; when this is completely supplied we must expect a renewed onslaught upon the world's markets.

Meanwhile, though the trade has not been so brisk as formerly, yet the national revenue showed on the 30th of June last a surplus of eighteen million sterling over expenditure out of an income of one hundred and twelve million sterling, and many millions of the war taxes have been already repealed.

It is highly absurd for any American to suppose that his country's prosperity can be independent of Europe. The countries of Europe form America's principal customers,² and if hard times and insolvency were to overtake these customers, it needs no abstruse economy to discover that America would suffer. She is making

¹ "You in Europe are continually asking, What is the use of America? What is America for? Here is my answer. The function of this country and its people is the diffusion among men of material good."—Richard Grant White.

² Her total exports in 1900 amounted to \$1,394,000,000, of which amount \$1,000,000,000 went to European countries.

things she does not want, and she wants things she does not make. Under the present circumstances of international capital, neither seller nor buyer can claim any advantage over the other, or prate about commercial independence.

Again, the idea that America's prosperity is to be gauged by the excess of her exports over her imports is equally fallacious. It merely signifies that America, having accumulated more capital than it can employ at home, has ceased to be a borrower, and is supplying capital—*i.e.* machinery and food stuffs—to Europe. When Europe begins to pay the interest on this capital, the imports into America will probably exceed her exports. Yet such a circumstance, properly viewed, can hardly cause misgivings in the mind of any educated American.

But suppose that Europe does not wish to borrow any more such capital from America. Suppose hard times replace the present prosperous ones. Would not an industrial collapse in England or Germany produce an immediate effect on American trade? Would it not mean that their warehouses would soon become stocked with unsaleable goods? The situation as to imports and exports would then be reversed; but it would obviously require an altogether different interpretation. The inflow would perhaps then exceed the outflow, but it would not signify prosperity, because the former would be not interest, but capital.

And capital has always been flowing to America from Europe. When one nation borrows from another, the loan must take concrete shape. It must be represented either by gold or goods, and interest must take

either of these forms. America has been and is paying her forty years' debt to Europe in produce and manufactures, and very naturally her exports have exceeded her imports.

It is not improbable she is now catching up, and is beginning to pay some of the principal, and is even lending where a decade ago she borrowed. But that is merely because Europe, owing to her greater recent military and naval expenditure, is paying a higher rate of interest on money, and American capitalists are seeking that temporarily higher rate.

But it must not be supposed that America's payment of interest on British capital in America is greater than is actually the case. The export of her manufactures is relatively by no means so large as those writers who speak of the American "invasion" would have us believe.

America has abundant coal resources; and coal being, according to the present conditions, the basis of machine production, her future in this respect is assured.

The coal area of Western Europe, practically all open to mining, is less than 10,000 square miles, while in America 50,000 square miles is already available, and this by no means represents her resources. The bulk of American coal is now mined in six States—Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois, Alabama, and Iowa. But coal is found in twenty counties in Virginia. Kentucky contains two large coal fields, one being 4500 square miles in area. The Missouri coal fields comprise 25,000 square miles, and the coal is of fair quality. Texas has a coal-bearing area of 30,000 square miles. The Rocky Mountain region is declared to abound in coal. Wyoming has 20,000 square miles

of coal lands. Colorado 18,000 square miles, and Montano 60,000 square miles of coal-bearing area.

But putting aside these huge facts, the six mining States alone have within the last few years distanced all competitors, even the United Kingdom, as may be seen from the following table:—

Year.	Great Britain.	Germany.	France.	Belgium.	America.
1885	161,800,000	73,600,000	19,500,000	17,400,000	102,100,000
1890	184,500,000	82,200,000	26,000,000	20,300,000	141,600,000
1895	194,300,000	79,100,000	28,200,000	20,400,000	187,000,000
1898	205,200,000	96,200,000	30,300,000	21,400,000	218,000,000

Thus it is seen that America in 1898 finally succeeded in exceeding the output of Great Britain.

Moreover, American coal is so abundant that the mines are shallow and easily worked, while many European mines are so deep as to threaten soon to be unprofitable.

A slow but regular increase of American coal to Europe has lately taken place, and this movement will go on until the European miner is forced to give up the battle. Each advance in prices helps the American mine-owner, who can now pay all freight charges, and profitably send his coal 3000 or 4000 miles. At present the mine price of coal is 6*s.* 7*d.* a ton in England, and in France 9*s.* 7*d.*, while in America it is only 4*s.* 7*d.*

"Our industry," wrote Jevons,¹ years ago, "will certainly last and grow until our mines are commonly sunk 2000, 3000, or even 4000 feet deep. But when that time comes, the States of Northern America will still be working coal in the light of day. Quarrying it down on the banks of the Ohio, and running

¹ The Coal Question.

it down into boats alongside. The question is, how soon will our mines approach the limit of commercial possibility, and fail to secure us any longer that manufacturing supremacy on which we are learning to be wholly dependent?"

Yet, with all her advantages, America has many natural disadvantages to overcome in comparison with her European rivals, and some that are insuperable. With the single exception of Birmingham, Alabama, there is no place in America so well situated for iron production as the British centres, with their proximity to points of shipment and consumption. England to this day is therefore superior in natural advantages to America, and with enterprise and organization could press the Americans hard upon their home market. If the high tariff made that impossible, it could drive them out of the foreign market unless they sold below cost price.

Readers of American newspapers can hardly fail to have been struck by the relative progress of the South over the North. Side by side with the accounts of the establishment of new mills in the former, of increased output and capital, are found items relating to lowered wages, strikes, lock-outs, and those disputes between capital and labour which presage the decline of a once great industry in New England.

Twenty years ago the total capital invested in Southern manufacturing was \$257,200,000; now it is \$1,500,000,000. The cotton crop has doubled, and the cotton manufacture has sextupled. In 1880 the total wages paid to factory hands in the South was \$75,700,000; now it is \$400,000,000. The output of coal has jumped from 6,000,000 tons to 50,000,000; that of iron from

397,000 tons to 3,000,000 tons. Cotton is king still in the South, where the production is now some 12,000,000 bales per annum; but it is not the sole industry, nor has it yet reached the high-water mark of development, although in actual cultivation it has probably reached the low-water mark in price.¹ The staple has been forced down to a price which would soon ruin an all-cotton country; while owing to probable arrangement with Cuba, and the recent Reciprocity treaties with the West Indian Islands, these latter become formidable rivals to the South in tobacco, sugar, and rice. But, on the other hand, it is the seaboard cities of the South which must be the chief ports for America's new trade with the West Indies; and Savannah, Charleston, Fernandina, Jacksonville, Tampa, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and Galveston will expand proportionately. Even now, Southern cattle, live stock, iron, steel, and cotton goods are being imported to Cuba and Porto Rico. The rivalry in sugar, rice, and tobacco is only serving to force the Southern half of America into keener competition with New England in the manufacture of its own raw material. Ten years ago ninety per cent. of the pork, for instance, consumed in the Gulf States came from Chicago and Cincinnati. Now large pork-packing factories are springing up in all directions, in addition to the large quantities of this staple raised and consumed at home by the Southern farmers. Flour mills are also beginning to abound in every State locally capitalized. A new

¹ The total cotton crop of the United States for the year 1901-2 was, 10,701,453 bales, against 10,425,141 in the previous year, and 9,439,559 during 1899-1900.

grain elevator, with a capacity of 1,000,000 bushels, has just been erected as far south as Galveston, Texas.

But the greatest activity is being manifested in the manufacture of cotton, where there are now 6,000,000 spindles at work, or more than treble the number operated a decade ago. Many of the minor mills pay 8 per cent. dividend, while the largest earn over from 12 to 20 per cent. To show the sentiment back of all this increased activity, I take the following from an address by one of the manufacturers.

"Every bale of cotton produced in Georgia should be spun in Georgia. There is no such thing as too many mills in the South so long as a single bale of cotton is shipped to New England or across the water. I am tired of seeing our farmers sell their cotton at \$25 per bale to foreign manufacturers, and buy it back in its manufactured state at from \$60 to \$75, the difference between the price received and the price paid having gone to pay freight, to enrich foreign manufacturers, and to feed and clothe the poor of other countries, while our own worthy poor are left to spend their lives in misery and want."

This is sound economic doctrine, and will yet inevitably be made the basis of all trade and production, unless Governments make the duties so high on alien manufactures and so low on the raw material as to encourage the exports of the one and discourage the export of the other. If America undertook to manufacture all her own cotton, it would be a blow to Europe to be felt, until other sources of supply were discovered; in the mean time the mills would be in the position of those in Lancashire during the Civil War.

I am a firm believer in the doctrine that Free trade

means waste, because it involves so many of the middlemen and transporters. Protection, on the other hand, brings producer and consumer together on the same ground, and so prevents waste. But this is by the way.

The sudden successful rivalry of the South is ascribed to the higher rate of wages paid in the North. Considerable investigation has been undertaken by legislative committees, manufacturers' delegations, and unofficial inquirers into what is called the "Textile War," which shed a flood of light upon the advantages attending cotton-milling in the South. The conclusion reached is that the Southern States have an enormous advantage in cheap labour, and that the mills of New England cannot compete their rivalry without a substantial reduction of wages.

The lower cost of living is found to be responsible for their difference. According to the report of American commissioners of labour, the average income of cotton weavers per family in the Carolinas was \$412.09; the average in Massachusetts was \$52.28, or 27 per cent. higher than in the South. But a family in the South is larger on the average, and there is a higher percentage of workers to each family than in Massachusetts.

So that it is estimated that wages in the latter State were 40 per cent. above those obtaining in the South, and this is doubtless correct. Besides, the Southern mills have the advantage of an hour or an hour and a half longer working day. Thus the cost of labour being the chief item—87 per cent.—the South having advantage of 30 or 40 per cent. in this regard. Is it wonderful, therefore, that capital is pouring into the South and revolutionizing the conditions of life there? Since 1897



lumber mills have sprung up all over the South ; factories for furniture, waggons, spokes and brooms are utilizing the enormous area of virgin forests. One of the lumber companies in South Carolina is amongst the largest in the country, wholly due to the Dingby tariff against Canadian timber.

Sheep-raising is becoming important in Tennessee and North Carolina, and woollen mills are arising in many places. In Florida and the Carolinas sufficient phosphate deposits have been discovered to fertilize all the grain and cotton lands for centuries, while in Georgia and Tennessee marble and granite are shipped in vast quantities. Of the other new industries, ostrich-farming is now being carried on in Florida with success, and not less successfully the cultivation of tea in South Carolina where the soil is admirably suited to the finer species.

The greatest obstacle in the way of the extension of America's non-European commerce has been her lack of steamship facilities. A large portion of her trade with the South American continent is done *via* Europe ; she has not a single line of steamers running to the River Plate, although there are numberless European lines running to and from that river and district. While trade has to be conducted under such conditions, it is impossible for it to expand. America has therefore come to realize that as long as she depends on other nations to do her ocean-carrying trade, her exports to the countries of the South continent and elsewhere will remain of relatively small account.

Not even her panacea of reciprocity will help her much. But once the Isthmian Canal is cut, with cotton

mills adjoining the cotton plantations spinning cheap cloth, with iron and steel forges in Alabama, Ohio, and Pennsylvania alongside coal mines, with the unequalled extension of internal communications, what is to set a limit to America's commercial progress?

Some might answer—the faults and insecure structure of society; the growing antagonism between capital and labour; the failure of the State to assimilate jarring elements. The set-back will be social, not economic; it will not arise from lack of material resources.

America has much to fear from labour troubles. There continues to be deep unrest among the industrial classes. The strikes and the great fortunes made by trust promoters, especially the coal and steel men, have naturally produced discontent among the wage-workers, and a desire for better conditions. Strikes in the bituminous coal fields of the West and South may be looked for, to be followed by another among the employees on the large railway systems. During the recent coal strike in Pennsylvania troops guarded the mines, with orders "shoot to kill" strikers who attempt by violence to prevent any men from working in the mines who may desire to do so. Intense bitterness prevailed on both sides, and the increased dearness of anthracite coal entailed great hardship upon the poor in large cities.¹

"The duty of the public in trade disputes," once said Lord Derby, "is to make a ring to see fair play."

But in America public opinion is not yet sufficiently

¹ The losses arising out of the strike were not less than \$92,300,000, of which \$21,200,000 represent wages lost by the men.

advanced to see or to desire to compel fair play. Personal liberty is talked about until it becomes wearisome to the ear; but it is not the kind of personal liberty to which we Britons are accustomed.

Take even the case of the recent steel strike, which is supposed to have been comparatively free from riotous excesses. In the districts covered by the strike hundreds of men willing to work were not allowed to work; the mill approaches were picketed by relays of strikers; non-union men were set upon and forced to retire under threats of assault. The few who succeeded in evading the vigilance of the strikers' pickets were simply prisoners, not daring to venture out even for food. At railway stations and in the streets inoffensive persons suspected of being non-unionists were pelted with stones, badly beaten, or kidnapped and imprisoned. Besides these actual sufferers were the thousands of other victims who, owing to the reign of menace and injury, were unable to come forward and obtain employment.

Where, it may be asked, is America's equivalent to the English "Conspiracy and Protection Act"? There are, indeed, various laws on the subject scattered throughout the States; but what avail are they when they are not enforced by the full strength of the Government, if need be? "Freedom," declares a Massachusetts judge, "is the policy of this country; but freedom does not imply a right in one person, either alone or in combination with others, to disturb or annoy, either directly or indirectly, another's lawful business or occupation for the sake of compelling him to buy his peace."

The entire authority of the State should, if necessary,

be put in motion to protect the liberty of a single citizen; the law should be uniform for all, and universal in its application, and the refusal and failure of the State to repress and punish violations of personal liberty is a practical alliance with, and a defence of, anarchy.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN ARMY

LORD WOLSELEY, with, as it seemed, a fine love of paradox, perhaps from an exaggerated belief in the value of individual initiative, has lately told us that the American Army is "the best in the world."

A few years ago the very phrase "American Army" would almost have been tinctured with irony.¹

Contrasted with the conditions which pertained less than a quarter of a century ago, the change in *personnel* and *moral*, is even more striking than that which has marked all the other conditions of national life. Europeans smiled at the laxity which attended enlistments. Who took the American Army seriously? What need was there for an American Army at all, except as a small mounted frontier force? In those days, as an American officer² reminds us, "the recruit who easily entered through the front door made his exit from the Army with equal smoothness; the result being that for a time the desertions outnumbered the enlist-

¹ In 1890 the whole military force of a nation of 60,000,000 consisted of only 25,000 privates (principally of foreign birth) and 2144 officers. The navy was even proportionally smaller. Yet both appeared to suffice, because it seemed absurd to suppose a war with any foreign power.

² General H. C. Corbin.

ments, and became a national disgrace." Yet the reformers of the Army had a hard task to enlist the public and the Government in their cause. Army reform finally came; it began with a closer scrutiny of candidates. The recruiting standard has gone on increasing in severity, until in 1898 only three men were accepted for every ten rejected as unfit; that is to say, only 29,521 recruits passed muster, while 98,277 applicants were rejected as lacking in legal, mental, moral, or physical requirements.

In the British Army the chief qualification is the physical one; it is almost a foregone conclusion that when a candidate presents himself he is a British subject. It would, on the other hand, surprise no one who recognizes the cosmopolitan character of America to learn that a large number of Army candidates were foreigners. Strictly speaking, of course, there are no foreigners in the American Army. If the force may not be called, as one of its commanders calls it, "American in every sense of the word," yet it is a legal requirement that the accepted soldier shall be a citizen of the United States, "or shall have declared his intention to become a citizen." Out of the 130,000 men who presented themselves at the recruiting office in 1898, only some 5000 were aliens, and these were promptly rejected. Of the 29,521 accepted applicants, we learn that 24,000 were native born and 5031 of foreign birth.

Every recruit is obliged to bring with him testimonials of good character signed by two persons, and it is part of the military requirements that "if satisfactory evidence of good character, habits, and conditions cannot be furnished by the recruits, or be otherwise

obtained, the presumption should be against him, and he should not be accepted."

There are other points in the recruiting system which deserve our passing notice. In addition to being of good character, he must specifically be free from intemperate habits; and recruiting officers are directed to seek closely for evidence of intoxication or other forms of debauchery. . . . The recruiting officer cannot be perfectly justified in rejecting men upon whom the smell of liquor was perceptible. The applicant must, furthermore, be intelligent, and must speak, read, and write the American language. Here is a quotation from "Triplet's Manual," the official guide for officers in their examination of recruits:—

"The examination of men for enlistment may, in general terms, be divided into the *physical*, the *intellectual*, and the *moral*. In the emergencies which our troops are called upon to meet, where celerity of movement and ability to endure privation and hardships are indispensable to success, the necessity for able-bodied men is obvious. Intellectually, although no educational standard is officially established, a soldier should be able to read and write, and should also be quick and clear in his understanding. The advance in the science and art of war, and the improvement in modern fire-arms, calls for a higher degree of intelligence than was required by the soldiers in the past. This is recognized by the Government by the establishment of schools and libraries, by providing reading-rooms that are liberally supplied with periodicals and newspapers, and by opening the way for promotion to all who will avail themselves of these opportunities for advancement. The care and attention that the soldier is required to give to his weapon and ammunition, the drill which their use entails, and the skill which may be attained by the practice of rifle-firing, develop individuality, excite interest and ambition, and tend to make the profession attractive. It is therefore desirable

that men should be selected who can appreciate this life, and who have the mental capacity to profit by it.

"The moral character should be scrutinized with care, in order that enlistments from the vagrant and criminal classes may be avoided. The recruiting *rendezvous* is a favourite haunt for these men; and a study of their personal characteristics will well repay the recruiting officer for his labour. The vagrant seeks admission to the Army usually at the beginning of winter, for shelter, food, and clothing, without any intention of completing his enlistment or of performing any more service than he is compelled. The criminal seeks to bury his unsavoury history under an assumed name, and by service in distant stations to escape the observation of those who know him. The evil influence of even one of this class cannot be overestimated; and no degree of physical perfection or soldierly bearing would induce a recruiting officer to accept his service."

In one sense, America may be said truly to have "the best army in the world," for not in America can the private of the regular army be made the butt of scornful jests, or the fact of his enlistment be accepted as *prima facie* evidence of his having failed in life. The legal requirements which must be observed before he can enlist, and the physical examination which he must pass, render it certain that his acceptance is a guarantee of worth. He is even welcomed in the music-halls.

In a country where nearly every man goes armed, and pugnacity exists to a remarkable degree, it is delightful to find an army so peaceful and well behaved. Before the prospective recruit passes into the hands of the examining surgeon, he is obliged to answer the following questions:—

1. Have you given your true name or an assumed one?

2. Do you understand clearly the nature of the oath of enlistment, and are you fully determined to serve the United States honestly and faithfully ?

3. What is your object in enlisting ? Do you already understand the nature of the "Declaration of Recruit" connected with enlistment ?

4. Are you familiar with the Act of Congress "to prevent desertion from the Army and for other purposes ?"

5. Do your parents and other relatives know of your intention to enlist ?

6. Are there any reasons for your parents or other relatives objecting to your enlistment ?

7. Give the names of two reputable persons, residents near the house of your parents, who are acquainted with them ?

8. Have you given up any occupation on account of health or habits ?

9. By what firm or individual have you been employed in the past six months ?

10. Was your character good when you left that employment or service, etc. ?

This is not all. There are numerous other questions regarding the recruit's parents and his own physical condition, and whether he has been convicted of felony or imprisoned in jail or penitentiary. The investigations into his bodily health are particularly rigorous. The recruiting officer is held rigidly accountable for the enlistment of men who may be found unfitted for service ; and if the enlistment has been carelessly made in violation of regulations, the expenses incurred may be deducted from the officer's pay.

In brief, the barriers to enlistment are much greater in America than at present in any other country.

In Great Britain only applicants for enlistment in the Household Cavalry are required to give certificate of good character, while the educational tests are confined to those who seek to enter the Engineer corps.

Moreover, the essentials as to height, weight, chest measurement, and age are less exacting with us than in America.

The pay of an American private begins at \$13 (£2 13s. 2d.) a month; after three years' service it is increased \$1; in his fourth year \$2, and in his fifth year \$3 a month. If the soldier re-enlists he receives \$2 a month additional, so that in his sixth year his pay amounts to \$18, or nearly half a crown clear per diem, in addition to first-rate rations, lodging, clothing, and medical attendance. A liberal furlough is granted, and when on furlough the private receives not only full pay, but a shilling a day extra in lieu of rations. His clothing allowance is so liberal that, with care, he can receive on his discharge a sum equal to the difference between the clothing allowed and clothing drawn, often amounting to £20.

The Government also permits and encourages soldiers to deposit money with paymasters, allowing 4 per cent. interest on such deposits.

But, best of all, the private can go on serving thirty years, and then be placed on the retired list with three-quarters of the pay allowances to which he was entitled at the time of his retirement. There are many such retired soldiers in America, less than fifty years of age, and drawing their four shillings a day, without ever

having received a wound or ever having fought a battle.

But now, when we pass from the American Army *in* Army to America as a military power, we have to deal with a different matter.

The people of America have gone about their military affairs like children playing at soldiers. There was no discipline, there was no craving for improvement, there was no intelligence.

For a bellicose and jingoistic folk, ready at all times to take and give offence, the Americans are still surprisingly unmilitary. Perhaps I should say that there is an absence of a scientific military spirit in the country. They do not take the profession of arms seriously; and our recent experience in South Africa has rather disposed them to believe that a regular army has very little advantage, if any, over the untrained volunteer.

"The indifference of our people to military literature," remarks General Anderson, "is surprising." He comments on the fact that whereas European periodicals publish many articles on military subjects, in American magazines they are conspicuous by their absence. "This apathy can only be accounted for by the fact that Mars has asked but a subordinate part in our national drama." To judge by the popular press and the tone of American opinion, one might suppose that all American wars had been triumphantly successful. Yet even in her campaigns against the Indians she has had to suffer numerous actual defeats. Of the Revolutionary War her people remember the successful battles, but forget the humiliating reverses of the untrained militia against a disciplined

army at, say, Long Island and at Camden. The war of 1812 was a succession of humiliations. "Our untrained and ill-disciplined levies," confesses one distinguished officer, "proved utterly unreliable."

The Mexican war was better, because there were very few volunteers, and if volunteers did well in the Civil War it was only because they fought against volunteers, and were led by regular officers.

From 1865 to 1898, the utmost required of the 26,000 men who formed the American Army was to chastise the belligerent Red Man, or perhaps to quell a riot at the instance of the Federal Government. Thirty-three years of inaction had done its work: this little army was ignorant of the art of modern fighting, it was ignorant of military tactics adapted to modern needs.

But, it will be asked, did the great Civil War teach the Army nothing? Did it not leave a heritage of professional knowledge of technical skill, of traditional discipline and *esprit de corps*?

The answer is that the American Army was little better than a body of armed civilians controlled by intelligent officers, who, capable as they were, could hardly be expected to take their profession seriously, as long as the public did not take them, or it seriously, as long as public opinion seemed to maintain that an army did require organization and training, but could spring into being at the mere behest of a President in any National emergency.

Strange to say, the lesson of the Civil War was unheeded. Both sides were equally ill prepared; both North and South spent months in drilling and placing

their armies in the field ; both sides committed unparalleled military blunders ; consequently there was no penalty suffered such as would have followed had one of the combatants been on a different and more efficient military footing.

Put into his hands the best and latest modern engines, let the field of operations be where it will—and the volunteer is not the regular soldier. Let the amateur be animated by patriotic zeal, let him have physical strength and endurance and skill in battalions, he is not and never will be a match for the professional soldier. But in America his inferiority is marked, because he lacks the leading essential, discipline ; because he has never been made to learn that hard lesson, implicit obedience. Subordination is never easy to the average American, in whatever capacity ; but he conquered, he was obliged to conquer, his natural intractability, at the time of the Civil War, at whose beginning instances of fantastic insubordination of men to their officers abounded. They had known their officers in private life, many of them were their social inferiors ; their superior military knowledge was suspected ; was it surprising that their commands were frequently disobeyed ? That on a march in a campaign, it was a case of the blind following the blind ?

But the American volunteers did master their lesson ; drastic penalties did their work, and the amateur soldier did at length acquire discipline. The popular reasoning was, therefore, that what he once did he could again. When the Presidential proclamation went forth, the raw levies would appear in their thousands and tens of thousands, they would undergo the usual process, and

soon be transformed into an army. But, in the mean time, what of the enemy?

Such was the situation at the outbreak of the war with Spain. "It has taken," remarked one notable American, "the weakest military power in Europe to open our eyes." What if it had been the strongest?

The system which took it for granted that the amateur was equal to the graduate was to encounter a severe shock. The first weeks of the war shattered many cherished American illusions. The nation heard with profound chagrin that one body of its volunteers had refused to go into action. It heard of one regiment becoming so demoralized as to threaten the entire line, and to avert a panic it had to be despatched unceremoniously to the rear.

The average American took no interest in his regular army. He (and she) reserved all his enthusiasm for the volunteers, who are often men of means and social position; just as the Englishman does on special occasions, but the Englishman knows that the backbone of his defence and defiance consists of the regular army, and the American is now beginning to appraise the trained professional soldier at his real value.

Since 1898 a new interest sprang up in the Army. The average man suddenly became aware that the men in the ranks are not all there was to the Army, that an institution known as the Staff Corps had quietly developed. The policy of *laissez faire* had bred official incompetence; the Staff Corps was utterly inadequate to the occasion of war. Criticism had exhausted itself upon the British War Office lately; but this department was in a high state of efficiency, and performed its

work with magical foresight and despatch, compared with the American Staff Corps in 1898.

Food supplies ran short, winter uniforms were provided for a campaign in the tropics, there were no hospitable arrangements, there were no transports to carry sixteen thousand men from Florida to Cuba. When the troops landed in Cuba the only rations at first available were soap and candles. Afterwards, the vessels discharged fat bacon and salt pork, probably the very worst food that could be furnished men who are undertaking a severe campaign in the tropics. But let me quote from one of the eye-witnesses of the campaign :

"When supplies were at last brought to the front, tomatoes in two-pound cans were issued. Think of men having to march and go into battle with bulky tomato cans stowed about their persons! Yet the commissary department had so little knowledge of the actual requirements of war that, because tomatoes for commercial use are sold in cans containing two pounds, that size was accepted for the Army. . . . To provision a few hundred men in garrison requires no great knowledge or executive capacity. This has been the experience of commissary officers for the past thirty years. They have drawn supplies, they have signed their names to vouchers, they have drawn their salaries. That is all."

Perhaps no department was so unready as the medical corps, which allowed regiments to go into action lacking a single surgeon. Troops in an enemy's country had bullets dug from their bodies with pen-knives, because the surgeons neglected to furnish hospitals, and were without their instrument-cases at hand. With a battle imminent, no provision was made for the care of the wounded, and when after the battle

the wounded were brought in tens and hundreds, there were no means for their proper treatment.

The great military question before the Americans is how to make the military strength of their country available in a great emergency.

"Our Army," said President Roosevelt in 1899, "has never been built up as it should be built up . . . there is nobody from which the country has less to fear and none of which it should be prouder, none which it should be more anxious to up-build. Our Army needs complete re-organization—not merely enlarging."

In 1900 the Secretary of War clearly drew the limits within which the movement must be confined, when he said that "the country must rely for its main strength upon the volunteers, since the armaments of other Powers are so great that almost any conflict in which we may become involved will require a much larger standing force than any which we are willing to maintain."

What the size of their standing army should be, we may gather from Mr. Secretary Root's recommendation, that provision be made for a "minimum force of 60,000 with an authorized maximum of 100,000," while Lieutenant-General commanding suggests the proportion of "one soldier to every thousand of population," or, according to the present census, about 80,000 men.¹

The possible military strength of America in war time should not be less than 2,000,000 men. How

¹ A scheme is now being championed in America which is to give the Army its own reserve by increasing the term of enlistment, while lengthening the present period of active service.

may this potential army of defence be so organized as to constitute a safeguard?

The outbreak of war soon opened the eyes of the public as to the efficiency of the National Guard. The administration was panic-stricken: equipments were missing, regiments which ought to have been mustered at a moment's notice were delayed for weeks. In only one or two States was the force in even approximate readiness. There was no self-reliance amongst the force even at their annual State encampment. When they assembled for the purpose of military instruction, their stations were supplied under contract by a professional caterer.

Yet it seems certain that in building up a great army, America must take into consideration her egregious National Guard.

What is the National Guard? It is a huge, ambitious, dilettante wire-pulling organization—about as warlike, scientific, and efficient as the Imperial Guard of China.

As to its political influence, a notable example was given just prior to the late war with Spain, when pending legislation for the national defence was arrested by the National Guard, because adequate concessions had not been made to its leaders. It has ramifications in every State, and its constitution enables it to take advantage of every political emergency to advance its own ends. As for that for which it was primarily organized, it merely goes under an uncertain amount of drill annually, administered in a haphazard way.

Being the National Guard, it is supposed to be subsidized by the nation, as well as by the several States; but when one learns that the amount of the subsidy is

only £80,000 per annum, to be distributed amongst two hundred thousand members, it is perceived that America hopes to do her soldiering very much, to use a colloquialism, "on the cheap."

It is true that, besides this, there is, in most of the States, an additional small appropriation; but, on the whole, the National Guard relies for its support upon private donations and upon the efforts of its individual members.

Americans always show themselves to be legal pedants—that is the inevitable result of their rigid Constitution—but never does this pedantry appear so ridiculous as in the discussions over the legal status of the National Guard.

Is the force a national or a local one? Must it, as a unit, obey the President, or is it a congeries of atoms, each obeying its State Governor? Fancy the destruction of prestige and authority implied in such a fantastic dispute! One group roundly declares that the organization is subject only to the orders of the Governors of the respective States, and that no call from the President is legally competent to put a single member into active operation before an enemy not on State soil. Another faction, while acknowledging the authority of the President, asserts that his order must come through the Governor, and that no call through other channels need be listened to. Another class, and this is growing into the majority, believes in the fundamental authority of the National Government, and announces itself ready always to respond to any orders received from Washington, regardless of the channel through which such mandate may come.

As a matter of fact, the National Guard is what we would term the Militia of America, and is, therefore, subject to the President, and not to the State Government.

At present the Army consists of seventy thousand regulars, which is only one man for every thousand of the population—an absurdly small proportion. A city of ten thousand inhabitants, so to speak, represented by ten soldiers! Well may it be said that "there can be no menace to the republic as a standing army of proportion so meagre, when compared to the total population." Inasmuch as a large proportion of this force will always be serving abroad, the number of regulars in the country is little, if any, larger than under the old *régime*.

America will have to improve her system of mobilization. The war against Spain was declared April 21, 1898. The first expedition which left San Francisco for the Philippines did not leave until May 25. This force consisted of five companies of regulars and two full regiments of volunteers. It did not boast a single field gun, horse, mule, or cart. A month later it was followed by two other expeditions, totalling 11,000 men, yet the entire force was without transportation, save such as could be raked and scraped together on the islands. Four months passed before Manila was attacked, August 13, the entire American Army then consisting of two regiments and two volunteer batteries of field artillery, parts of four regiments of regulars, and eight regiments of volunteers.

Imagine such a situation if America had been fighting a first-class power!

Since the close of the Civil War general officers have never had under their command at one time more than

a few thousand men. Consequently, they knew nothing of tactics on a large scale. The new mobilizing arrangement will give brigade and divisional commanders large bodies of troops to handle, and so enable them to conduct a campaign under conditions approaching reality.

The charge for this annual mobilization will naturally fall upon the National Government, that is to say, the encampment expenses. It now makes an annual appropriation for the benefit of the militia force, and it could exercise influence upon the States which refuse to send their troops to the encampment by depriving them of their share in the appropriation. Or the system under which the appropriation is allocated might be changed, and a fixed sum paid to the State for every soldier present at the national encampment. But this would hardly be necessary—it would suffice that the National Government requested the co-operation of the State authorities: they would not dare refuse.

That with an army may come militarism and a military caste is not unlikely in America, but for serious reasons it will never attain the ascendancy it has got in France. The Americans have always been fond of military distinction; from the Army they draw the chief store of the titles with which they ornament their not always distinguished personal nomenclature. Such titles are not always a guarantee of military distinction or even of military service on the humblest scale. The Governor of a State may appoint any private citizen to his *entourage*, and the appointment carries with it a coloneley. I do not profess to know how generals are made, but not long since I addressed a letter to a prominent newspaper

editor in Boston whom a few years ago I knew as Colonel T. In his absence my letter to the colonel was replied to by his secretary, who informed me somewhat coldly, I thought, that *General T.* would make an appointment on his return to town. Conscious that the Cuban War had intervened, I subsequently remarked to a mutual friend that that conflict had enabled the colonel to show his real as distinguished from his fictitious military prowess. "Cuban War!" exclaimed my friend. "Why, T. hasn't been within a thousand miles of Cuba. He is a general *honoris causa*."

I cannot close this chapter without some reference to the pension system.

No other nation in the world has dealt so liberally and ungrudgingly with the survivors and widows and orphans of its wars. In the last thirty-three years it has paid to its pensioners the stupendous sum of half a billion sterling, in addition to three millions in fees for the medical examination of applicants and fifteen million sterling for other expenses of administration. The grand total in dollars is 2,327,021,872. In brief, the nation pays away thirty millions sterling annually for pensions, and the war with Spain has added several thousand further names to the pension-roll.

Pension attorneys have educated the public mind to believe that service in war means a pension, whether the soldier is disabled or not. Consequently, all who went into the Spanish War were familiar with the systems of its large appropriations. The pension agents swarmed in the volunteer camps, and "thousands of well-meaning lads, who had just passed a rigid physical examination to enter the Army, made all their

arrangements for pensions before performing any duty."

How debauching must such a system be! The number of volunteers who saw service in battle during the war with Spain is paltry enough, yet 27,047 claims for pensions were filled up to June, 1900.

CHAPTER X

THE NEW SHIPPING

AMERICA has lately been making great efforts to possess a navy and a mercantile marine. Popular interest began to centre in the navy, thanks largely to the writings of men like Captain Mahan, who began, in 1897, to preach the gospel of armaments, the need of aggressiveness, and the danger of a policy which looks inward and never outward. Some time before the war with Spain, and the ensuing naval victories, and since then, the popular demand for battleships has been strenuously approved by the President and acceded to by both Houses of Congress.¹

¹ A return was issued in August, 1902, showing the fleets of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, America, and Japan, distinguishing the different classes of vessels built and building. The following table gives a summary of the comparative results:—

	Battle-ships.		C. D. Vessels.		Cruisers.		Torpedo Vessels and Boats.		T. B. D.'s.		Sub-marines.	
	Built.	Building.	Built.	Building.	Built.	Building.	Built.	Building.	Built.	Building.	Built.	Building.
Great Britain . . .	52	15	4	—	126	37	126	11	108	23	—	9
France	28	8	15	—	46	18	264	37	10	24	12	22
Russia	18	8	14	—	21	12	148	10	27	27	—	1
Germany	25	9	11	—	38	11	96	—	21	11	—	—
Italy	17	7	—	—	21	1	159	4	9	6	1	1
America	10	8	12	4	22	15	24	7	2	18	1	7
Japan	7	—	2	—	33	2	66	14	14	5	—	—

But America finds that the execution of a programme of naval construction is not solely a matter of money.

The latest report of Rear-Admiral Bowles, the chief constructor, shows that there is not a single vessel now under contract that is not over a year behindhand. For instance, six submarine torpedo-boats, contracted for in August, 1900, to be delivered in eight months, were two years later still unfinished. The contractors are not troubled by the fear of penalties, as these are uniformly remitted by the Secretary of the Navy. Of the fifty-two vessels now building, fourteen are first-class battleships and armoured cruisers, and nine are fast protected cruisers. Among the remainder are four single-turret monitors, exactly resembling those built at the close of the Civil War. They were forced upon the Naval Department by a band of influential Congressmen in the summer of 1897 as mounts for a gun which has since been proved to be utterly without value.

America has repeatedly attempted, and I am not sure the attempts are not about to be renewed, to place warships on the great lakes. At present she is debarred from doing so by a compact between us and her Government in 1817, known as the Rush-Bagot Convention.

It was a very wise arrangement, because at the time it was negotiated Americans and Canadians on the respective borders of the lakes were not on the best of terms, and the mutual disarmament served to create greater mutual confidence. It stimulated commerce and encouraged settlement, and what is specially true of the first twenty years after the compact is true to-day.

Changed maritime conditions have indeed arisen not anticipated by either party; but it is safe to affirm that,

were the convention to be abrogated, its abrogation would soon come to be a source of all the hostility, jealousy, and misunderstanding which it was framed to avert.

It is true that an absolutely literal compliance with the agreement has not always been observed, as, for instance, when in 1838 we found it necessary, owing to political troubles in Canada, to increase our naval armament on the lakes beyond the point fixed in the compact. When America promptly remonstrated, we made her Government see that the increase was necessary owing to the incursions of armed bands of pirates and revolutionaries; that our sole purpose was to guard the Queen's dominions against a manifest danger, and that when the danger was over the increased armament would be discontinued. As the hostile incursions with which Canada was threatened were from combinations of armed men unlawfully organized and prepared for war in the United States in defiance of the efforts of the Government to prevent them, "it is not surprising that the danger continued for several years." Ultimately the Americans launched a small iron war-vessel, *Michigan*, of 498 tons, in 1844, under protest from the British Government. But it was not until the outbreak of the Civil War that the American foreign minister, Mr. Seward, made any adequate reply.

"It is not," said he, "supposed by this Government that their retaining of the steamer in question upon the lakes is a violation of their arrangement of 1817. But if the British Government thinks otherwise, we shall be happy to consider its views in that respect." To this, as far as can be ascertained, the British Government

made no reply; and so for a full forty years the matter of the *Michigan's* illegal patrol of the great lakes has been dropped as a subject of international remonstrance. The vessel still exists, and may occasionally be seen by tourists and yachtsmen moving about in fine weather in her task of transporting the members of the hydrographic survey.

In the meantime, however, the Americans, during the Civil War, sought to abrogate the Convention, even going so far as to give us notice and to repeal it by Act of Congress.

They thought better of this decision later on, and Mr. Seward, on behalf of America, withdrew this notice. "You may say to Lord Russell," he wrote, "that we are quite willing that the Convention should remain practically in force."¹

In 1890 there was a project to build a steel practice vessel for the naval academy on Lake Michigan, but the terms of the Convention were duly observed, and the project fell through. Two years later the Senate passed a resolution directing the Secretary of State to inform the Senate whether the agreement of 1817 was still in force.

The Government replied that in their opinion it was,

¹ "It was doubtless not at all within the contemplation of the understanding of 1817 that the National resources in naval construction should be materially diminished thereby, as they are at present, through the exclusion of the facilities afforded by establishment in the Lake cities. These establishments might in emergency render important service in the construction of torpedo-boats, and other small vessels, which, with the concurrence of the British authorities, could be taken through the Welland canal and placed in commission for sea service as promptly as would be possible if they were built on the Atlantic seaboard." (American Secretary of the Navy, letter dated April 16, 1898.)

notwithstanding that Congress had repealed it in 1865, because the British Government had been so instructed by Mr. Seward, and if America's good faith was to be accepted abroad they must sustain the arrangements made by her Foreign Minister.

Now we come to 1898, when a Bill was passed by Congress authorizing the construction and maintenance of a gunboat on the lakes, providing "that the said construction of said gunboat shall conform to all existing treaties and convention."¹

But the gunboat has not been built, for in that year the joint High Commission for the settlement of various pending questions between America and Canada was the "revision of the Agreement of 1817 respecting naval vessels on the lakes." But the labours of the High Commission came to nothing—they are "suspended," and so the construction of the American gunboat is still in abeyance.

America has not always scrupulously respected the letters of the agreement. For many years she has maintained armed revenue cutters far exceeding the prescribed tonnage and armament, and thereby invoking in 1857 and again in 1865 a protest from the British authorities, because these revenue cutters are always available for auxiliary use by the navy in time of war.

Several of these rendered conspicuous service in the recent Spanish War.

The chief point we have to consider with regard to

¹ Mr. Boutell thinks this is probably the only instance where an Act of Congress has been set aside through instructions issued by an American Cabinet Minister to an American Minister abroad. "It is," he adds, "not a legislative precedent that is likely to meet with the approval of modern Congresses."

the observance of the Rush-Bagot Convention is that at present only one party can put war vessels on the lakes without building them there, unless Canada consents to the use of her canals for this purpose. We, on the other hand, can conceivably send to the lakes from the Atlantic all war vessels capable of passing the Canadian locks, or 130 gunboats, 170 torpedo-boats, and 110 destroyers, a formidable force. But we could not attempt to do this in the event of war until some act of belligerency had actually taken place, or unless we had six months previously given notice of abrogating the Convention. So that it would appear that the agreement restrains us from making adequate preparations for the protection of Canadian shores, and the chances are slender that, during war, our fleet would ever reach the lakes uninjured. Doubtless, the first achievement of the Americans would be to blow up the locks.

So far the Convention is to America's advantage, and it is doubtful if the establishment of a naval ship-building industry on the lakes would equal this advantage, even if to it were added the proposed training of a naval militia on these waters.

At the close of the American Revolution America's total shipping was less than half that of Great Britain, but by 1850 her tonnage was 3,500,000 to our 4,250,000 tons. In the next few years America had taken a leading share in the Transatlantic and China trade, and by 1854 was only 100,000 tons less than Britain's 5,250,000 tonnage. Seven years later, at the outbreak of the Civil War, America had 5,482,120 tons—her high-water mark, but still 400,000 less than

Britain's. Then wood and canvas were superseded by iron and steam, and, unable to build the new ships, and forbidden by a foolish Congress to buy, America lost her lead, her shipping fell off, and to-day stands at less than half what it was forty years ago. The first steel vessel ever built in America was constructed in 1895 of steel plates imported from Glasgow.

Could there be a more striking instance of progress and development than that five years later, in 1900, American steel plates should be imported into Glasgow for the construction of British ships? Is America to recover her position in the maritime race? Perhaps; but it will not be instantly. She will have to increase her shipbuilding sixfold to produce what Britain turns out every year, while her registered tonnage of vessels already built is only a tenth of ours. Rapid as are her strides in shipbuilding, America cannot make good this disparity by ordinary means.

Let us see to what extraordinary means she may, in the emergency, resort.

At present the American flag carries only about one twelfth of America's commerce. By a new policy of finance and protection it is hoped that soon 75 to 80 per cent. will be American.

In the Congress of 1901 a Bill was introduced "to promote the commerce and increase the foreign trade of the United States, and to provide auxiliary cruisers, transports, and seamen for Government use when necessary." This is the celebrated Shipping Subsidy Bill.

This measure provides that there shall be paid to American sail and steam vessels conveying cargoes compensation at the rate of one and one-half cents per

gross ton for each additional 100 miles on longer voyages. It is not necessary that the vessel shall carry passengers. It is simply to make trips in the foreign trade with cargoes of not less than a prescribed amount, no matter what the nature of the trade may be.

In order to stimulate the building of large steamers of more than the average rate of speed additional subsidy is proposed, based upon speed and tonnage as high as 2.3 cents per gross ton. Foreign-built vessels admitted to American registry are to receive only 50 per cent. of the compensation granted to home-built ships, while ship-builders are to be allowed to make contracts with the Government which will guarantee them the same subsidy as that which is to be enjoyed by vessels already constructed. No vessel is to be entitled to compensation unless at least one-fourth of her crew are citizens of the United States, or have declared their intention to become such; while bounties are provided for vessels and crews engaged in deep-sea fishing.

By the passage of this Bill the Republican party hope to restore the American merchant marine to the position it once held and lost. It is naturally argued that in aiding the ship-owners they are aiding the whole nation; yet at the same time, what the average American sees is that the owners will all become multi-millionaires by the enactment of the law, which the "Shipping Ring" is pressing upon Congress.¹

¹ As to the scope of the Hanna-Payne Shipping Subsidy Bill "compensation" is payable (1) upon gross tonnage; (2) for "mileage sailed both outward and homeward bound"; (3) to all vessels "engaged in trade" between our own and foreign countries; (4) according to speed—the rate per ton to certain vessels having ability for speed above fourteen knots, is increased in proportion to fleetness as tested on a trial trip, presumably in ballast trim, to

But not content with the roseate future held out to the mercantile marine by the champions of State subvention, a group of capitalists have recently planned and executed a more dramatic and decisive *coup*. In the month of January, 1902, it was announced that Mr. Pierpont Morgan, acting for this group, had negotiated the purchase of a number of American and British steamship lines, which were thenceforward to be amalgamated under a single administration, and has popularly come to be known as the Shipping Trust. Apart from American ambition to possess a mercantile marine, a factor in the situation undoubtedly is that the steamships, as they were formerly controlled, did not pay during the last few years they have been running. It was vitally necessary to concentrate the management, to reduce expenses, and to dispense with the full equipment with which each separate company had to be served. It is calculated that the savings resulting from eliminating the ruinous competition, and the ability to charge uniform prices instead of cut-rates, will make money for all the lines which do not now pay.¹ "While we are told the Combine will owe its inception to America, its basis

establish the record of each vessel. There is nothing to be deducted or withheld for voyages in ballast, or with partial cargoes (no doubt because then "compensation" would be most required).

For all practical purposes, the whole of American foreign shipping will come under the operation of this law. Vessels operating outside its scope would be forced to engage in the coasting trade, or be transferred as foreigners, or lie idle.

¹ The Morgan combination, however, has to earn enough to pay interest on a vastly inflated amount. For engineering the combination Mr. Morgan was to receive some two and a half millions sterling, on which interest must be paid, and doubtless a very large number of other persons, who had contrived by their efforts towards the carrying through of this gigantic amalgamation, would have to obtain their reward likewise.

will be international, and the management will be mainly directed to the policy of paying the shareholders the best returns. No blow has been aimed at British prestige, for British interests and shareholders will jointly benefit." The Comhine has certainly attracted less attention in America than it has in England; probably there are only four ships in the community which at present fly the American flag. The Shipping Trust materially benefits the American railroads. They have very satisfactory accommodation in the existing lines. But if they will not directly gain, at least they will now definitely know what ocean-rates, hitherto fluctuating, are going to be. Rates will tend to become more uniform, and will not be subjected to rebates and commissions, which are the characteristics of all the competitive organizations.

Will this audacious *coup* turn out a profitable one for its promoters? There are many who venture to express the opinion that, if the idea is thereby to obtain control of the Atlantic carrying trade, it will lamentably fail. As Professor Ginsberg has lately pointed out,¹ the costly ship built in America cannot compete in the world's market with the cheap British-built vessel. Mr. Morgan is buying costly ships, as if the shares in the new Comhine are to be worth their face-value. The sea is not Protectionist, and cannot be.

"Mr. Morgan must either secure a monopoly, and an absolute one, killing all rivals and controlling the output of new tonnage on both sides of the Atlantic—in which case he can make the British consumer of American food-stuffs and manufactured goods pay the interest on his inflated capital, or that capital

¹ British Association Meeting, 1902.

will not make the expected return. To sum up, it would appear that there was little ground for fearing that Britain will lose the right to fly the red ensign over the combination's fleet, for the interest of both the American ship-builders and of the labour organizations are against the admission of these ships to the United States register. Belfast is secure of her large share of the new work for the organization. The British public as a consumer is not likely to suffer seriously from what has taken place, because it seems inconceivable that the Combine can successfully corner the freight market, even if it wishes to."

As for the question of which flag shall be flown by the ships, this depends on the fate of the Subsidy Bill, which has already passed the Senate and is now before the House. Should this measure become law, then doubtless a large portion of the new ships will be built in American shipyards, and will fly the American flag. But if it does not become law, then those who control the Trust will undoubtedly consider it more economical to build the vessels in Great Britain, and run them under the British, German, or Belgian flags.

But the matter of the flag is a very vital one, and will prove the most serious in the long run, in spite of the attempt of the Trust promoters to belittle its significance.

With regard to the huge development of inland navigation, it is solely due to Canadian enterprise that America possesses the present open pathway which now connects the lakes and the oceans. If she had expended as much money in proportion to her size and population as Canada has, there is little doubt Chicago would have long enjoyed fully the advantages of a seaport.

In order to explain the process by which a steamship from Europe may and does reach Chicago, we must

first call attention to the river St. Lawrence, now navigable for ocean craft as far as Montreal. Then come the Lachine Rapids, to avoid which vessels are carried around by the Lachine Canal and locks. After this is the broad reach known as Lake St. Louis, and then the Soulanges Canal enables the ship to circumvent another obstruction. Beyond the Soulanges lies Lake St. Francis, and beyond is still another canal; and so the vessel goes on, alternating between rivers, lakes, and canals, as far as Lake Ontario. On the western side of this great inland sea, the vessel is lifted to the higher level of Lake Erie by the famous Welland Canal and locks, and so avoids the Niagara Falls. *All these artificial waterways pass through Canadian territory!*

For nearly half a century the Isthmian Canal meant the Nicaraguan route to the people and politicians of America, for the simple reason that the Panama route was controlled by foreigners. If America was ever to build a canal at all, it must be *viâ* Nicaragua. The financial failure of the Panama project, so far from leading Americans to perceive where their true interests lay, and so direct them to take over the uncompleted work from the French, led them more than ever to consider the alternative route.

Just at what juncture a small group of senators recognized the advantages to be reaped from De Lesseps' abandoned labours would be hard to say.

Senator Hanna, the leader of the party, voted against a favourable report on the Nicaragua Canal Bill in committee. Consideration of this measure in the Senate was prevented by the votes of the Republican majority. Yet the Bill could have been passed at any time during

the session, and the failure of the friends of the Administration to press it forward remained for a time a mystery to the majority of Americans, who supposed that the matter had been publicly settled.

But the Government, as we now have good reason to suspect, was holding back for terms.

Neither President nor Senate ever had any intention of constructing the Nicaragua Canal, but these tactics were so far effectual that the French company was brought to terms, and finally offered to sell at Uncle Sam's own price, *i.e.* \$40,000,000.

Public opinion soon underwent a transformation, and now, after all the hard things said about the Panama route, calls on the Government (which had meant to do so all along) to close with the offer.

It is the estimate of the Walker commission that, possessed of the French concession, and of the work completed by the French company, the canal could be constructed for \$38,130,704 less than by way of Nicaragua. As there is a good harbour on either side of the isthmus, the Panama Canal could be maintained for \$1,350,000 less per annum than the Nicaraguan—a sum equivalent to 3 per cent. on \$45,000,000. A ship could steam from ocean to ocean *via* Panama by the light of one day, as against thirty-three hours by the Nicaragua route.

The completion of the Isthmian Canal will undoubtedly stimulate American shipping, although, perhaps, at the expense of her railways, whose owners are, of course, doing their best to retard the scheme.

It is the belief of the Americans that within five years after the completion of the canal its tonnage will

be very much larger than that of the Suez Canal to-day.¹

The tolls will probably be fixed at the Suez rate, *i.e.* \$1.80. This would render the gross annual receipts at over eight million dollars on the assumed traffic for the first few years.

With reference to the human element, everything has changed and is changing in the American mercantile marine save the condition of its seamen. The maritime laws of America place the seaman in a position relatively far more unjust and degrading than that of his predecessors. In the matter of personal liberty he exists under all the disabilities which formerly oppressed the negro. In brief, he is a chattel, both in law and practice.

In law, the seaman is a "ward of Admiralty." His helpless condition under the ancient maritime laws, framed in 1790, is made the excuse for imposing upon him burdens "that could not be imposed upon other classes without depriving them of rights that were personal freedom."²

"Seamen," according to a recent Supreme Court judgment, "are treated by Congress . . . as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing the protection of the law in the

¹ The net tonnage for 1901 through the Suez Canal shows an increase of 1,085,688 tons over that of 1900, and of 928,210 over 1899. The transit receipts, which amounted to 100,386,397 francs, were higher than any previous year since the opening of the canal, and show an increase of 9,762,789 francs as compared with those of 1900. No special reason can be assigned for the increase in the trade through the canal except that the economical situation of India has recently improved, and that there has been an increased activity in the trade with the East.

² Mr. Justice Harlan.

same sense in which minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and their guardians."

The maritime law of America derives its authority from the code of the Middle Ages, beginning with the *Consolato del mare* of indefinite antiquity, earlier than the thirteenth century.

In 1897, the Supreme Court rendered a decision which evinces the extreme conservatism of American law. Two years before, four seamen of the American barque *Arago* deserted at Astoria, Oregon. The brief set forth that the laws under which the seamen were held to servitude operated to deprive them of liberty and prosperity without the due process of law, to deprive them of the right of trial by jury, and to hold them to slavery and involuntary servitude, contrary to the Constitution. On the latter ground it was indeed contended that the law binding the seaman to fulfil his will is in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime.

The Courts sustained the historical statutes ("from the earliest historical period the contract of the sailor has been treated as an exceptional one"), and the sailors had to go back to their master.

The decision attracted wide attention, and was charged with signifying for the first time that the personal liberty of the citizen is not a right inherent in the fundamental law, but is merely a privilege enjoyed under the tenure of public opinion, and public policy among other instances.

At the present moment, an American boy named Amos Stone, a native of Boston, and the son of respectable

parents, is an inmate of a lunatic asylum at Seattle, Washington State, as the result of treatment received from officers on board an American ship. Another American boy, Ephraim Clark, has been confined in Thomaston Maine Penitentiary for twenty-five years, for mutiny under circumstances of extreme provocation. "Such cases," says one critic, "contain a sufficient explanation of the native American's aversion to the sea. He sees the seaman, the driftwood of all races, brutalized at sea, robbed ashore, practically without redress, and an object of pity and contempt."

American ships are dreaded by the sailor the world over. America can never have a mercantile marine unless she reforms in this particular. The personal treatment endured by the scamen at the hands of the officers is not better than it was in Dana's day.

"Extreme brutality," says Mr. W. MacArthur, in his monograph on the subject, "is the rule, almost without exception. It is a standing charge against our maritime law that it requires no qualification other than that of citizenship on the part of sailing-ship officers. Here America occupies a unique position among maritime nations. The consequence may be foreseen: the men in authority on board American ships are selected because of their ability to maltreat the wretched men under them, and not for their seamanship. This leads to the perpetration of the most wanton brutalities conceivable, by minds trained to ingenious methods of inflicting torture upon their subordinates, and undeterred by the fear of consequences, social or legal."

Pick up any American newspaper published in the Maritime States, and it is not unlikely you will come across the familiar case of a scaman just returned from a voyage, bringing charges against shipping officers, charges which seem incredible for inhumanity. But

the public is indifferent and apathetic or sceptical : the charges are dismissed with " monotonous regularity."

America is far behind Britain, Germany, Italy, and Denmark in her ancient laws for the treatment of the sailor, and she will have to alter this if her forthcoming mercantile marine is to become popular.

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CHAPTER XI

TRUSTS AND COMBINES

INDUSTRIAL consolidation has been carried far and carried quickly by America. Twelve or fourteen years ago there were not a dozen business combinations in the country which might, in the American language, appropriately be termed Trusts. Now there are nearly three hundred Trusts, covering the production of almost every article of daily use, from matches to sleeping-cars, and involving billions of capital. In one year alone (1899) the industrial combinations formed represented an authorized capitalization of two billion dollars, a sum equal to all metal currency in circulation in America.¹

But there has lately come a second phase in the centralizing process. Some of the larger combinations are organized for the purpose of holding the stock of other corporations. A large company buys up all the stock of several other companies, and issues its own stock substantially in exchange. The profits of the constituent companies form the fund from which the dividends of the holding company are paid. In other

¹ There are in 1902 exactly 287 Trusts, with an amount in capital stock scheduled at over five billion dollars, the outstanding bonds amounting to about two billions, and the total capitalization being close on seven billion dollars, or about a third of the entire manufacturing capital of America.

cases, on the formation of a combination, the new company buys for cash or stock all of the plants of the uniting companies, and these companies are then dissolved. The former method may be described as the "Trust," and the latter as the "Combine."

The economic is the paramount phase of American life, and no economic tendency is so extraordinary, so absorbing, or so new as that which is concentrating the entire industries of the country into single corporate groups. In some departments of manufacture these are supreme and complete monopolies.

The possibilities for economy with a Trust are very great, because it dispenses with travelling salesmen and with advertising, and practises the distribution of goods from the nearest source of supply. Thus the cost is reduced often more than one half. It is clear that the present competitive system involves most waste, and often the consumer is obliged to pay 100 per cent. over the prime cost of the article.

There are, then, great possibilities of social economy and advantages in the new system; but, on the other hand, it is also being selfishly used to make exorbitant profits and to crush competition by unfair discrimination and tyrannous practices.

Competition reduces prices, but there is a point in the reduction of price beyond which it is not possible for any of the competitors to go, unless their capital, and consequently their output, is so large that they are content with the minimum of profit or even with loss, in the hope of lessening the number of smaller competitors. A lessened output would soon restore prices to such a level as to yield the normal profits. Unless

this is achieved by the manufacturer, the glut in the market must be met by the withdrawal of a portion of his capital in the business, or to direct it into other lines of business. This was the old way. But machinery is now more costly, and possesses a more specific character, and it is not so easy to withdraw capital from an unprofitable business.

Professor Jenks of America has found that "industrial combinations have been able to control productions; in other words, to restrain competition to such an extent as to enable them materially to raise the prices of products." Another American professor, Mr. Bullock, calls attention to the contradictory assertions of the Trust magnates that "Trusts are necessary to stop competition, which has become wasteful and generally pernicious; while they contend that the spirit of the eliminated corrective agency which they call 'potential competition' is still skulking round somewhere with power to act, and that it will certainly be evoked by the groans of the victimized consumer."

There are not wanting many leading financiers who predict that a combination of industries will inevitably result in one of the greatest financial crashes ever felt in the United States, and that, too, at no very distant period.

"Combinations of all great industries are a menace to Government," declares Mr. Russell Sage. "Such combinations are not only a menace, but are the oppressors of the people. Should an era of combinations ensue, the American people will certainly revolt against them, and, if they do, there will be financial ruin such as people have never dreamed of in the history of the world. There are certain times when combinations are useful and beneficial. When several industries are

beginning business, it is well for individuals to combine for mutual protection until business is fairly on its feet. When the business is firmly established, combination should be disrupted, and the concern conducted along individual lines. The embarrassment of one individual would not then mean the wrecking of the industry.

"It is better to have such industries divided among several individuals than combined into one great corporation, the embarrassment of which would mean the ruin of all. Industries conducted along individual lines have many safeguards. Instead of but one source, each individual has several, separate and distinct from each other, to which to apply for aid during any great trouble."

The essential feature of the Trust is monopoly. Legally it is merely a large corporation, but in fact it is a compacted group of competing corporations—a giant consolidation able to control the entire output of any special manufacture and to destroy competition by temporary underselling.

It is a monopoly which "so controls business, whatever it may be, as practically to regulate competition and to fix the price of its products on the whole, with little reference to competitors, or to the cost of production, but mainly with reference to securing the greatest net results."¹

¹ On the other hand, the British commercial agent, Mr. Bell, has recently thrown light upon the moderation and consummate ability in dealing with human nature which characterize the policy of the greatest of the Trusts and indicate the real moral strength of the Trust system in general. "Notwithstanding the enormous demand for iron and steel, prices have been kept at a reasonable level. This has been largely due to the United States Steel Corporation, which firmly refused to raise their prices unduly."

One reason, as Mr. Bell observes, is that the Steel Corporation prefers a steady and regular trade upon a vast scale, and at a moderate profit, to the wild fluctuations of losses and gains inseparable from prices sensationally inflated and then as deeply depressed. There is also another solution of the

The consequence is, competition must be met by "cut-throat" methods. The article is sold for less than cost, and the weaker firms manufacturing it go under. In fact, to use the common American defence, it is a case of "trust or bust"—combination or extinction.

The capitalist Trust is therefore a natural outcome of modern competitive conditions. If it in each instance assumed its form naturally, if it merely restored normal prices and did not resort to oppression and injustice in order to perpetuate its supremacy, there would be no agitation against Trusts, nor would they threaten the commercial and industrial fabric of America.

The Trust tends to depress the price of raw material, for one thing, and so injure the market for the farmer.¹

It is futile to try and abolish Trusts; it is flying in the face of economic evolution and the possibilities of production; but you can regulate them, just as you can and do regulate banking and insurance.

In 1890 an Act was passed by Congress "to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," which is now commonly known as the Anti-Trust Act. It provides that:—

"Every contract combination in the form of Trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or

Steel Trust's moderation. It is afraid of rousing the public to anti-tariff legislation. If it abused its advantage, its monopoly would disappear by the abatement of the Protectionist duties.

¹ Professor Graham thinks that under the Trust system in the future production will be largely increased and wages "might be as high as at present, though the trade unions would occupy a less strong position than they now did to enforce their desires by a strike. The employment of the working classes would probably be more steady, though their sense of independence must not be so strong."

commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."

The passage of this Act was thought by many to herald the downfall of the iniquitous Trust. But there was soon seen to be grave difficulties in the way of its practical enforcement.

To begin with, the sole authority of Congress to legislate upon the subject is found in the constitutional provision that it shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. Unless, therefore, a "Trust" restrains commerce with foreign nations or among the several States, or, as it is called, interstate commerce, it is not within the scope of the Act, which has no relation to transactions within the boundaries of an individual State.

This interpretation was first settled publicly in 1894 by the Supreme Court in an action brought by the Government under the Act. It appeared that by the absorption of numerous other companies a certain corporation had secured control throughout the country of the manufacture of refined sugar. It was therefore charged that there was a combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce, in that it contemplated that refined sugar should be sold in States other than those in which it was produced. Nevertheless, the Court decided (one member dissenting) that the question where the sugar would ultimately be shipped was without importance; the acquisition by the Trust of sugar refineries was merely an act done within the State where they were situated, and was not an act in restraint of interstate commerce, even though it might indirectly affect such commerce. The Supreme Court pointed out that

if the latter circumstance alone brought transactions within the purview of the Federal power, the National Government would control to the exclusion of the States "substantially everything of importance in business operations and affairs." On the contrary, it held that contracts, combinations, and conspiracies to control domestic enterprise in manufacturing, agriculture, mining, or production in all its forms, or to raise or lower prices or wages, are not within the prohibition of the Statute, although they may tend to restrain external as well as domestic trade. Congress did not attempt to limit and restrict the rights of corporations created by the States, or the citizens of the States, in the acquisition, control, or disposition of property, or to regulate or prescribe the price or prices at which the property or the products thereof shall be sold.¹

Other cases were tried before the Supreme Court, and it was soon rendered evident that so far as its efficacy went in restraining the growth of the Trusts, the Anti-Trust law was almost a dead letter.² The rule was laid down that facilities furnished, or services rendered, in connection with the transaction of interstate commerce, are not a part of that commerce, and agreements

¹ In this construction of the Anti-Trust Act, the Court therefore held that the various processes of production are antecedent to and distinct from interstate commerce; that commerce begins after production has ceased and when the product commences its final movement from the State of its origin to the State of its destination. All this hair-splitting clearly shows the obstacles which the American people as a whole and the national power have to overcome.

² "In the United States we have inherited (from Great Britain) this same slowness of political growth, and it is favoured by our obstructive written Constitution, which is characterized by the Hamiltonian forethought of hindering legislation or amendment to the extent, it may be feared, of hindering healthy progress."—Professor A. Watkins.

or combinations to fix or maintain the charges for such facilities or services are not within the four corners of the Act. The construction which the latter has thus received makes plain how narrow is its scope, and that few except those engaged directly in the business of interstate transportation are affected by its provisions.

Yet the terms of the Anti-Trust Act are said to cover everything regarding which Congress has the constitutional power to act. In one of his annual messages to Congress, President McKinley said, "It will be perceived that the Act is aimed at *every* kind of combination in the nature of Trust or monopoly in restraint of interstate or international commerce."

Congress, then, can do no more than it has done in the way of Statutes. It is helpless, unless to direct severer processes of inquiry and heavier penalties.

Producers may combine to limit production or control prices; those furnishing services or facilities in the transaction of interstate commerce as above described may combine to fix the price and extent of such facilities or services; the consignees may combine to control the price of their services or the number of persons engaged in the business; but none of these operations are comprehended in the Statute.¹

What, then, do we see? Simply, that the National Government has no powers save those expressed in the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. It is idle for the ill-informed American opponent of Trusts

¹ Yet, to show how far the State Courts are ready to go, we have the remarkable decision of the Illinois "Supreme" Court, by which the Associated Press (an organization similar to Reuter's Agency or the Central News) is ordered to sell its news to any newspaper that may apply.

to demand--what he is always demanding--the enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act; he should look into his rigid Constitution and perceive that the objects of his repugnance do not come within the constitutional jurisdiction or legislative powers of the nation or within the prohibition of the nation's law.

Unless the Supreme Court consent to a more helpful interpretation, America may yet wake up to the consciousness that her commerce is being muzzled by her eighteenth-century Constitution.

Considering the threatening nature of the Trusts, it is not surprising that their abatement should form a mighty political issue. Yet the Anti-Trust crusade is confined to neither political party. But how differently do they approach it--how different are the remedies proposed! The Republican leaders can hardly be sincere in wishing the earning power of the Trusts curtailed, and they must have listened to President Roosevelt's recent speeches with something like consternation until they were convinced that the President carefully avoided naming a remedy.¹

¹ At Pittsburg, in 1902, President Roosevelt made the following remarkable speech:--

"Especially great and especially difficult are the problems caused by the growth and concentration of great individual, and, above all, of great corporate fortunes. It is immensely for the interests of the country that there should be such individual and corporate wealth as long as it is used aright, and where it is not used aright then it becomes a serious menace and danger. The instruments and the methods with which we are to meet these new problems must in many cases themselves be new. But the purpose lying behind the use of these methods and instruments must, if we are to succeed, be now, as in the past, simply in accord with the immutable laws of order, justice, and right. We may need, and it is my belief that we shall need, new legislation, conceived in no radical or revolutionary spirit, but in the spirit of common sense and common honesty, and with a resolute desire to face facts as they are. In the solution of these difficult problems we need a character that

So far he has pointed out no definite path along which investigation should proceed. He has, indeed, spoken of "governmental control," and even of an amendment to the Constitution; but what sort of control and what sort of amendment he does not specify. We have not much faith in either remedy. No scheme of "governmental control" has yet been proposed that would not do far more harm than good; while as for amending the Constitution, I have on a previous page shown the difficulty of the process.

Still eluding to what will prove a counsel of pure perfection, very difficult to realize in practice, Mr. Roosevelt declares that his aim is to destroy the evils of the combines. But he is profoundly impressed with the conviction that the industrial efficiency of the mammoth corporation is the foundation-stone of the present commercial power of the United States, and he maintains without hesitation that if America cannot

will refuse to be hurried into any unwise or precipitate movement by any clamour, whether historical or demagogic; but, on the other hand, a character that will refuse to be frightened from a movement he thinks right to undertake by any pressure, and still less by any threat, expressed or implied. Mr. Knox has shown that much can be done along the lines of supervision and regulation of great industrial combinations; but, if we recklessly try, without proper thought and caution, to do much, we shall either do nothing or else work ruin that would be felt most acutely by those citizens who are most helpless. It is no easy task to deal with great industrial tendencies. By dealing with them in a spirit of presumptuous and rash folly, and, above all, in a spirit of envy, hatred, and malice, we should invite disaster so widespread that the country would rock to its foundations. Special legislation, municipal, State, and national, is needed, but, beyond all, we need an honest and fearless administration of the laws on the Statute books, made in the interest neither of rich nor poor, but in the interest of exact and equal justice to all alike."

This latter is a mere piece of rhetoric, seeing that the Anti-Trust law has been pronounced by the Supreme Court powerless to affect the Trusts. In fact, the whole utterance carefully avoids going to the root of the evil or of giving fright or offence to the Trust politicians.

succeed in attacking the evils without impairing the advantages of the Trust system, she had better bear the former than sacrifice the latter.

"It is a great deal better that some people should prosper too much than that no one should prosper enough, so that the man who advocates destroying Trusts by measures that would paralyze the industries of the country is at best a quack, and at worst an enemy of the Republic."

Again he says—

"The nation must assume the power to control by legislation. The immediate need in dealing with Trusts is to place them under the real, not nominal, control of some sovereign, to which, as its creatures, Trusts still owe allegiance, and in whose courts the sovereign's orders may with certainty be enforced. This is not the case with the ordinary so-called Trust of to-day, for the Trust is a large State corporation, generally doing business in other States also, and often with a tendency to monopoly. Some governmental sovereign must be given full power over these artificial and very powerful corporate beings. In my judgment the sovereign must be the National Government. When it is given full power, that power can be used to control any evil influence, but that power should be exercised with moderation and self-restraint."

Now let us enumerate the certain remedies, and in doing so we may perceive some of the difficulties which cause the President embarrassment in his policy of extirpating the evils of the Trusts without injury to their industrial efficiency.

These remedies are three in number—

1. Lowering the tariff on goods hitherto protected for the Trust.
2. Equality of railway rates to all shippers, large or small.

3. Full publicity relating to the capital and operations of the Trusts.

The reduction of the tariff is the only method which would largely protect the community from the practice of such abuses as have occurred and from the possibility of worse. But the President has so far shrunk from laying sacrilegious hands upon McKinleyism, which has been the Ark of the Covenant for the Republican party.¹

Yet, Mr. Havemeyer, the "Sugar King," has called the tariff "the mother of Trusts," and has admitted, if the duties were remitted in the case of any articles the production and distribution of which were known to be in the hands of a monopoly, the abuses we now hear so much of would be very greatly curtailed, if not for a time absolutely abolished.

In 1901 Mr. Babcock, a Republican Congressman, gave notice of a motion for placing steel on the free list. He and his friends had no difficulty in proving that when a "struggling industry" is at last capable of

¹ Mr. Roosevelt has since denounced the proposition to remedy the Trust evils by changes in the tariff. He declared that the real evils connected with the Trusts could not be remedied by any change in the tariff laws. He pointed out that the products of many Trusts were unprotected, and would be entirely unaffected or at the most only slightly affected by the change. In this connection the President especially mentioned the Standard Oil Corporation and the corporations controlling the anthracite output. Some corporations, he said, did well, others did ill. The Trusts could be injured by depriving them of the benefits of a protective tariff, but only at the cost of damaging all their small competitors and all paid workers concerned.

The necessary supervision and control in which President Roosevelt firmly believed as the only method of eliminating the real evils of Trusts would have to come through wisely and cautiously framed legislation. He was confident that in this instance there were the best reasons for the amendment of the Constitution, but at the same time he believed that without this amendment a good deal could be done by the existing law. All power should be used with wisdom and self-restraint, and all men, rich and poor, should obey the laws alike, and receive their protection alike.

capitalizing itself at eleven hundred millions of dollars, it may be reasonably left by a paternal Government to take care of itself.

The tariff laws, then, are the bulwark of the oppressive Trusts, and, in the language of the Democratic ex-Attorney-General, "tariff reform must be coincident with Anti-Trust legislation."

Now let us take the second point. Many think the only real solution of the Trust question is Government control of the railways, because the fact is, the railway system of America has passed into the control of a few persons, and these persons must inevitably be brought into relationship with the heads of the Trusts, and so establish discrimination.

The Trust would still be comparatively harmless, so far as its ramifications over a wide extent of territory are concerned, were it not for the aid and abetment of the railways. The Interstate Commerce Commission in its last report declares—

"There is probably no one thing to-day which does so much to force out the small operator and to build up those Trusts and monopolies against which law and public opinion alike beat in vain as discrimination in freight rates. This problem is so serious that it will soon attract an attention that has hitherto never been given it."

By reason of their control of enormous traffic, the Trusts are able to dictate to the railways the terms upon which they will purchase transportation.

The railroad and the Trusts between them employ one-fourth of the non-agricultural labour of America. The political danger of this is patent, especially when it is borne in mind that only a fraction of these workers are members of a trade union.

CHAPTER XII

THE NEW IMMIGRATION

AMERICA has always been crying out for people. Her appeal has met with a hearty response, and the Old World has poured out its teeming thousands of souls to fill up the waste places of the Republic and contribute an unwonted squalor to its cities.

But the hospitality of America has been grossly abused; the demand lately has become general for the restriction of immigration. The recent exploits of the anarchists have accelerated the movement. "We shall soon find," exclaims the Commissioner of Immigration at New York, "that this country is the harbouring-place for the malecontents, criminals, and illiterates of the world."¹

¹ The Shattuck Bill, which will receive the attention of the Senate this year, aims at correcting some of the evils connected with immigration. Amongst its provisions is one dealing with the immigration of illiterates. All immigrants over fifteen years of age must be able to read the American language "or some other. For testing purposes the inspection officers are to be furnished with copies of the Constitution of the United States, printed on uniform pasteboard slips, each containing not less than twenty, and not more than twenty-five words of the said Constitution, printed in the various languages of the immigrants in double small pica type. Each immigrant may designate the language in which he prefers the test shall be made, and shall be required to read the words printed on a slip in such language. No two immigrants listed on the same manifest shall be tested with the same slip."

There is, however, another reason for the demand for restriction.

Formerly the bulk of the men and women knocking at the door, besides British, were Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians. But last year twice as many Croatians and Slavonians entered her portals as English, three times as many as Scotch, as many Slovaks as Irish, three and a half times as many South Italians, and twice as many Hebrews as Germans. Then there were Lithuanians, Magyars, Ruthenians, and other races whom not one American in a hundred had ever heard of before, and who may or may not become good Americans, speaking the American language, and helping the American eagle to scream in another generation. The three principal elements in the total immigration into New York alone of 1900 were: Italian (South), 84,346; Hebrew, 60,764; and Polish, 46,938. Following these came the Irish, 35,607; Scandinavian, 32,952; and German, 29,682.

What a contrast from thirty years ago, when the immigration from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Scandinavian countries was three-quarters of the total! Even in 1895 it was still more than one-half; and in 1898 one-third of the total. Now it is less than an eighth, and is rapidly approaching what one official declares will be a negligible quantity.

Immigration from North-Western Europe, apart from the Irish and Scandinavian who arrive to enter domestic service, may be said to have well-nigh ceased.

Italy sends at present by far the largest number of immigrants. The returns issued in July for 1902 show that 493,840 immigrants landed in New York for the

previous twelvemonth—an increase of 104,940 over the figures for the preceding year. About half of these were Italians, while Hungarians, Russians, and Poles made up a majority of the remainder.¹

All this deluge of Latin and Slav humanity means that the West will suffer. This incoming stock does not care for farming, but elects to remain in the eastern cities and mining regions, and to help to swell the already congested labour market.

In 1895, among the States which declared to an investigating committee of the Treasury that they desired no further immigration of any kind were Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, and California. In 1902, out of forty-eight States in the Union, only four desire any immigration.

America would thus now be glad to shut her doors to the poor-and-oppressed of Europe and Asia; to the well-to-do and oppressed alone she extends a polite welcome.

There is yet another reason for alien exclusion. America has so long fostered immigration to her shores that she does well to inquire whether it would not be well for her own interest that the steady stream should be checked. The normal increase of her population

¹ "America," declared Mr. Hay, in his note to the Powers concerning the Roumanian Jews, "welcomes now as always the voluntary immigration of all aliens fitted to become merged in the body politic. Its laws provide for their incorporation indistinguishably in the mass of citizens, with absolute equality with the native born. Equal civil rights at home and equal protection abroad are guaranteed them. Almost none are excluded except paupers, criminals, and the contagiously or incurably diseased. The voluntary character of the immigration is essential. Hence assisted or constrained immigration is shut out. The purpose of this generous treatment of the alien immigrant is to benefit him and the country alike, not to afford another State a refuge for its undesirable elements."


guarantees for the future a safe and sufficient growth; and she has yet enormous stretches of territory waiting to be reclaimed from the primeval wilderness.

Besides, is she not in danger of becoming un-Americanized? Is she now assimilating the foreign element in her population as thoroughly as she has done in the past? We all recognize the value of the mongrel—the advantage he enjoys. Dealing with “ethnical grafting,” Professor Lombroso tells us that no pure race has become great, nor has remained so, without the admixture of foreign blood. The first, and perhaps the greatest, of human inventions, the alphabet, would have remained in the limbo of the uncreated but for the graft of the Semites upon the Egyptians. The Dorians, as a pure race, were not great; but as soon as they became blended with the Italianized Sicilians and the Pelasgi of Sicily and Magna Græcia, they wrought a revolution in Etruscan art. Such men of genius as Archimedes sprang from this amalgamation. To the admixture of Norman blood the Saxon and Anglo and Dane owe the greatness of England. The Japanese were originally inferior to the Chinese, but the present Japanese possess a strong infusion of Malayan blood, which has influenced tremendously their national character. “The graft of the German race,” says Lombroso, “very potent because then in its formative, produced the phenomenon of Polish culture. The development of Poland in the midst of her Slavonic neighbours, who were still uncultured, was rapid and most marvellous. The Sicilians evince greater evolutionary tendencies than the Neapolitans, and this because of their strongly mixed blood. Noteworthy also is the fact that the



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spirit of progress is strongest in Palermo, where the mixture of Norman and Saracen was strongest. . . . Long before the Venetians sought refuge in their islands, a mixture of Roman, Greek, and Slavonic had taken place amongst them." The disintegrating influence attending the commingling of a civilization achieved after long inspiration and painful experience with the customs, manners, and habits of thought of an inferior class of aliens is patent to all.

Time and effort are essential to the growth of homogeneity. The solidarity of any Government and nation is indispensable to its practical efficiency and to its moral progress. Admitting, therefore, the advantages of "ethnical grafting," is there not a point when it ceases to be a virtue—when it becomes a national danger? America has revelled for nearly half a century in a carnival of miscegenation. Hers is the most mongrel race on earth. In addition to her five million foreign-born citizens, America has a million and a half of aliens, 25 per cent. of whom do not even speak the American language. As they profess allegiance to other Powers, and Italy, Germany, and Russia do not relinquish their military claims on their subjects abroad, they are a potential source of danger.

In 1890 there was in the country this large non-constitutional population, which was nevertheless included unchallenged within the constitutional population, for election purposes. These aliens—these people owing allegiance to other Governments, are increasing in America. The number of aliens in the Republic in 1890 was large, the males of voting age numbering 1,189,452. It was so much larger in 1900, that, assuming the alien

family was of the average size, there would be between five and six millions of conscientious monarchists in America, who did not subscribe to her institutions. New York contained 400,000, Pennsylvania 294,000, Massachusetts 250,000, California 227,000, and Illinois 202,000. The subtraction of these non-Americans from the population would have a marked effect upon the Congressional representation of many of the Northern States.

The fact is, that in many parts of America the country is saturated by the alien element, and no more may be absorbed without a dangerous precipitation.

The time may come when it will be difficult to discern traces of the original Government and the spirit of American institutions.

By the present method of naturalization the immigrant is able to influence America's institutions before he understands them. He is given power in the body politic almost immediately.

The law provides that two years before the alien is admitted to citizenship he must take an oath of his intention to become a citizen. He must renounce allegiance to other Powers; must agree to support the Constitution; must have resided in America continuously for five years, and in the State where the oath is taken for one year; and, lastly, he must satisfy the Court before which he appears that he is of good moral character.

Yet does any one suppose that these restrictions are universally observed?

The elementary schools in the Northern States of America are largely made up of non-English-speaking

children of poor immigrants, especially in such cities as New York, Boston, and Chicago. Even in small towns the proportion of young children who are of foreign birth and their education is a problem dealt with successfully by the elementary schools, as the children are soon affected by the American air, and show a great aptness in learning and a determination to succeed. In the foreign quarters of larger cities there is often a mere sprinkling of children of American parentage. In the Hancock school in Boston in 1902 there were 1167 Hebrews, 1273 Italians, and only 80 American children. In schools of this character there is what is called an "overflow" room for children newly arrived in America. Some are too old for the primary grades, and none know the language, so the sorting out and educating these children of various ages and intelligence is no easy task. The work, however, is much simplified by the desire both on the part of the children and of their parents to become Americanized.

It is estimated that within a radius of fifteen miles from New York City Hall there are now more Jews than in the whole of Germany. Slowly, but surely, the Jew is permeating the whole commercial life of New York, and getting a control of many trades within his fingers.¹ Gradually, too, the Gentile element, particularly

² The Jews are about one-eightieth of the population, yet they claim 115 out of the 4000 millionaires of the country, about two and a half times as many as they are entitled to. Even leaving out the backwoods, and confining the inquiry to the town populations, it is found that the number of Jew millionaires is still disproportionately large. Most of them are of German extraction, and have been settled in the country thirty years or more. No Russian name is to be found on the list, and very few recent emigrants. The business of the successful ones extends from banking to pork-packing, from realty to dry goods, from distilleries to cotton. In New York such of them

the Irish and the Irish-Americans, are becoming aware of the pressure which Jewish industrial competition is putting upon them. The constant wholesale influx of poor Jews from Russia, Germany, and Austria has led to a marked lowering of wages, and when this came home to the poor Irish, the persecution of the Hebrew commenced. The antagonism has recently evoked unseemly riots, and as the increased cost of living and the ingenious methods of the "sweater" continue, serious trouble is to be feared. Yet, amidst all the outcry against alien pauperism, it would be hard to match the Irish in that respect.

Of the inhabitants of New York City, 12·6 per cent. were born in Ireland. This percentage supplies 35·5 per cent. of all inmates of the hospitals and insane asylums, 60·4 per cent. of the almshouse paupers, 36·7 per cent. of the workhouse inmates, and 15·4 per cent. of the penitentiary convicts. As one recent American statistician remarks, "If all the inhabitants of this city were Irish-born, they would require eight such almshouses as the one now maintained. Ireland," he adds, with fine satire, "does not make a great show on the map, but her existence is absolutely necessary in order to maintain in New York an almshouse of the present magnitude."

The inconsistency of Americans was never shown more clearly than in its treatment of a really hard-working and well-behaved race—the Chinese. Twenty-two years ago the Chinese exclusion laws were put into operation; they were passed to appease labourers with

as are not lawyers or theatrical managers are mainly engaged in the clothing trade.

whom the Chinese did not and could not compete. They were then, as now, chiefly employed as agriculturalists, and in the performance of work which no American would voluntarily do—that is, menial drudgery. The class which declared itself injured by Chinese labour were not Americans, but European aliens, accustomed to nearly, if not quite, as low and degraded social conditions as the Chinese; yet no sooner had they landed in America than they joined in the clamour for excluding these exceedingly useful and industrious immigrants from the country. It is highly probable that much of the immigration which has come to America from Asia is superior to that which has come from Europe. It is morally certain that China has not sent thither paupers, criminals, or lunatics.¹

America, by her exclusion law, has certainly largely divorced herself from a nation from which she might derive much more commercial benefit than she does at present, or is likely to do in the near future.

¹ At present there are single States of America with over 10,000 feeble-minded persons. According to the last census there are over 100,000 idiots and lunatics publicly known in America, which is supposed to be 25,000 below the real number.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NEGRO PROBLEM

It is gravely maintained that there are times when reason and law do not and cannot govern in America, where the *sentiment* of the whole or a part of the people is stronger than the *law*.

A contemplation of such a dangerous contingency involves us in the meshes of the relationship between the only two races which do not assimilate in America¹—the black and the white: in other words, the negro problem.

Prior to the Civil War the negro was fostered and protected by the institution of slavery, and for a portion of the nineteenth century the ranks of the blacks were reinforced by fresh importations. Under these influences the negro population increased between 1790 and 1860 from 757,208 to 4,441,830—that is to say, sextupled itself in seventy years.

Since the war which freed the negroes, these four and a half millions have expanded to nearly nine

¹ I should like it here to be understood that I use the term "assimilation" in its political and social sense. We cannot shut our eyes to facts; and I would further make it clear that the statistics of the black population comprehends the varying degrees of colour.

millions,¹ which means that it has doubled itself in four decades. The increase in the last ten years (1,370,749) is alone equal to the population of Connecticut and Rhode Island. In view of this, what becomes of the comfortable theory of the negroes' extinction by reason of "enfeebled vital capacity"? It is true that the negro constitutes a slowly dwindling minority of the total population, owing to the enormous influx of alien whites, to the number since 1860 of 14,000,000. But if the two races, white and "black," should continue to grow at the same rate as during the past decade, it would require at least 110 years to reduce the negro element to one-tenth of the total population. Ten per cent. is, then, the practically irreducible minimum; and as long as the negroes form one-tenth of the nation, the race problem is a serious one for Americans in their present state of mind to face.

In the South one constantly hears the phrase, "The negro is all right in his place." Now, what is the negro's place? In the opinion of one eminent black cleric,² he has no place at all in America. Neither the North nor the South gives him a "place," and his sole chance of happiness and prosperity would seem to be in exodus to the land of his origin, Africa.

Let us see if the negro has a social sphere guaranteeing him freedom, comfort, and justice in any part of America.

There is no blinking the growing severity of the

¹ According to the census of 1900, the "black" population throughout the entire country has increased in practically the same ratio as the white population, there being 8,840,789 as against 7,488,788 in the year 1890. The growth is thus a trifle over 18 per cent.

² Bishop Turner.

national attitude towards the negroes. No longer is it confined to the South. The North has become suddenly acquiescent, leaving the South to deal with the problem in its own way. In every Southern State the negroes have been disfranchised by more or less devious methods, until the nullification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution is all but complete. Only the other day a Southern Senator openly defended and applauded lynching.

A Bill was lately introduced into the Legislature of Louisiana—a State notorious for the frequency and brutality of its lynchings—authorizing the Governor to transfer negro prisoners and order a change of venue in cases where a lynching was threatened. Respect for law and order, one would have thought, would have ensured the passage of this measure. The Louisiana law-makers, however, with full knowledge that thereby they were practically licensing lynching, contemptuously threw it out. A few days later an Alabama judge released a white man who was convicted of having helped to burn a negro alive, the victim being afterwards proved innocent of the crime laid to his charge; while in Missouri, in the "black-belt region," there is an almost chronic state of civil war between the blacks and the whites.

Again, the movement towards giving legal effect to the social segregation of the two races, which has always been the custom of the South, is growing rapidly. The "Jim Crow" cars on the railway are now required by law. In Louisiana, marriages between white and coloured persons, no matter how little the admixture of negro blood may be, have been declared illegal; and a Bill

has just been passed requiring separate tram-cars for whites and negroes in the cities throughout the State.

An Englishman, knowing of the prejudices of the South, would suppose that the blacks would fly to the more congenial atmosphere of the Northern States. But the negro knows that, on the whole, he is better off where he is. There are not as many negroes in all New England as there are in two counties of the State of Mississippi.

In the thirty-one Northern and Western States and Territories they are not so numerous as in the State of Alabama.

The black suffers an industrial exclusion north of the Mason and Dixon's line in return for his political suppression in the South.

Race prejudice is not wholly confined to the South. The recent race riots in New York, the lynchings in Ohio and Indiana, and burnings at the stake in Kansas and Colorado, betray something more than acquiescent apathy.

In New York, negroes, no matter how well-dressed and well-behaved, are excluded from theatres, hotels, places of popular resort, and even from churches. If a black man has the temerity to enter a white man's church, which is not often, he is shown to the gallery, and a pretty wide space made for him by the other occupants. Mr. Daniel Frohman, of the Lyceum Theatre, one of the best known of American managers, told me that, some years ago, a coloured man and his wife were upon one occasion forcibly debarred from entering his theatre. The man naturally protested, calling the manager's attention to a law which imposes a fine of \$500 for such race discrimination.

"I am a gentleman," he said; "at least, I behave as such. Why cannot I obtain the seat for which I have paid?"

The reply was one commonly heard all over the Union in such cases—

"Because it would ruin the name of the house. I cannot, therefore, afford to have a coloured man, even in the Lyceum Theatre. I prefer to pay."

The negro was considerate enough, or wise enough, not to seek legal redress. Yet, about the same time, Mr. Fortune, the mulatto editor of the *Age*, was ejected from a second-rate drinking-saloon on account of his colour. He sued the proprietor for \$5000 damages, and got a verdict, the jury awarding him \$200.

Not until the possibility of negro domination has vanished will the South express its free thought on national questions. That section is now Democratic because it would escape negro rule in local offices, and negroes in collectorships, postmasterships, and other Federal positions. When this has been removed, disintegration will follow.

The citizens of the Southern States are determined upon the maintenance of a dominant white political organization, and the only way they can see to the fulfilment of this end is by restricting the voting privileges of the blacks. A number of States within the last few years have, therefore, had recourse to the method of adopting new constitutions, whereby the general suffrage has been ingeniously delimited, so as to cover the case of the negro, without any direct and, of course, unconstitutional provision to that effect. The authors and upholders of this principle claim that they

have a perfect right to institute any plan by which the voting may be controlled; and point to such northern States as Massachusetts and Connecticut, which have prescribed voting qualifications for the people. In the case of Connecticut there is a male population of voting age of 280,340, with only 5204 coloured voters; so that colour is not the motive for the discriminating clauses in the new constitution. The great mass of illiterates here consist of white persons, there being but 719 coloured citizens who do not read or write. On the other hand, there are 18,265 illiterate whites of voting age in Connecticut; an inexplicable circumstance, considering that this is one of the oldest States, with a good common school system. Article 29 of the State Constitution, adopted in October, 1897, provides that every person shall be able to read in the English language any article of the Constitution, or any section of the statutes of the State before being admitted as an elector. Only 181,000 availed themselves of their political rights at the last Presidential Election, which shows that the restrictive article struck deep.

Even in those States where the negro still retains the voting privilege, he has no voice in the government of the State. Many have expressed curiosity as to this result. The answer is a simple one. The candidates for the office are selected, and the questions of the State are decided in a white primary, or caucus, in which the negro is not allowed to participate. The united white vote being in the majority, the decision arrived at in caucus is ratified at the polls, and the negro's vote is not needed or solicited.

Here is an illustration of the evils of negro suffrage.

The city of Wilmington, North Carolina, is one of the oldest towns in America, is well-built, and has a large commerce in cotton and turpentine. Of its 25,000 inhabitants, three-fifths are negroes. Yet, although numerically strong, it must not be supposed that the negro is a factor in the development of the city or its locality. Thirty years of freedom and an absolute equality of educational advantages with the whites have not produced thrift or fostered talent. Of the taxes in the city and country the whites pay 96 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., the negroes pay 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Consequently, we may almost be prepared to admit the pleonastic charge the whites bring against him, that the negro here is "thrifless, improvident, does not accumulate money, and is not a desirable citizen."

Yet, in spite of this, at the ballot-box all men are presumed to be equal, and the negroes, if they voted, would rule by mere power of numbers. How was this prevented? The methods throughout the South vary. In Wilmington local government the negro preponderance was nullified by gerrymandering the bulk of the black vote into two wards; while the appointment of local magistrates was entrusted to the State Legislature, which was always Democratic, *i.e.* white. But in 1895 the Populist propaganda took hold of many Democratic voters, and, together with the white Republicans and the 110,000 negro voters, carried the State, and placed the Democrats in a minority. Two years later, the triumphant majority began to enact laws which were primarily responsible for the race war of 1899. One of their statutes deprived the white citizens of Wilmington of their suffrage by authorizing

the Governor (a Republican) to appoint five out of the ten members of the Board of Aldermen, while the other five were to be chosen by the five wards, two of which were overpoweringly black. Moreover, magistrates were ordered to be elected.

The consequence of this was that there were presently 36 negro magistrates, each possessing the power to give and imprison for all misdemeanors not requiring a jury. Forty negro policemen were appointed by the mayor and chief of police elected by the negro aldermen, a negro registrar, negro deputy-sheriffs, and numerous other black officials.

One of the magistrates, for instance, was a stevedore, elected by the votes of his fellows, and who, when the British Vice-Consul at Wilmington defended some British sailors before him, announced contemptuously that "De King of England ain't got nothin' to do wid yer co't." Queen Victoria then sat upon the throne.

Of course, the situation could not last. The white men of the city met in solemn conclave, and determined to rebel against the black usurpation. In the mean time the negroes, who had been docile and peaceful when under control, grew bold and insolent with their access of power. An election was held; the whites swept the State, and in Wilmington at once took steps for removing their lost prestige. A series of resolutions declared that "the negro domination had for ever passed, and that in the future the white man, and the white man alone, should rule." The leading blacks of the city, 32 in number, were summoned to meet the Committee, and nearly all came in response to the summons. "The scene," writes an eye-witness,

"was dramatic." Seated at one end of the room were the 25 white men; at the other end sat the 32 negroes. The whites were anxious, but determined; the negroes cowed and terror-stricken. The resolutions were read, and, in answer to a query from one of the blacks as to the meaning of a phrase, re-read. There was no discussion, no argument. The whites delivered their ultimatum, gave the negroes until the following morning to make answer, and declared the meeting adjourned. The whites and blacks then passed silently into the night.

The town woke up next day, and went about armed. A conflict was inevitable, and it came. An act of incendiarism began the work, and it was followed by a skirmish in which three negroes were killed, and three wounded. More bloodshed followed, Wilmington was given up to panic; the negroes fled to woods and swamps. The white victory was complete, not merely in Wilmington, but in the eastern part of the State, where similar scenes were enacted.

As a result of this treatment, the tendency of the negroes is to gather in "black belts." This race gregariousness is shown very markedly in the last census. In one region of the South, enclosing 400,000 square miles, we find three-fourths of the total negro population. In 108 counties of this region the negro outnumbered the white by more than two to one, while in 171 others they are in the majority.

This Africanized area has increased from 71 counties in 1860 to 108 counties in 1900, and the average density of the black element in these counties is treble that of the whites, and on the steady increase.

"The opposite tendency of the Southern population," says Mr. Kelly Miller,¹ "is also noticeable. Just as the black spots are growing blacker, the white spots are growing whiter." There are ten counties in Virginia where the negro element constitutes less than a tenth of the population; in one of these there are 9687 whites, and only five negroes. Wherever, also, the negro is in a marked minority, that minority invariably becomes smaller. As the South develops into a manufacturing region, the rural whites will be drawn into the cities as operatives, leaving the blacks behind to preponderate numerically. The conclusion is that the majority of the negroes tend to gather into the "black belts" of the country and into the "black wards" of the cities, showing the forces of internal cohesion and of external pressure.

The last census shows that there are 41 cities with a coloured population of more than 8000,² the total number of negroes in these cities being about 1,000,000, which is a figure exceeding the total city population in America in 1830. Yet the negro is out of place in the city; he has no fixed status in its industrial system, and is compelled to loiter on the edges in such employment as the whites are unwilling to accept.

It is worth while to remember that if the black race is to acquire the full benefit of contact with the civilization of the white, it must be in the absence of political hostility between the two races. The prejudice of the whites against the black is an evil, however, which all can understand; but the prejudice which some mistaken

¹ An able negro writer.

² The city of Washington has 86,702 negroes.

zealots seek to foster in the black against the white is a far greater evil.

Again, the negro is not to work out his own destiny in America by means of the ballot. Such a doctrine is pure demagogism. What the negro must do is voluntarily to renounce the ballot merely as a measure of prudence; he must work, acquire property, and develop industrially.

The suggestion of Mr. Booker Washington, that he learn the trades, is a sound one, and the most practical solution of a difficult side of the question. Polytechnic schools for the negroes, and good negro carpenters, stone-cutters, builders, and machinists would certainly add to the material assets of the country.

While the grim and ghastly anarchy of negro-burning remains as a blot perpetually replenished on the fame of America, her people would do well to restrain their indignation at the achievements of imported anarchists, whose methods are merciful in comparison.

A great outcry has arisen because of the cruelty done by certain Americans in new territories, but the President has done well in calling national attention to the lynching committed at home under circumstances of cruelty infinitely worse than the troops have committed in the Philippines.

"The men who fail to condemn these, yet clamour at what has been done in the Philippines, are guilty of neglecting the beam in their own eye while they are taunting their brother about the mote in his. Every effort is being made, and will be made, to minimize the chance of cruelty in the Philippines, but the acts of cruelty there have been wholly exceptional, and have been shamelessly exaggerated. They are bitterly regretted,

but they afford less justification for general condemnation of the army than the lynchings afford for condemnation of the communities where they occur."

One American, I see, boldly asserts that the lynching is not done "merely to deter negroes, but in most cases out of pure revenge, and in order to afford the ignorant and vicious white of both sexes a cheap spectacle." This is an indictment which I would shrink from making, although I will not deny that revenge is a very strong impulse among the lynching class of whites and the love of fair play a very weak one.

I do not think there can be doubt that the South is prejudiced against a fair hearing of the case of the negro. It may be, as I have heard said, that the virtue of cool dispassionate reasoning does not exist south of Mason and Dixon's line. If anything, my sympathies are with the people of the South, but no one can sympathize with intolerance, overbearance, and narrow-mindedness. Only lately we have an example of this in the treatment accorded a Georgian college professor. This gentleman, himself a Southerner, contributed to the *Atlantic Monthly* a rational, moderate article, recognizing that the negro race was inferior to the white, and pronounced emphatically against intermarriage or amalgamation. Nor did Professor Sledd object to the safeguarding of the ballot against negro preponderance. But he strongly condemned lynching, and maintained that the negro had rights which the white man was bound to respect. For this offence Professor Sledd was burnt in effigy by his students, and resigned his chair to avoid expulsion. His articles also provoked violent attacks in the Southern press. The only way in which

the question of negro rule can be settled appears to the Southern white to lie in the negro's disenfranchisement. To secure this result three methods only seem to offer themselves, viz. the negro must be frightened away from the polls; else he must be forcibly resisted when he undertakes to deposit his ballot; or his ballot must be destroyed or nullified. The first method is now unhappily chosen.

"At the same time," remarked a careful observer, "the casting and the counting of the ballot are his constitutional rights; and so long as these are denied him there is a confession that our vaunted scheme of universal suffrage is a failure and a farce."

It would be well if some of the fast-dwindling band of partisan zealots of the North of America were to take their stand, not upon their own vain imaginings, but upon the doctrine of Abraham Lincoln himself, shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War.

"I will say," said he, "that I am not, nor have ever been, in favour of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favour of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior; and I, as much as any other man, am in favour of having the superior position assigned to the white man."¹

¹ Speech at Charlestown, Illinois, September 18th, 1858.

CHAPTER XIV

THE NEW POLITICS

ARE there not two great forces at work in America now, as they were at work in England in the "seventies" ?— Socialism, the chief ingredient of populism and Bryanism ; and Imperialism, which involves class and militarism ? If so, it demonstrates that America is a body politic such as we are, and is not immune from the diseases— or shall we say external symptoms of growth ?—which visit other nations. Socialism and Republicanism, with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain among the cohorts, looked very irresistible thirty years ago, and Imperialism after Mr. Gladstone's onslaughts appeared a forlorn hope. But just as surely as Socialism will subside in Germany, as anti-clericalism and anti-semitism will dwindle in France, and as these forces may yet change the face of Spain— so will the American Republic have its time of internal collision and antagonism: "According to the state of the blood, so will the issue be," is a surgical aphorism. According to the blood of the State so will the issue be in politics. The American organism is not yet healthy, through its veins a turbid fluid courses, it is subject to the wild and morbid impulses of youth, it does not know its own mind, it is not quite at moral

unity with itself; but it is strong of arm and tumultuous of head, and full of enthusiasms and beliefs.

A new spirit has lately informed its politics. Since 1898 we observe a marked tendency to raise the whole tone of public life. Public interest has become centred in Imperial matters, in the upbuilding of international commerce, in the work of establishing peace and orderly government in the outlying portions of the Empire. It has less to spare for the local political crank with his petty programme, or the local boss in his wire-pulling. With the decrease of State power, this was inevitable; with the growing establishment of a Civil Service on European lines, the professional politician class must ultimately languish.

Less than five years ago there was no fundamental difference in the tenets of the two great political parties. It was in vain that Mr. Bryan and his friends tried to foist the Silver Question upon the Democratic party; it did not touch the feelings or emotions of the people; it left their moral sense cold. But by the war with Spain, American politics were at last provided with a real and vital issue. "Expansion" and "Imperialism" became the watchwords of the Republican party. At the same time it ran athwart existing party lines: there were adhesions here, objections there; a new school of thought seemingly became huilt up, and both parties became considerably altered in complexion. In Massachusetts, the two Senators, both Republicans, each prominent in the councils of his party, occupied diametrically opposed positions on the question of Imperialism. As in Britain, the Opposition, divided against itself, dwindled into insignificance; as in England, neither

party is yet able to adjust itself to the new wants, and the new war-cries.¹ Southern Democrats and Northern Democrats have never been quite the same thing, because the party has an altogether different social meaning in the two sections. But take away that social significance—disenfranchise the negro, and a large part of the Southern Democracy would undoubtedly go over to the Republican party. The unfortunate Democracies, realizing the desperate straits to which they have been reduced by the bosses who rebelled against Mr. Cleveland in 1896, and sold themselves to the Bryanites, or silver party, are making a serious effort to redeem themselves. The two parties are diametrically opposed on the question of Imperialism; and they also hold not less divergent views on the subject of a standing army, or "militarism," as the Democrats call it. Here is the official utterance of the party on the increase in the military establishment—

"We oppose militarism. It means conquest abroad, and intimidation and oppression at home. It means the strong arm, which has ever been fatal to free institutions. It is what millions of our citizens have fled from in Europe. It will impose upon our peace-loving people a large standing army and unnecessary burden of taxation, and a constant menace to their liberties. A small standing army, and a well-disciplined State militia are amply sufficient in time of peace. This republic has no place for a vast military service and conscription.

¹ It is curious to note how party lines can, on great occasions, now be obliterated in America. This was not formerly the case. In the Civil War, Republicans and Democrats were arranged against each other in almost solid phalanxes, because the abolition of slavery was the cardinal principle of the Republican party alone. But now when any great question arises which concerns the country's outside relations, the President has only to speak, and he finds a response from a sympathetic people.

When the nation is in danger the volunteer soldier is his country's best defender. The National Guard of the United States should ever be cherished in the patriotic hearts of a free people. Such organizations are ever an element of strength and safety. For the first time in our history and coneval with the Philippine conquest, has there been a wholesale departure from our time-honoured and approved system of volunteer organization. We denounce it as un-American, undemocratic, and un-republican, and as a subversion of the ancient and fixed principles of a free people."

As with Imperialism and militarism, so do Trusts come in for scathing criticism. The Republican party also indulges in a condemnation of Trusts, and "favours such legislation as will effectively restrain and prevent all such abuses, protect and promote competition, and secure 'the rights of producers, labourers, and all who are engaged in industry and commerce.'" But very few of the leading members of the party are said to regard this seriously; for the Republican managers are themselves the aiders and abettors of the Trust system. The attempt made in Congress a few years ago to pass a constitutional amendment abolishing Trusts has been called a "transparent humbug."

It is amusing to us to see the Republicans indulge themselves in self-laudation over the war with Spain.¹

¹ Extract from the *Republican Platform*: "In accepting by the Treaty of Paris the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish war, the President and the Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people. No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty throughout the West Indies and the Philippine Islands. That course created our responsibility before the world, and with the unorganized population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good government, and for the performance of international obligations. Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the

"It was a war," says their manifesto, "unsought and patiently resisted, but when it came the Government was ready. Its fleets were cleared for action, its armies were in the field, and the quick and signal triumph of its forces on land and sea bore equal tribute to the courage of American soldiers and sailors, and to the skill and foresight of Republican statesmanship." Of course, it was really the persistent nagging of the Democratic minority in Congress which finally brought the Government to declare that Cuba must be free and independent, and thus rendered war inevitable.

"The skill and foresight of Republican statesmanship" was hardly a factor in the achievements of the land and naval forces, while both parties unanimously voted the fifty millions appropriation, and supported the campaign of the President.

President Roosevelt himself has robbed the Populists of their chief slogan. This third party sprang into existence in 1891. Its chief object was to destroy industrial Trusts, restore the full value to the currency, and secure governmental control of railways and telegraphs. It declared for postal savings banks, which the people of nearly every country enjoy, except America; for an income-tax; for municipal ownership; and for the direct vote of the people for Senators. At present, the tariff issue would seem to have disappeared from American politics. But its disappearance

high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued peoples. The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. To Cuba independence and self-government were assured in the same voice by which war was declared, and to the letter this pledge shall be performed."

is, I think, only temporary. The extraordinary prosperity, under the existing tariff laws, which has attended the last two protectionist administrations, and the presence of other problems raised by the Spanish-American war, have submerged the tariff question.

There have, it is true, been many suggestions made altogether to eliminate it from politics. Some demand the establishment of a permanent commission charged with the oversight of the tariff laws and regulations, and the adjustment of duties to suit the changing conditions, prevent unfair inequalities, and "secure to the Government the largest revenue consistent with the best interests" of producer and consumer. But it is to be feared that this is a counsel of perfection: it would hardly be feasible in America's present stage of political development.

The Government of the United States, however, will continue to require a large revenue to pay the expenses of its maintenance, and the method by which the taxes providing these revenues shall be levied, collected, and paid, must always continue a burning question. There will still be a class demanding indirect taxation, as at present, and another class holding that internal revenue or an income-tax, or both, offer the best means of providing the necessary funds of Government.

It is probable that the democratic party will champion an income-tax at the next election, and demand a revision of the present customs tariff.

After the main issues have been disposed of, the two parties find it possible to agree on some of the minor ones. Both uphold the principles of the State

irrigation of arid lands, chiefly because it is a burning question in the State of Wyoming. Both seek to catch the soldier vote, old and new, by endorsing a liberal pension policy, and both favour the construction of the interoceanic canal; the Republicans being non-committal in their use of the word "Isthmian," while the Democrats, not knowing the mind of the administration, plump flatly for the Nicaraguan route. In 1896 the Republican party platform advocated the "renewal and extension" of the reciprocity arrangements negotiated by President Harrison's administration, "on such terms as will equalize our trade with other nations, remove the restrictions which now obstruct the sale of American products in the ports of other countries, and secure enlarged markets for the products of our farms, forests, and factories."

The advocacy of this policy, and the carrying out of the attendant measures, were undertaken zealously by Mr. McKinley to the day he was shot down at Buffalo, notwithstanding the almost insulting hostility of the Senate. Reciprocity, as understood by the Republican party, is described in the last national "platform" as a policy "so directed as to open our markets on favourable terms for what we do not ourselves produce in return for free foreign markets." The Postmaster-General offers the following concise definition of reciprocity:

"Its principle, rightly understood, is axiomatic. Brazil grows coffee and makes no machinery. We make machinery and grow no coffee. She needs the fabrics of our forges and factories, and we need the fruit of her tropical soil. We agree to concessions for

her coffee, and she agrees to concessions for our machinery. That is reciprocity."

The late President McKinley also thus defined reciprocity:

"It is to afford new markets for our surplus agricultural and manufactured products, without loss to the American labourer of a single day's work that he might otherwise procure."

With the Democrats, for the present, fiat money and the free silver agitation is done with. Large numbers of the party forming the best element have been much impressed by the exhortation of Mr. Cleveland, in which he reminded the party of its old historic principles, antagonism to protection, and appealed to them to take advantage of the division among their opponents, and of the new responsibilities of the country, to adopt a practical and healthy policy in lieu of the impractical and fatuous dogmas to which they lately gave adhesion. In this way only, he urges, can the Democrats recover their natural share of national authority, and the evil of the Trusts be restrained. That this appeal has not fallen on deaf ears is shown in the sudden lukewarmness evinced towards the Bryanite movement. Mr. Gorman, a veteran intriguer, may be the party candidate in 1904; as an alternative the party mantle seems to have fallen on the shoulders of Senator Hill of New York, an able politician, indeed, but a man devoid of ideals and spirituality. There is really only one candidate who can be expected to do battle against Mr. Roosevelt in 1904 with any chance of success, and that is the ex-President himself. True the tradition against a third term is against him, but it would be wise in

the Democrats to offer him the nomination in the hope that his strength will override the power of the tradition. His appearance as the democratic delegate on a Free Trade platform would restore the continuity of his party's policy and also something of the dignity which it has latterly lacked.

America has advanced very far towards the purification of her politics in the last decade. One of the greatest steps in reform has been taken in the Civil Service. The Civil Service plan has rightly become one of the essentials of our modern systems of Government. It was inevitable that America would have to resort to it, if she ever intended to possess clean and effective administration. There was a time, prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Law, when "post-offices were made clearing-houses for political runners, and when drunkenness, corruption, and bad government lurked in the very official atmosphere—in other words, when postmasters unflinchingly, and without conscience or self-respect, debased their official power in the interests of political candidates."

The Presidential elections of 1876 and 1880 are now admitted by both sides to have been grossly corrupt. Ward "heelers" and slum "bummers" stalked throughout the land. Money was distributed lavishly by the campaign managers on both sides. Matters in this direction had gone to such infamous lengths¹ that a

¹ That this condition is not exaggerated, I may quote the testimony of Mr. Perry S. Heath, the present assistant Postmaster-General: "Postmasters, collectors of internal revenue and customs, United States marshals, and even men upon the Federal bench, were leaders in political management. The post-offices of the country were the head centres of each community; and there clustered in them on week-nights and on Sundays the floating voters

cry went up in Congress and the country for reform, and in 1883 the original Civil Service Law was placed upon the Statute Book.

The Executive in America often acts because he is forced to act, if action is to take place at all. The public, weary of delay, applaud him. It is natural to Democracy to move slowly, in that he moves through a many-headed, often discordant, legislature. It takes years to do what, under a monarchy, a sovereign, or his minister, would do by a single pen-stroke.

The scope of the new law thus forced upon the Congress by the President was narrow; it embraced only 13,924 positions as against the 83,817 classified ones to-day. Nevertheless, the complaints of the "spoilsmen"¹ were bitter, and it was only with great difficulty that Federal office-holders of any grade adjusted themselves to the new *régime*. At length President Cleveland, espousing the views of the reformers, felt himself called upon to pen a proclamation warning Federal office-holders against offensive or pernicious political activity. It was addressed, "To the heads of departments in the service of the General Government," and began in this wise:

"I deem this a proper time to especially warn all subordinates in the several departments and all the office-holders under the General Government against the use of their official positions in attempts to control political movements in their localities.

"Office-holders are the agents of the people, not their to accept their money, and managers to take instructions. Postmasters . . . handled the mails with a view to party advantage. Their employers, every one of them, were of their own political faith. No man had a position for a moment who did not work and vote for the political principles of the party in power."

¹ "To the (party) victors belong the spoils."—President Jackson's motto.

masters. Not only is their time and labour due to the Government, but they should scrupulously avoid in their political action as well as in the discharge of their official duty offending, by a display of obtrusive partisanship, their neighbours who have relations with them as public officials."

But the conditions which belonged to 1886 no longer exist. In the last political campaign there was less political activity among Federal office-holders than ever before. Indeed, a man who enters the Civil Service seems to evince even less interest in politics than his English confrère.

In seventeen years the classified service has risen from 13,924 to over 80,000. When Mr. Arthur's term expired 15,573 employees were in the classified service: Mr. Cleveland added 12,000 during his first term, his successor 15,000, and at the close of Mr. Cleveland's second term the rest stood at 86,932. Mr. McKinley reduced the list by 11,000, so that there are now at least 100,000 places reserved in the Government as party spoils, among these being Revenue collectorships, deputy marshalships, and pension examining boards.

This means that numerous chief clerks and heads of divisions go out with each expiring administration.

The consular service is still included in the spoils system. Whenever you come across an American consul, or an American diplomatist, you may be fairly sure he is enjoying the reward of political service rendered to the party in power. It is obvious that to render such a service efficient it must be divested of all political influence: it should be, and doubtless will be, placed in the hands of a competent non-partisan board, having full control and vested with the power to make all

appointments and the necessary rules and regulations for a proper administration. At present the methods of appointment, insufficient salaries, the shortness of office and insecurity of tenure, and the absence of reasonable classification, are enemies to efficiency.¹

Europeanization of the American Civil Service, although antagonized, will ultimately prevail.

It is then hoped that the Americans will have hardly fewer changes in their Civil Service on a change of administration than England has had since the Civil Service order of 1870. That is, the political heads of departments, the members of the Cabinet, will go out with the retiring President, but the assistant

¹ There is no country which imposes upon her consuls duties so numerous and varied. The American Consul is obliged to examine into the values of merchandise, and to certify invoices of goods about to be exported; he is a free information bureau, and is expected to entertain all Americans calling upon him. He must be alert and industrious, a good business man, and able to write a first-class report. Yet his salary is only one-half or one-third what is paid by us to our consuls.

There are 700 consuls and consular agents of America abroad; and no one would guess from their personal accessories or their habitat that they represented a great nation.

The consular service was primarily intended to protect the lives and property of American citizens abroad, and also in a measure to promote their welfare. But it has since widely altered its scope. It is now chiefly a great commercial intelligence department. Its legal and diplomatic character has been put in the background; and although it is still attached to America's Foreign Office or Department of State, it would more properly come under the scope of a Department of Commerce and Industries.

But for a nation of business men, as the Americans proudly boast themselves to be, the consular service is on a most unbusiness-like footing. Until lately it was wholly utilized as a political asset, wherewith to pay campaign obligations.

The term of each consul is limited by the will of the Administration, and as the latter is exposed to quadrennial change, there is little inducement for incumbents of office to perfect themselves in the service. Such a system which permits a man to be recalled, simply through change of administration, is certainly not business-like.

secretaries of the other departments will remain, as now do the assistant secretaries of the State department.

The comptrollers and auditors of the Treasury, commissioners and collectors of customs, commissioners and collectors of internal revenue, assistant postmasters, general postmasters, the comptroller of the currency, and bank inspectors, will then be men trained and fitted for their technical duties, who have achieved promotion on account of their personal ability and of long service.

The demand for reform will go on in America until, in Mr. Carl Schurz's words, "the spoils system is totally abolished, and the new order of things has supplanted it in the ordinary ways of thinking and the political habits of the people."¹

"Let us hope devoutly," exclaims another American, "that it will rapidly advance in favour until every department of federal state and municipal government in the United States shall be conducted on business principles by persons selected for the places that they are to fill."

Moreover, nearly every State has now adopted the Australian ballot system, which guarantees an honest vote and an honest return. Votes cannot now be openly purchased, and such incidents as Mr. Bryce described in 1893 could not occur.²

¹ There is, however, a new evil which Civil Service Reform has itself fostered.

The thousands of postal clerks throughout the country are banded together in a solid organization for the purpose of influencing legislation in their own interest. So dangerous does this principle appear that President Roosevelt has lately issued an order forbidding attempts of public officials or employees to secure legislation for the increase of salaries.

² Political campaigns still continue expensive, but it is solely on account of the educational "literature," halls, bands, and speakers.

The movement for reform led by New York has affected nearly every city in the country. It has even invaded the municipal government of San Francisco, long a bye-word for corruption and extravagance. In that city numerous attempts to get a new charter adopted had failed, but in 1900 the spirit of reform saturated the mind of the people, and a new era began. A Civil Service Commission, composed of three persons holding office for three years, is appointed by the Governor of the State. Promotions are to be made according to merit and term of service. No employee of the city shall be discharged, except for dishonesty, inefficiency, insubordination, or habitual discourtesy. Salaries of public offices must be fixed at rates no higher than those paid for similar services in similar employment. Sex will be no bar to a suitable office. No person can be appointed to, or dismissed from, an office for political reasons; nor can he or she be removed without a fair public trial. Particular care is to be taken to have the examinations conducted fairly and without favouritism.

It is not likely that a system which has made political corruption a profession can be uprooted in a few years. Payment for political services begins with the money doled out to the ward-heeler or canvasser, and continues by regular gradation of salary to state offices, congress-men, judges, governors, and finally in the salary of a senator at Washington. The maintenance of this profession of paid politics rests upon the practice of conferring public appointments at the behest of the senators or representatives from each State. It is against this practice that Mr. Roosevelt, like his predecessor Garfield, has sternly set his face. He early

announced his intention of exercising his own discretion in filling a public office; although the fulfilment of this intention has involved not a little friction between him and the party leaders, yet the President's independent attitude has been warmly received throughout the country.

While on the subject of the New Politics, we cannot fail of paying a passing tribute to the growth of the Referendum principle in legislation. When Congress, Legislation, and Municipal Council fail to express the wishes of the people—when they are composed of professional politicians who cannot be trusted—then the evils of Democracy must be met by more democracy, and the Swiss principle of direct legislation by the people must be called in.

This is the only way by which the growth of personal power under republican forms can be checked by those who feel that personal power should be checked. And it is undeniable that the mayor of our American city is vested with too much power, considering the method by which he is chosen.

It is undeniable that the movement for the great use of the Referendum is making rapid progress. Every party—Republican, Democratic, Populist Prohibition—has declared for it on their platforms, an action, whether sincere or not of itself, significant of its popularity. In 1898 the Union Reform Party adopted it alone as its programme. In 1894 amendments for placing the Referendum in the Constitutions of New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts just missed passing in those States. In 1896 the South Dakota Legislature passed a constitutional amendment for the Referendum by two

votes to one, and Utah and Oregon have followed suit. Many cities, including San Francisco, Minneapolis, and Detroit, boast a local Referendum. It would, on the whole, seem that the system is best adapted to local government to correct State and municipal scandals and abuses. But there are some who see in this extension of democracy visions of wild, bowling mobs taking the law in their own hands and defying constitutional authority and the counsels of the wise. A referendum is obviously a dangerous system in a community where prejudice runs stronger than the spirit of order and fair play. The principle needs to be hedged round about in some States, and it ought not to be taken unless its need is clear. But it gives the people the last word, and the people would rather follow the initiative of a wise ruler they trust than an oligarchy they distrust: a further corroboration of the Platonic proposition which I have put on my title-page.

CHAPTER XV

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT

IN my chapter on the growth of Presidential power I have shown that the headship of the United States of America is not inferior, so far as actual power and direct authority go, to that held by any of the monarchs of Europe.

It has already given employment to the pens of many ingenious and enthusiastic Transatlantic writers to trace a parallel between the German ruler, or Emperor, William II., and the American ruler, or President, Theodore Roosevelt. Both of these illustrious personages, we are told, boast a "superabundant vitality, fearlessness, seeming disregard for public opinion, and many-sidedness." Nor does the parallel end here.¹

The versatility of the Kaiser includes war, politics, art, science, and literature; and the same may be said of the President. William is forty-four years old; Theodore is precisely the same age. Both have been previously credited with rashness, impetuosity, and imprudence; both have, as rulers of great nations, lived to stultify their traducers. Names and titles do not

¹ Sir W. Laird Clowes, a personal friend of the President's, points out that, on the other hand, "he has no love for state or ceremony, and is in no sense a *poseur*." This may well be. *Mais—l'appetit vient en mangeant!*

signify actual power. Call the one, President Hohenzollern of the United States of Germany, and the other, Emperor Theodore of the Empire of America, and you need not be at the pains of adding to the one or subtracting from the other one jot or tittle of the power which each now possesses as an actual, if not an inalienable, appurtenance of his high office.

Let us pursue the resemblance, apart from character or the potentiality of office, into their respective situations. Both came into power as the legal successor of two men in whom all the world had confidence—men who represented wisdom, caution, and the personal love of the people. William's predecessor had died "crowned by the aureole of success, having created a nation, and having emerged victorious from a campaign that amazed the world." For a moment, when his successor took the oath of office, there was experienced a feeling of distrust, of national uncertainty, of apprehensiveness for the character and policy of his youthful successor. The same is true of Theodore Roosevelt. All four—predecessors and successors in Germany and America—were soldiers, and Theodore and William were to prove how groundless were the fears of their people; they were to show that both were men of peace and political sagacity, although both believed in the sword, and "longed for an opportunity to show how finely tempered was the blade."

Theodore Roosevelt is the youngest President who has ever ruled America. He is a notable exception in being a gentleman by birth, and a scholar who knows his own country and Europe, who knows much of foreign languages. Moreover, he is the only President

who ever sat in the chair of State who has served an apprenticeship in one of the great departments of State.

Can there be any who will say that all this does not betoken an entirely new order of things? If there were no other fact from which we were able to deduce that a change has come over American politics it would be this. If another and cognate fact alone were needed, it would be that the head of the Cabinet—virtually his Prime Minister—is John Hay, a scholar and a poet, a man who, on visiting England a few years ago, was neither afraid nor ashamed to write such lines as these :—

“ON LANDING IN ENGLAND.”

“Once more, hail, England! Happy is the day
 When from wide wandering I hither fare,
 Touch thy wave-warded shore and breathe thine air,
 And see again thy hedges white with May.
 Rich memories throng in every flower-gemmed way;
 Old names ring out as with a trumpet’s blare;
 While on with quickened pulse we journey where
 London’s vast thnnder roars, like seas at play.
 To thee, the cradle of our race, we come,
 To warm our hearts by ancient altar fires;
 Not breaking fealty to a dearer home,
 Thy children’s children, from whatever skies,
 Greet the high welcome of thy deathless eyes,
 Thon fair and mighty mother of our sires.”

Go over the roll of American Secretaries of State since Hamilton, and see if you can find amongst all those mediocrities one with the ability to write such lines, the sentiment to prompt them, the courage to publish them!

¹ *Pall Mall Magazine*, December, 1894.

It was said of the late President McKinley that, without being a great man, he had a "marvellous capacity for hearing and interpreting the murmur of public opinion, which he thought it the duty of his life to obey." "This mode of governing," observes a writer in the *Spectator*, "has one advantage only half perceived, that it increases the force of the State to an almost indefinite degree. Guidance may be wanting when the head of the State is always listening; but the march can never be undecided, and the weight of the marching myriad, thus kept at one with its foremost files, must always be prodigious."¹

Mr. Roosevelt is in many ways the most robust and vigorous personality in the politics of the world. He has the gifts which democracy adores—courage, magnetism, strength. His determination and decision cannot be questioned.

There is no more profound error, even from the point of view of more electoral tactics, than that of the politicians who think that a democracy prefers its statesmen to echo the supposed sentiments of the average man. Democracy is conscious of its own shortcomings, it sighs for leadership, and the man who shrinks from leading cannot hope for a full measure of popular trust. Demos may be king, but like any other monarch he cannot do without advisers, men wiser than he. Amid the besetting sense of perplexity and lack of independent knowledge, which always paralyze the mind of a democratic people when

¹ I might also call attention to the fact that the leading and most brilliant member of the Senate is not a "millionaire," nor a party "boss," but Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, a scholar and a cultivated writer.

abandoned to their own devices, what they crave for and admire above all, is the touch of masterful leadership, which brings great questions to an issue. Whatever may be the issue, no living man, not even the German Emperor, has shown more of this quality than President Roosevelt.

He is in some respects a more remarkable and important occupant of the White House than any of his forerunners, scarcely excepting General Washington and Mr. Lincoln, both of whom were specially deputed by the American nation, the one at its inception, the other in its gravest crisis, to do the work they accomplished. The most fortuitous accident in Mr. Roosevelt's singularly fortunate career was that which placed him in the presidential chair, for which he was only vaguely regarded as a remotely possible occupant. Had he asked for the presidency he would certainly have been rejected by the fickle and disorganized constituencies that three years ago were at fever-heat in the angry rivalry between McKinleyites and Bryanites. McKinley's untimely end raised Roosevelt from the vice-presidency, in which nothing was expected of him but that he should cause no trouble, and be a mere nobody—to the position in which he has so notably distinguished himself by an honesty of conduct which would never have recommended him to the wire-pullers and the dupes of either the Democratic or the Republican party.

There is something singularly attractive, even about the fearless isolation and dramatic novelty of a presidential candidate appealing to the suffrages of the whole people without the support and in spite of the wishes

and intrigues of the hitherto omnipotent machine. Mr. Roosevelt is sufficiently formidable, though standing alone. It is quite possible that the "bosses" may bow to his ascendancy, and equally so that they may be crushed in the conflict if they decide not to have the President at any price. But it is significant when a great state like Pennsylvania has already begun to match the intrigues of the log-rollers and wire-pullers, and although threatened by some of the bosses, pledges its thirty-two votes in the electoral college to Mr. Roosevelt.

As the republican vote in his own State, New York, is almost certainly his, should his party not lose its majority in these two great States before 1904, this means sixty-eight votes to begin with. It is in vain that the desperate politicians by profession, backed by the big Trusts, form the project of running Mr. Hanna for the presidency. The defection of this wing of the party only increases the widespread popularity of the President, although their power is shown in their defeating their attempts to establish reciprocity with Cuba, and other national measures in which they are seen simply battling for their own pecuniary interests.

About the middle of October, 1901, a little incident occurred in Washington at the Presidential Palace, which for a time threatened to undo, so great was the significance attached thereto by a portion of the American people, much of the unity which had been wrought north and south. On the spur of the moment, the President invited Mr. Booker Washington, a late afternoon caller, to remain for dinner. Mr. Washington is a scholar, an able administrator, and of courteous manners. But he

is a negro: and instantly a great cry went up. The South had been outraged.

Up to this episode, President Roosevelt had the warm, sympathetic approval and support of the Southern people, and the Southern senators and representatives. He had made it known that Democrats would be selected for Federal offices when the other party could not furnish good material, and had actually just appointed ex-Governor Jones as the Federal District Judge in Alabama. It is impossible to believe he will not regain this political approval; but the Southern people, as I have already shown, are intensely prejudiced, and comradeship for the negro is in their eyes a heinous crime. But the incident shows the courage of the man, as hardly anything else has done.

As to the personal influence which he exercises on society and in the White House, it is sufficiently indicated by the fact that, differing from most of the previous Presidents, he is a gentleman by birth and breeding, an Anglican in religion, a sportsman, and allied to a lady who is a social leader. It has often been remarked that the early careers of the Presidents have not qualified them to lead the world of fashion, and this remark extends to their wives, with the single exception of Mrs. Cleveland, who was both a beautiful woman and a charming hostess. Mrs. Roosevelt is equally charming, and in her æsthetic tastes and lofty ideals is well fitted to influence any society.

There can be, I think, little doubt of the tenure by His Excellency of the Imperial office for a second, and even, if the Americans be wise, of a third term. There is little danger to be apprehended from one-man power

in modern civilized communities, and when the one man is Theodore Roosevelt, the Americans should give him a free hand, in office, for as long as he cares to sustain its cares.

For "as the nation develops, and the people increase their qualifications for self-government, it will be seen that they will lay hold of the presidency as the only organ sufficient for the exercise of their sovereignty."

¹ Ford, H. J., "Rise and Growth of American Politics."



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CHAPTER XVI

EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

AMERICA has as yet no national system of education. The educational advantages provided vary a good deal in different States—for each State provides and supervises its own system in entire independence. Yet, underlying all difference of method, there is an essential unity of aim, which is “to make democratic education universally accessible, and by means of it to lift up the whole population to a higher plane of intelligence, conduct, and happiness.”

As Dr. Eliot, President of Harvard University, points out, “Democratic education is a very new thing in the world, and its attainable objects are not yet fully perceived. Only a generation ago in some of our Southern States it was a crime to teach a member of the laborious class to read.”

From the elementary school to the university education in the States is to a large extent gratuitous. This is due in a great measure to the sums and land revenues set apart by the several States and to other legislative provision, and next to the enormous contributions made to higher education by opulent citizens of the republic. Mr. Cobden noticed the liberality of American citizens

graduate has not the slightest chance, entering at twenty, against the boy who swept the office, or who begins as shipping clerk at fourteen. The facts prove this."

It is said that the average age of entering business of the most successful men in America, such as Messrs. Wanamaker, Vanderbilt, Peabody, Armour, and others, was sixteen and a half, and the age of entering into partnership twenty-two. Mr. Henry Clews remarks—

"I do not employ college men in my banking office; none need apply. I don't want them, for I think they have been spoiled for a business life. The college man is not willing to begin at the bottom. He looks down on the humble places, which he is fitted to fill. And, indeed, he looks down on all business as dull and unattractive. . . . His thoughts are not with his business, but with his books, literature, philosophy, Latin. Now, no man can approach the exacting business life in that half-hearted way. Business requires the undivided mind."

It is observed, however, that the objections of these captains of industry, many of whom have been liberal donors to the various State universities, to college education were usually somewhat qualified by the phrase "as it now is." Moreover, it was universally admitted that for professional men the old university ideal was a good one. Of late years a decided effort has been made to forward technical education both in the high schools and in the universities, and to establish a complete system of commercial and business training.¹

¹ Mr. Thistelton Mark has recently furnished detail of the equipment and work done by such establishments as the Armour Institute of Chicago, the Bradley Institute of Peoria, the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale, the Lawrence School at Harvard, the School of Mines at Columbia University.

But now for the other side of the picture. In spite of the progress of the last ten years, it is quite fatuous to speak of the higher Educational System of America being worthy of our own or anybody's example. President Harper, of Chicago University, confesses quite frankly, that "the field of higher education in America is at the present time in an exceedingly disorganized condition."

A university in America does not generally mean what we regard as a university. There are hundreds of academies, too, which are called colleges.¹ Let us take a casual peep into the administration. To English ideas a professor's life at a university should be in the nature of a freehold. In America, on the other hand, there is too much immobility—not enough fixity of tenure. The reason is, of course, to be found in the fact that, with a few exceptions (such as Yale), there is no self-government granted to an American University. In academic as in political life, the tendency is to one-man power. In the State Universities and in those

and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the latter having been described as "the finest technical institution in the world."

It seems that twenty-one years ago a School of Finance and Economy was founded in connection with the University of Pennsylvania, with the help of a gift of \$100,000 by Mr. Joseph Wharton, and since 1898, largely under the stimulus of foreign example, the Universities of Chicago, California, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Vermont, Dartmouth College, and finally Harvard, have established special schools or schemes for higher commercial teaching. The innovation has been received with favour. The total number of commercial students in schools and colleges reported to the Bureau of Education rose from 131,518 in 1898-1899 to 190,698 in 1899-1900. Technical education, apart from the universities, has been handsomely endowed of late years in the United States.

¹ A Bachelor of Arts from one university has been known to enter the "Preparatory Department" of another, where the best part of a year was needed to fit him for admission to the freshman class.

privately endowed or supported by religious denominations, the teaching staff is ruled despotically by a president, who acts as the vizier of the millionaire benefactor or "regent," "trustees," etc., who rarely interfere with his decisions.¹

Nearly all academic institutions are virtually controlled, as we may already have inferred, by capitalistic influences. This is productive of effects far from salutary both upon the teaching staff and upon the pupils, but the time is not yet at hand when public opinion even partially realizes the consequences of their faulty organization.

On the subject of social distinctions in the common schools, Rev. Cecil Grant says—

"Though the conditions of American society are of necessity widely different from our own, the educated American is no less aware than ourselves of the worth of culture, and were it found that the mixing of the social strata in their schools caused a general levelling down of manners, or that their daughters ran a risk of undesirable entanglements, the higher class of Americans would most certainly not send them to the common schools as universally as they do. As a matter of fact, the writer's own observation, supported by the unanimous testimony of all whom he had the opportunity of consulting, was to the effect that, whereas the levelling up was most surprisingly apparent, no signs of the reverse process were to be detected.

"At school, as at college, idleness is tempered by the commercial instinct. The boy drinks in with his mother's milk the creed that success in life is life's main object, and that to succeed one must work. The writer was told, as an instance of the importance attached to educational success, that in Harvard for some time there had been an average of one suicide yearly after

¹ This system has its advantages from a pecuniary standpoint, as in 1900-1901 it realized £3,500,000 in academic endowments in America.

the result of the examinations. It would not be just to say that there are no higher motives at work, or perhaps to claim any superiority for England in this respect. The fact that the English boy is too idle to think of the future does not prevent him from developing the commercial spirit very fully later on."

From education I pass to science.

While praise has been showered plentifully upon America for her industrial achievements and her inventions, it is well to ask what has she done in the way of science? What position does she occupy in the scientific world? Everything would seem to have favoured the growth of brilliant investigators—rich endowments—bountifully equipped colleges,—and yet, where is the American equivalent for Pasteur, Lister, Kelvin, Koeh, Berthelot, Lodge, Crookes, Slaby, Hertz, Helmholtz, Röntgen, Rayleigh?

There are numerous examples of clever workers in applied science, but where are the great philosophers—the investigators—the Franklins and Rumfords of to-day?

In the marvellous new science of neurology, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria contribute distinguished exponents: America none.

In the domain of chemistry an American name of repute is wholly absent. Take electro-chemistry, the aluminium and calcium carbide industries are to-day worth millions of dollars to America. Yet America contributed nothing to their slow and painful evolution.

In brief, in nearly all the departments of science, which require penetrating reflection, America finds herself isolated from the rest of the world. Perhaps the most brilliant example of the fruitful union of scientific

experiment and scientific imagination is the new theory of ether, which offers to the universe the only explanation of the phenomena of light, heat, electricity, and magnetism, of the Marconi telegraph and X-ray photography. To this theory scores of great scientists, from Kelvin and Helmholtz to Lorenz and Poincaré, have brought their contributions, every country in Europe can boast a representative. America contributes nothing.

As to the causes of America's scientific inferiority, it may be that she has no institutions, such as the College of France, the Pasteur Institute, the Royal Institution.¹

"I have before me," writes the American Professor Synder, "the latest volume on metallurgy, summing up twenty years of marvellous work. From almost a dictionary of names, Belgian, Netherlandish, German, English, French, Russian, I can find but two Americans, Professor Gibbs, whose contribution was most indirect, and Professor Howe. Not even a science which rests upon a billion dollar Trust seems to arouse the interest of one original 'inventive American mind.'"

It is to remedy this defect, to lessen this inferiority, that Mr. Carnegie has undertaken the establishment of an institute bearing his name.

The purpose of the founder is to secure for the United States the leadership in the domain of discovery by "an assiduous collecting of brains similar to the collecting of rare books and works of art which Americans are now carrying on in so lavish a manner." There is no organization in England which has done more for

¹ It is a curious circumstance that the Royal Institution was founded by an American, Benjamin Thompson (Count Rumford). He was born near Boston, and took sides with the Northern country during the Revolution.

English science and industries than the Royal Institution. The total cost of a century of scientific work in the laboratories of the Royal Institution amounts to £119,800, or an average of £1200 per annum. The Carnegie Institute in Washington will dispose in a year of as much money as the members of the Royal Institution have expended in a century.

All this may bear great fruit; but in the mean time the national unsympathetic attitude towards scientists must alter if the best men are to devote their lives to the public in a field not always the most lucrative.

England, France, and Germany honour their men of science in the most marked way, but, as Professor Newcomb is obliged to confess, it is "significant of America's inferior place in science that the idea of such celebrations in honour of science and scientific men is so foreign to our notions that it is hardly likely to present itself for generations to come."¹

¹ America undoubtedly boasts some eminent physicians and surgeons, and in dentistry she leads the world. As a further illustration of the tendency of the times we see the medical profession now in process of combination on the English model.

The following extract from the new constitution of the American Medical Association gives a clear idea of the purpose of the medical profession in reorganizing its societies:—

"The object of this Association shall be to federate into one compact organization, the medical profession of the United States, for the purpose of fostering the growth and diffusion of medical knowledge, of promoting friendly intercourse among American physicians, of safeguarding the material interests of the medical profession, of elevating the standard of medical education, of securing the enactment and enforcement of medical laws, of enlightening and directing public opinion in regard to the broad problems of State medicine, and of representing to the world the practical accomplishment of scientific medicine."

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEW LITERATURE

SINCE the American Copyright Act of 1892, the literature of America—at least, in the department of fiction—has taken an upward bound which is astounding. To the protection afforded by that Act to American authors must be ascribed the sudden rise of a whole flood of native talent, which, passing the literary borders of the country, has inundated Europe. Prior to that time America may be said to have been dependent on Britain for her fiction, although it is true that there existed a number of native writers whose work was esteemed, but whose following in the country was comparatively small. The universal vogue enjoyed by British authors had for a century been fostered by the system of piracy, which made it feasible to put on the market a novel often at a fifth and sometimes at a tenth of the price such a book would command in England, or that a book by an American author would sell for in America.

The result of this has been to keep America provincial as far as literature is concerned, a relationship which has not been without its advantages, in that it constantly held high ideals of thinking, conduct, and speech before people who would otherwise have lapsed

to a level more purely Bœotian than was reached by the Westerners of Jackson's day.

When this unfair condition of things became abolished, an indigenous school of fiction sprang up like a mushroom in the night. Patronized by national sentiment, and perhaps also by national vanity and prejudice, authors who had long languished for a publisher and a public now disposed of their wares by the tens and even the hundreds of thousands. But there was another reason for this vogue. Whatever their literary shortcomings, they delineated, or sought to delineate, a life familiar and attractive to Americans at large. Most of the denizens of the large cities migrated thither from the villages and the farms of the country—often at an early age—carrying with them tender recollections of the old home, and the simple rustic characters they knew in their childhood. Amidst the high pressure, moral, mental, and physical, of the workaday cities, men and women turned with delight to whatever recalled to them those homely and pathetic scenes. Americans are at heart a simple people—a nation of children—when the cunning and greed and the worldliness have been scaled away, and "Grandfather's Clock," "The Old Red Barn," "The Old Oaken Bucket" are achievements which move them strangely.

The play that enjoyed the greatest successive run of any on the American boards was *The Old Homestead*. It was not a drama—you could not call it a drama—it was a mere presentation of rustic character, in all its loveliness and uncouthness, surrounded by other rustic characters and rustic scenery. It ran for years; it evoked numberless imitators, who all succeeded.

It was the forerunner of such books as "David Harum" and "Eben Holden," which sell more and are read more than Shakespeare, and Scott, and Dickens, and Thackeray put together. These works are no masterpieces—the two mentioned were written by men who were not professional authors—they are merely transcripts of the sayings, reports of the doings, of actual people—professedly so—distinctive Americans—creatures known on the other side of the Atlantic—and therefore making their first bow in literature. All this amply justifies their existence, all this explains their huge popularity. There is none of the artistic genius here of the great school of American novelists, of Hawthorne, of Holmes, of Howells, of Cable, of Bret Harte, of Miss Wilkins. It was perhaps "a new graft on the tree of English literature," although of this I am a little doubtful. I should rather call it a purely American growth. The authors occasionally, it is true, lapse into English; but the body of their works is written in, their characters adopt exclusively, the American language.

We turn now to regard a consequence of their success. They set a fashion; they stimulate the public into reading American books by American authors. The demand created, we see, to our amazement, within twenty-four months, men and women rushing from the church, journalism, the college, the business office, to become authors. It is not necessary to have art, insight into character, judgment, knowledge of the world: a little aptitude for scribbling, and a clever publisher will soon push the aspirant into renown. The presses of America groan with the printing of novels, and yet

there is scarce a duodecimo which will outlast a single lustre. The quondam barrenness is overspread with verdure, but it is all, or nearly all, weeds. I do not wish or intend to disparage the great writers—they would have written had there been no "boom" in American fiction. But even these are specialists; and by no means specialists of the magnitude of George Moore, let us say. It is needless to proclaim that there are no writers of the depth as well as breadth of Thomas Hardy or Mrs. Ward.¹ Perhaps Mr. Howells puts it squarely when he says—

"Our life is too large for our Art to be broad. In despair at the immense variety of the material offered to it by American civilization, American fiction must specialize, and, turning from the superabundance of character, it must burrow far down in a soul or two."

The new school has done something. It has shown that America's beginnings are not unromantic and unattractive. Time is now shedding his mellow rays upon the Colonial era, although Thackeray in "The Virginians" had showed its worth. The early history of Greece, Germany, France, Italy, and England were rich in *romance* and romance; but it was not supposed that America had anything to offer to the native author comparable in richness, or worthy to engage the pen of poet and romancers. But since (to quote one cultured American²) "we have come to understand our own

¹ American literature has always suffered from the narrowness of American national experience. "One cannot undertake a study of the literature of America," remarks Mr. Sheffield Clapham, "without some longing for a greater warmth, brighter colours, more fervid imagination."

² Professor Hamilton W. Mahie.

history more clearly, and to comprehend its significance both as an extension and expansion of the spiritual history of Europe, and as a new chapter in the unfolding of the human drama, our eyes have been unsealed, and we have become aware of the wealth of material at our disposal for the making of literature."

The easiest novel to write, and the easiest to fail in, is the historical novel. But considerations of artistic failure did not deter the army of embryo novelists. Here again, was a national want—an arid patch in the field of American literature. America was at length old enough to have a history; her Colonial days receded into the twilight, and became invested with a grace and charm unseen before. The new ambitious school was instantly on hand with its pen, and wrought diligently and according to its lights and limitations at what Stevenson called "tushery." They could be realists as well; no particular province of fiction was theirs, but they chose the din of arms, horrid tumult of the "swashbuckler swashing on his buckler."

In these novels incident succeeds incident with startling rapidity. There is no time to draw character; there is no time for natural descriptions; in brief, these "historical romances" are but glorified dime-novels.

See how their pages reek with bloodshed. Take this—

"The ruffian against whom I was pitted began to draw his breath in gasps. He was a scoundrel not fit to die . . . unworthy of a gentleman's steel. I presently ran him through with as little compunction, and as great desire to be quit of a dirty job, as if he had been a mad dog."

Or these—

“Now, I'll scalp you!” he cried, in a voice terrible to hear; and with his words, out came his hunting-knife from its sheath. . . . In fact, he had taken off part of Maisonville's scalp . . . insisting upon completing his cruel performance . . . He shook the tuft of hair at Maisonville, and glared like a mad bull.”

“Young Brandon replied: ‘Stand your ground, you coward! . . . If you try to run I will thrust you through the neck as I would a cur. Listen how you snort.’ . . . The fellow started to run, but turned, and fell upon his knees to beg for life. Brandon's reply was a flashing circle of his steel (elsewhere a dexterous twist of his blade), and his sword-point cut lengthwise through Judson's eyes, and the bridge of his nose, leaving him sightless and hideous for life.”

Well may the eminent critic observe that the inventors of these hideous incidents possibly do not prefer bloodshed. They are mostly gentlemen of peaceful callings, and the instincts of law-abiding citizens, with probably no love of homicide in them. Nevertheless, “that delicate something which we call tone, whether intellectual or ethical, must suffer from an orgy of the kind, as it would suffer from an excess in opium or absinthe.”

These excesses, too, are mainly clothed in a garb which is supposed to be in unison with the period. The style is stilted and archaic, with occasional lapses into the American language.

In “Richard Carvell,” we have the hero observing that he “raised up in bed,” and another, a London lackey of George III.'s time, reports his master as being “some better.” “Another of the new historical novelists makes a Franco-American backwoodman of the Fenimore Cooper type employ phrases of current American slang;

and yet another gives vivacity, if not vitality, to an English princess of the sixteenth century by having her speak and act as a twentieth century hoydon from Indiana." ¹

No new English historical novel has enjoyed the overwhelming popularity of these numerous American romances. Mr. Howells has an explanation for this: "It is possibly because the English have looked more constantly and more profoundly into the past, and found there was nothing in it, that they have invented imaginary realms, and left the exploitation of history to our more ardent, more inexperienced, romantic school, it is certainly simpler to cut loose from any sort of fact, and abandon one's self to pure fake as the English have done."

Yet, with all its defects of style, of taste, or perhaps only of art, the new American school of fiction has served, and is serving, as a great unifying influence. It will not, unless it produce some really great writer, worthy to compete with the best, endure for any time. It does not possess the elements of endurance, and as for the bulk of its achievements they have not, in Dr. Johnstone's immense phrase, "wit enough to keep them sweet, or vitality enough to preserve them from putrefication." ² No American writer had hitherto been able

¹ W. D. Howells, in *North American Review*, vol. clxxi.

² Could anything display the current literary spirit and tendencies in America more than the many advertisements offering to teach fiction?

Here is a sample one which I reproduce verbatim, omitting, however, the name of the enterprising firm of tutors in fiction.

"SHORT STORY WRITING TAUGHT.

"Our course of home spare-time study in short story writing is in charge of successful authors, and we buy and print all available work of our students.

to give the American race clear consciousness of its strength, its aims, and its works; no writer had bound the race together in the consciousness of community, although the statesmen have frequently done this. Yet I do not deny that there have been national writers, and I notice that President Roosevelt condemns the "futility of talking of a Northern literature, or a Southern literature, an Eastern or a Western school of art or science. Joel Chandler Harris is emphatically a national writer; as is Mark Twain. They do not write merely for Georgia, or Missouri, or California, any more than for Illinois or Connecticut; they write as Americans, and for all people who can read English."¹

As to poetry, it is scarce in America, although there are any number of facile versifiers. There are no Longfellows, no Bryants, no Poes, no Whittiers, no Lowells—not even a Whitman.

The real poetry is not of the classic mould, but it has the marks of genuine poetry about it for all that.

"This is the 20th century improvement on high-priced correspondence instruction.

"Most rejected manuscripts have slight faults easily corrected by a little practical study.

"Testimonial from a Student.

"I have read with pleasure Supplement No. 1. It is a broad and comprehensive way of writing on this subject. It will bring many new authors into the market.

"F. S. GLOVER,

"55, Worth Street, New York City,

"What a Professional Writer says.

"Am especially pleased with your short story writing supplement. This is a thoroughly good thing.

"ELLIOT WALKER,

"Pittsfield, Mass."

¹ "The Strenuous Life."

Mr. Whitcomb Riley is as true a poet as Robert Burns, and so is Mr. F. L. Stanton. Mr. Markham has also given signs of having great gifts. But after these men we must turn to the other sex for passion and metre. In America there has always been a superabundance of female poets. Mr. Stedman's recent anthology of American poetry is distinguished among books of this sort by the number of its female names; the Mary Annes and Harriets appearing more than a third as often as the Johns and the Jameses and the Williams. We read herein of the "glowing, prophetic periods of Emma Lazarus, the highly sensitized lyrics of Helen Jackson, the playful fancies of Katherine Lee Bates, and the exquisitely finished verses of Edith Thomas."

But there are no Mrs. Brownings or Christina Rosettis to be found amongst them.

When we turn to the domain of art—*i.e.* pictorial art—we find an astonishing record of progress in the past dozen years. It is not merely that the owners of some of the most famous names in contemporary British art are Americans by birth and up-bringing; for the significance of that may be easily exaggerated. None of these men received their art training in America, and have passed most of their lives in Europe.¹ Yet Mr. Abbey, Mr. Sargent, and Mr. Whistler are distinctly American in their temperaments and in the character of their work. It is informed by a certain vigour, and reveals a quite American perception of effect and hatred of convention, such as we see exhibited in everything

¹ Mr. Roosevelt condemns the American painter who lives abroad. But the question is, Can he be produced at home?

the American workman handles. There is no largeness or nobility of conception, no Rubens-like purity of colour or outline; because these qualities, in their equivalent form, are not characteristic of any American art or achievement.

Perhaps a distinctive school of American art may arise—is arising—in America.

“What struck one most in the American work at Paris, in 1900,” remarked an English critic recently, “was the beauty, the strength, the originality of the landscapes, most of which came from American painters living, not in Paris or London, but at home. Their canvasses were not mere reflections of French models, as American painting often is; so that it seemed as if, were an original American school to be looked for anywhere, it would be among the landscape men who are working quietly in their own country.”

As for American journalism, it is hardly necessary to explain its salient features to Englishmen, since the establishment within their own community of newspapers conducted on similar lines and animated by the same ideals. As one recent observer has said, “The American newspaper has simply become an industry—a business conducted for the usual ends of business, with public teaching and influence, but by a by-product.” As to the number and value of newspapers in the United States, there are, it appears, over 15,000 establishments for the publication of periodicals; an increase of 24 per cent. in the decade since the previous census. About 400 are started every year, or more than one for every day of the year, including Sundays. Of the 15,000 existing journals, about 2000

are dailies, and 12,000 weeklies. Considerably more than the half of these publications are really very unimportant, as but 6000 out of the 15,000 have more than 1000 circulation. After giving the amount of the capital invested in the newspapers and their output in wages and material, it is reckoned that "the value of the product is \$223,000,000, that is £44,600,000. As a "business proposition," therefore, the American newspaper is exceedingly attractive.

The mainspring of such journals being in the counting-house, there are no longer any editors in America in the old sense of the term. In fact, most of the American newspapers are equipped with leader-writers, news editors, city editors, theatrical editors, sporting editors, "exchange" editors, every kind of editor except a real editor. Yet there are exceptions to this rule, and I think the exceptions have been growing more numerous of late. The reaction against the Yellow Press is already felt, and it is possible that the new journalism will find a method to maintain itself in spite of commercial disadvantages.¹

¹ Anything more hideous to the eye and repulsive to good taste than the advertisements and head-lines in the American newspapers can hardly be conceived. One marvels how it is they are tolerated by the reader.

CHAPTER XVIII

PROGRESS AND CHARACTER

IN inquiring into the growth of what we may call the American Empire we learn that in the lapse of a century and a quarter the number of States has increased from thirteen to forty-eight, that from an area of 860,000 square miles it is now over three millions, that from a population of three millions it is now eighty millions.

America proper is thus a big country, but it is not the biggest country on the planet, as nine-tenths of its inhabitants piously believe.¹ In mere area it is smaller than our Canada. Leaving out Alaska and the Philippines there are 3,025,600 square miles of territory under the Stars and Stripes. Australasia has a territory of 3,077,374 square miles. So it would perhaps be well for us to rid ourselves of the mere idea of size. Life being counted not by moments but by actions, so a country should be estimated not by its superficial area, but by the number of its settlements. Deserts, prairies, forests and lakes add nothing to actual civilization. A wheat farm of half a million acres and two hundred inhabitants is a consideration merely equivalent

¹ Russia, which has all the natural resources of America, and is already matching its progress, has an area of 8,450,081 square miles and a population of 129,211,113.

to an equally profitable manufactory of less than five hundred thousandth the area. America is in truth a country of magnificent distances, but mere distance, like time, becomes meaningless if it be not punctuated by human art, industry, and population. Great Britain, small as it is in area, is a compact organization, and if it were spread out to the size of America it would, humanly speaking, be no greater. It contains cities, towns, villages, and hamlets. Each of these centres of life is separated by green fields, by forests, by moors, by rivers and other natural features. Expand the area of these spaces—these natural features—enormously, and, lo, you have America!

But even then, how much smaller would be America by reason of the history, the accumulated interests, the traditions, the legends, the associations that invest with life, even to complexity, every mile of English ground?

One is bound to say that the homogeneity of the American people spread out over such a country is astonishing. Here in Europe we are accustomed to a dozen diverse nationalities within such a space as separates New York from San Francisco. To travel four or five hundred miles in any direction is almost of necessity to encounter varying racial types, strange religious manners and customs. But America, vast as its area, presents the same face from ocean to ocean, from Canada to Mexico.¹ The city which is reached by the traveller to-day is the city of yesterday, in replica, nor

¹ This is a great change indeed. Mr. S. L. Clemens, writing in 1882, was able to tell the geography of the country by the dress and personal appearance of the inhabitants.—“Life on the Mississippi.”

does the eye catch anything to vary the monotony of architecture or the dreary parallelograms of the streets. With the people, speech, dress, and deportment is the same. The shops are the same, the same goods you find in Boston are displayed in the same manner in St. Louis. Market Street in San Francisco is the counterpart of Market Street, Philadelphia, even to the ferries at the bottom of each thoroughfare; State Street, Chicago, is a reproduction of Broadway, New York. Birmingham is far less like Nottingham than is Cincinnati unlike any other city in America.

A great deal of this homogeneity may be more apparent than real. You cannot eradicate racial tendencies and predispositions. Yet it is certainly a fact that the American type is at present in the ascendency. As Mr. Frederic Harrison has recently observed—

“Those who direct the State, who administer the cities, control the legislatures, the financiers, merchants, professors, journalists, men of letters—those whom I met in society, are nearly all of American birth and all of marked American type. I rarely heard a foreign accent or saw a foreign countenance. The American world is practically ‘run’ by genuine Americans. Foreigners are more in evidence in Loudon or Manchester, it seemed to me, than they are in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston.”

Sir William Butler some years ago spoke of America as—

“That vast human machine which grinds Celt and Saxon, Teuton and Dane, Fin and Goth into the same image and likeness of inevitable Yankee—grinds him, too, into that image in one short generation, and oftentimes in less; doing it without

any apparent outward pressure or any tyrannical law of language or religion, but nevertheless beating out, welding, and amalgamating the various conflicting races of the Old World into the great American people. Assuredly the world has never witnessed any experiment of so gigantic a nature as this immense fusion of the Caucasian race now going on before our eyes in North America."¹

The real significance of this is said to have appealed to the late President McKinley on the occasion of the noteworthy tour he made just before his lamented death. The solidarity of the nation, its community of interest, the singleness of patriotic purpose, we are told, struck him with tremendous force. He saw that, as long as such conditions continued, there was "no need to question the future of the republic."² We therefore find him, in speeches delivered at that time, constantly impressing upon his auditors the idea of national unity. "One flag, one country, one destiny," was his perpetual text, and even an imagination less susceptible than Mr. McKinley's might have caught fire at this extraordinary spectacle. It is one of the wonders of the world. Reflect upon the racial, lingual religions, moral and architectural diversity of the Roman Empire—of the British Empire. Contrast the American Empire with the empire of Austria-Hungary, where in a territory comprising only 240,000 square miles, less than a fourteenth part of the area of America, we find such a diversity of language that the printed money expresses

¹ "The days of diversity are numbered," cries out Professor Sedgwick. "All races are trimmed, lopped, and squeezed into the American mould. Miss Wilkins's New Englanders, Bret Harte's miners, Owen Wister's ranchmen are passing away."

² H. L. West, "The President's Tour," in *The Forum*, August, 1901.

the denomination of each note in above a dozen different characters, where the debates in the Reichsrath resembles Babel itself. And we know that Austria-Hungary is, in truth, a much betinkered structure, in imminent danger of collapse; while, on the other hand, America, in spite of its size, is a unit, complete, not inharmonious, resting on solid foundations.

Some years ago it was openly declared that the people west of the Rocky Mountains were able and willing to exist independently of their Eastern brethren. The acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii has brought East and West together in mutual interests and intercourse. More Eastern people visited San Francisco in the three years following the war with Spain than had travelled to the coast in the thirty years previously. The Rocky Mountain barriers have been razed to the ground. No longer on the outermost edge of America the Pacific Coast capital is now a halting place on the way to Manila, the capital of Oriental America, two hundred miles farther on.

The redemption of the West and South from the barbarity and often bloodthirsty localisms, formerly distinguishing those sections, is only to be regretted by the novelist and playwright, and perhaps those of us who lament the disappearance of the picturesque. "The Texan," we are told, "likes to be told that he lives in a great State. He looks forward to the time, apparently not far distant, when Texas will be the Empire State. Above all, he is anxious that the Eastern visitor shall observe that wealth and culture, refinement and intelligence, are not strangers within the Texas border." There may still exist in the innermost recesses of the

State the typical "bad man" with black flowing moustache, and ever-ready pistol; but he is not in evidence to the tourist. The reception to Mr. McKinley in the capital of Austin brought together a throng of as fashionably-dressed and beautiful women as would have graced any function in the East.

Nothing could better illustrate the change which has come over the South than an episode in the tour of the late President, in the typical Southern city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, where the fortifications of the Civil War still remain, although covered with grassy lawns, he saw an arch formed by cotton bales, bearing the single word "Expansion."

It was remarked as significant that in the city where this display occurred, the reception of the President was most demonstrative in its nature. It is a great cotton mart, Englishmen, Germans, Italians, French, representatives of every commercial nation constantly reside here, for the purchase of this great staple and its shipment abroad. The cotton-growers realize the value of these foreign markets; they know that they must go beyond America to find buyers for their surplus stock, and they were quick to perceive that the war with Spain opened to them the markets of the East.

For them China and the Philippines have ceased to be mere names on the map, and become the homes of millions of human beings who are clothed in the product of the cotton loom. Within less than sixteen months after the war with Spain, the exports of cotton goods to Manchuria alone had increased by over ten million dollars. Is it surprising then, that the commercial instinct of the South, so long dormant, should

have awakened, and that the cry of "the open door for southern cotton" should find an enthusiastically responsive echo from the lips of men so long indifferent to international policy?

When the President talked of the great opportunities awaiting the American cotton-planters, and emphasized the opening avenue of trade as a further incentive to industry and energy, he was cheered with a yell as ear-piercing as that which thrilled Pickett's men at Gettysburg. It may not be new blood in the veins of the Southern people, but it is blood which is coursing with new sensations. These Southerners were learning the value of the dollar. They are realizing that the practical business side of a question is to be preferred to the sentimental.

For a long time the States of the vanquished Confederacy held aloof from commercialism. A dozen years ago, when I was temporarily resident in Georgia, the most advanced of the Southern States, it was still deprecated as a northern trait, which could only be cultivated by northerners in that region. Even now, politicians of the old school continue to resent the development of commercialism which is honeycombing the political structure of the South. But the new element—the business element—in Southern politics they are powerless to withstand. It is the logical sequence of new conditions in their part of America; of the growing wealth and prosperity which marks every State. All the cotton used to be sent North, or to England; now the mills beside the railway line of nearly every town are monuments of commercial development. The diversification of the crops in the

South, long and fairly urged, has become realized. In Alabama, vast fields of corn have taken the place of cotton; many of the valleys yield immense returns as grazing lands, or when sown with potatoes. Garden vegetables and fruit, such as melons and strawberries, are raised in profusion for shipment to the North. Moreover, the northern immigrant and the southern native are dwelling together in harmony. Commercialism has already broken down the barriers of sectional sentiment.

Not much more than a decade ago San Francisco was but little more than a name to the average dweller in the east, from which it was separated by a tedious and costly railway journey. The Pacific coast was a section apart from the rest of the country. Its merchants habitually spoke of "importing" merchandise from the States? But during the last few years there has journeyed a steady procession, mostly armed men from East to West, all of them gathering numbers as they pass, and all animated by a single purpose all active, intelligent and patriotic. But for the event of the War with Spain, these Eastern men would never have known personally the Pacific coast, or have held a close community of interest with their fellow-republicans 3000 miles distant.

San Francisco, more than any other city, has experienced practical benefits from expansion. It is the *entrepôt* of America's commerce with the East. Its docks have been thronged with thousands of soldiers hastening to Manila, while returning regiments have beheld the outlines of the Golden Gates with delight. The enormous supplies for the Philippines and the late

American Army in China were broken in bulk at San Francisco, and the transfer from train to transport, has given employment to thousands. And it is but the beginning. Henceforward the argosies that sail the Pacific will increase in number and value, until New York's maritime importance on the eastern seaboard may be counterbalanced by San Francisco on the Western.

Nearly all the European critics of the American Union the last seventy years have laid stress upon the nation's lack of a true capital. How, they asked, can a nation possess any solidarity in matters of art, taste, dress, and speech, when half a dozen cities spread over 3,000,000 square miles of territory contend for the honour of being the arbiters in such matters.

To-day a visit to Washington would convince them that the nominal capital is in a fair way to become the ideal capital.

While Washington may never become the "greatest commercial emporium" of America, which President Washington hoped it might, yet every census reveals, perhaps to the astonishment of Washingtonians, a striking increase in its commercial wealth. Manufactures have been discouraged rather than encouraged, yet they have increased until, in 1890, products to the value of nearly \$40,000,000 were recorded. It has been remarked that the *per capita* wealth of the city has been kept in advance of the whole country since 1860.

Since the Civil Service law was enacted in 1883, each President has been able to render the tenure of office in the executive departments more secure, and

one result of this has been a marked improvement in the character and tone of Washington society.

There are in the capital employed under the Federal Government no fewer than 20,000 persons, to whom the sum of \$23,000,000 is paid annually. These 20,000 officials with their families represent 80,000 of the city's population. "So large a group too, representing intelligent men and women, reflects the highest civilization, and insists upon the best moral and intellectual conditions. So the churches of Washington flourish, and its schools rank with the first in the land."

Amongst these office-holders are now a larger number of scientific men than are to be found in any other American city. They are chiefly members of the ever-increasing scientific bureau of the Government. They form a distinct and important class, maintaining half a dozen learned societies, and furnishing the largest element in one of the three most important clubs. They will be increased by the impending establishment of the Carnegie Institute.

But when we have thus paid tribute to America's growth, wealth, and unity, let us not exaggerate her moral importance in the world.

The true greatness of a nation is in its character, its power to speak with one voice, and that voice to be strong, and just, and intelligent; it must be able to fill a leading *rôle* in the drama of civilization and world-progress.¹

¹ His country's future commonly presents itself all roseate to the American who has not yet acquired the thinking habit, but it would be hard to parallel this for optimism so healthy as to be boisterous.

"We anticipate that within the life period of the majority of those who will read these lines, America will dominate the world in literature, art,

New American civilization, it has been truly said, has come to "centre about the conception of life as a matter of industrial energy."

Must it not be something of a reproach to a nation that when she is assailed—savagely, unjustly, if you will—as she was assailed by a leading English review at the outbreak of the Hispano-American War—no adequate rejoinder rises instantly to the lips even of a fair-minded onlooker?

"Wipe out Spain and America and their achievements to-morrow, and which of them would be mourned by civilization? Should we miss the iron, and the oil, and the corn, and the pigs, or the poetry of de Vega, the art of Velasquez, the immortal fiction of Cervantes. A nation that is barren in every branch of creative art may be rich in material goods—but all its millions will not buy it immortality in the world's judgment-book."

We may say wealth is greatness; but, even so, surely that wealth ought to be diffused amongst the people

science, finance, commerce and Christianity; and believing, as we do believe, that by virtue of the intelligence, industry, and conscience of her people, she is the nation best fitted to hold that commanding position, it becomes the chief mission of this journal to hasten the day, and to help to perfect the equipment of those upon whom the responsibility must fall for the successful performance of their duty, progress, and civilization."

This is not from the *Oshkosh Clarion*, but from that well-known journal of light and leading *Harper's Weekly*.

From this boasting it will be thought that America is but little changed. "We are," wrote Sydney Smith in 1820, "the friends and admirers of Jonathan. But he must not grow vain and ambitious, or allow himself to be dazzled by that galaxy of epithets by which his orators and newspaper scribblers endeavour to persuade their supporters that they are the greatest, the most refined, the most enlightened, and the most moral people on the earth. The effect of this is unspeakably ludicrous on this side of the Atlantic, and even on the other, we should imagine, must be rather humiliating to the reasonable part of the population."

of all sections. America cannot be great in this sense, because half her population is ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clothed. She presents only her finer side to Europe.

Let us cut ourselves loose from this habit of megalomania; let us see America in her true proportions. There is, and always has been, with us a sect which sees in America a great, and noble, and powerful champion of freedom and civilization, the splendid redresser of balances; her political institutions and her wide moral and physical latitudes come in for their whole-souled applause. There was and is another school which thrived upon detraction of America.¹ Both lack knowledge.

Does America's action before the world express her spiritual life? Every nation, every people has a life of the spirit; and nearly always, at least in the older nations, the collective deeds which go to form its outer character, bear a just relation to its ideals. As those ideals, as that spiritual power, is potent and deep, weak and shallow, so is the worth of a race to be gauged.

"There is," says a distinguished American,² "in the heart of every race a group of ideas, which may be called ideals, since they express the passions, the faith, and aspirations of the people. There is also in the same race a power of action, and an executive ability, a skill in doing; and the real national problem is the coordination of those two sides of life: the side of idea, and the side of action."

¹ But of course, as I am reminded, the larger part of the world has never until lately thought of America at all, or if they did the image they vaguely conjured up was that of a "lop-eared, shaggy, hulking, raw-boned, braggart among the nations, marvellous for its size, its dyspepsia, its politics and its millionaires."

² Professor Hamilton Mabie.

Two things, according to M. Brunetiere, stand in the way of the higher civilization in America, namely, the great distance between the centres of social and industrial activity, and the spirit of commercialism. There is, indeed, as yet no co-ordination of intellectual standard and aims; the development of its land, its minerals, and its trade.

It is one of the profoundest symptoms of real worth in America, that her people are now beginning to confess they have much to learn from the older nations—lessons in efficiency, economy, and administrative intelligence.

"It will," writes the same able American, "indicate greater confidence in our own institutions when we give up boasting, and are willing to go to school to any people who can teach us."

When America will abandon that pharisaical pretence of contentment with her own institutions, when she can bring herself to believe that there are spiritual and æsthetic needs which her form of government does not and cannot supply, when her people, in short, acquire humility, and tolerance, and reverence, she will seem to certain of her neighbours worthier of emulation.

Wise men have told them that ornament is one of the wants of human nature; and yet they have not taken the lesson seriously to heart, although unconsciously seeking to gratify this want on every possible occasion. Thousands go abroad to feast their eyes on the pomp and pageant of older lands; but it must not be thought that all those at home are cut off from glory. Their military uniforms wax more splendid; never are

they prouder than when carrying gaudy banners and flaunting gaudy badges. At least five million males in America belong to seeret societies, foresters, knights of labour, etc., the membership of which comprises the precious privilege of wearing a sash, gold lace, or a flaming rosette. And these are the people with their "Senators" and "Honourables," and judges and colonels, who can reproach *us* with our traditions, our outward marks of inward grace, who can affect to regard *us* with amused tolerance. "They are children to us in certain points of view. They are playing with toys we have done with for whole generations. That silly little drum they are always beating on, and the trumpet and the feather they make so much noise and cut such a figure with, we have not quite outgrown, but play with much less seriously and constantly than they do. Then there is a whole museum of wigs, and masks, and lace coats, and gold sticks, and grimaces and phrases which we laugh at honestly, without affectation that are still used in the old-world puppet-show."¹

Yet is it not strange that amidst the throngs that line the streets, where these "puppet shows" pass, the most eager, the most appreciative, almost the most numerous, were Dr. Holmes's compatriots pressing forward for place, reckless of inconvenience and expense, thirstily elbowing the old world "children" aside.

It is difficult, often amusingly difficult, to make the mass of Americans understand that Britain is also a republic and a democracy; that there is far more justice and freedom there than in their own country. The old idea of despotism still lingers, often in unexpected

¹ "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table."

quarters, and the prototype of the Jefferson City editor, who "mailed" a copy of his little sheet across the Atlantic, confident that the anti-monarchical onslaught it contained would make "Queen Victoria tremble in her Tower of London" is still to be found. Americans at large either possess exaggerated notions of the British royal prerogative and of British institutions, or else they ludicrously under-rate both, faults chiefly arising from their cynicism and lack of political seriousness, perhaps also to their want of perspective. But an American is never to be trusted by his speech. He is laughing even when he seems sincerest, and his derision often veils a deep and honest respect. One might apostrophize him in the language used by the Saracen to the Christian knight: "You are of a nation that loves to laugh, and you make sport with yourselves and with others, by telling what is impossible, and reporting what never chanced."¹

Yet he is occasionally startled out of his affectation and his cynicism, as when, for instance, one of his fellow-countrymen, whom he cannot well accuse of servility or mental decrepitude, boldly tells him the truth. When Mr. Waldorf Astor cast off his allegiance to America there was the usual cry of "snob" and "tuft-hunter," but what could they say to Mr. Bret Harte who "preferred the freer life of England," or of Mr. Henry James, or Mr. Sargent, Mr. Abbey, Mr. Boughton, and a score of others. Even as I write, the newspapers contain an account of the naturalization of Major Alexander Davis, a wealthy New Yorker, who tells his countrymen that there is "a larger measure of

¹ "The Talisman," chap. i.

individual freedom in England than there is in America, although," he adds dryly, "I suppose it would be hard to find any American who would acknowledge that." Another of his sentences catches the eye: "Somehow one leaves all small prejudices behind when one lives in London for any length of time." Ah, America is the land of prejudices; a wide, a charitable latitudinarianism is reserved for the few; the shadow of Salem and Plymouth Rock is over the land; and the spirit of wide tolerance which England has achieved is not yet to be enjoyed. It is not merely the prejudice against here the rich man, here the well-dressed man, there against the black man: it is the widespread habit of judging men and matters by their externals that is most deplorable.¹

Every nation possesses a moral and intellectual atmosphere of its own. Its people breed it, and imbibe certain characteristics not easily understood or condoned by other races. An American, with all his adaptability, can hardly ever look at the world from the side we others would fain choose. Too often he looks out from back windows upon back windows.

I cannot forbear quoting a more pregnant passage from Dr. Wendell Holmes, written in the fulness of years and wisdom: "All sentiment," he confesses, "is dying out of our people—no loyalty for the sovereign,

¹ I once read in a famous Southern newspaper this bitter dictum on Tolstoi: "We do not need to read this man's books to form an estimate of his character. His portrait shows him to be what he is—an evil, lying, and bestial fanatic. You can see the man by his face."

In no country do appearances count for so much as in America. A man must look the part to play the part, and if Nature has been unkind in this respect, it will take more than an average lifetime to overcome the popular prejudice.

the king-post of political edifice; no deep attachment between employer and employed; no reverence of the humbler members of a household for its heads; and to make sure of continued corruption and misery *universal* suffrage—supplying all the great sewers into the great aqueduct we must all drink from." Yet, if the doctor could have lived until 1925, he might have taken a less pessimistic view. "Even now we behold the union which is formed through intermarriage with American millionairism with European, and particularly with the British aristocracy, and the growing eagerness of American wealth to find admission to the Courts and the Court circles of Europe. Between militarism and aristocracy there is a subtle bond; and militarism may open the door through which aristocracy will find its way."¹

Is it altogether without significance that such honours as Dewey's and Hobson's can be won by military and naval success, while a public career in civil life carries with it, unless successful, the stamp of vulgarity, almost of disgrace?

The Americans probably never show themselves to greater disadvantage than when belauding a hero of their own choice. Even when the object of their

¹ Professor Goldwin Smith.

But there is a worse feature of Europeanization which Americans may well dread. The marriage customs of Europe are making great strides in America. The financial standing of the parties are growing more important in marriage than their personal qualities. "As we depart," remarks Professor Fetter, "from the simpler conditions of the colonial and pioneer period in this country considerations of social relations, of family influence, and of other factors which may further the interests of the individual contracting the marriage are more and more allowed to enter into the prejudice of the interests of posterity."

adulation is a worthy man, the maudlin character of the tribute offends the universe; when he is unworthy, it makes all decent people, in and out of the republic, despair. The miserable achievement of the American officer Funston, which would make a Briton hide his head in shame, is made an object-lesson in gallantry. Funston is held up by public-school teachers as a model hero and patriot. "If this Funstonian boom continues," writes Mr. Clemens, "Funstonianism will presently affect the army. In fact, this had already happened. There are weak-headed and weak-principled officers in all armies, and these are always ready to imitate successful notoriety—breeding methods, let them be good or bad. The fact that Funston has achieved notoriety by paralyzing the universe with fresh and hideous ideas is sufficient for this kind." Among the fruits of Funston's example are the torturing of the Filipinos by the awful "water-cure," and General Smith's world-famous order: "*Kill and burn!* This is not a time to take prisoners. The more you kill and burn, the better. Kill all above the age of ten. Make Samar a howling wilderness!" Suppose a British officer in India or South Africa had given such an order!

If a neighbour critic may say so frankly, there is no people which has greater need to hold up to itself constantly high ideals of conduct and morals—because there is no people who struggle so passionately for material advantages, and are, therefore, most exposed to temptation in the methods by which they may gain it. They may be said to have, at present, chiefly executive energy without depth of idea or spiritual direction. Their school of character is action—per-

petual action—and they know little of that calm philosophical force which takes in life without relation to externals, or to noise and movement. Yet the paths converge at last almost to the same ends, for, as we have been told, “action instantly tracts on character, modifies ideas, makes them more definite, and grounds them more deeply,” whereby the professor and the practiser reach the same conclusions.

I had intended to devote some space to religion in America, but the subject is not easily handled, and might prove invidious. Students of America's beginnings are aware that half the colonies owed their origin to a desire to “worship God freely;” in other words, the people were dissenters. The Episcopal, or Anglican, Church was in the minority in nearly all sections. There is to-day no State Church, yet the rapid growth of Episcopalianism is great and universal. It is the Church of which the President and the leading members of the Government are communicants. It is the Church, not merely of the better classes, but its growth and influence now extend into all parts of the country.

While all religions continue to flourish in America, yet one important new influence is the gradual effacement of Puritanism and Bible reading amongst the masses, especially in childhood. American literature, under American thought and speech, has, from the earliest times, been permeated as *Biblicism*; even journalism and humorous writing has been indebted to Scripture for many of its points, which, in Britain, have been thought almost profane. Men and women from childhood have been saturated with the writings of the prophets and apostles. But with the banishment of the

Bible from the common schools in many States, owing to the jealousies of the sectarians, this Hebraistic influence disappears.¹

Mr. Thistelton Mark, however, draws attention to the fact that there are signs of a movement in America in favour of the extension of direct ethical teaching. A considerable number of schools have been started in connection with different religious denominations, and this rival movement has, to some extent, placed the public schools on the defensive, and has led to more emphasis being laid on the moral side of education. Another interesting outcome of the same movement is to be found in the ethical culture schools of New York, which seek to provide indirect moral teaching a substitute for definite religious instruction.

¹ An educational conference, held in 1902, placed on record a resolution deploring the exclusion of the Bible from the common schools. The regret expressed is based on literary, and not on theological grounds. The English Bible is spoken of as "a literary work of the highest and purest type," and it is alleged that its influence is gradually ceasing to permeate American books. President Eliot, of Harvard, recently observed that "the mythologies, *Old Testament stories*, fairy tales, and historical romances on which we are accustomed to feed the childish mind contain a great deal that is perverse, barbarous, or trivial, and to this infiltration into children's minds generation after generation of immoral, cruel, or foolish ideas is probably to be attributed in part the slow ethical progress of the race."

APPENDIX I

THE NATIONAL TITLE

IN nation-making it is a decided advantage to start with a distinctive name in the world. The importance of a national title ought not to be under-rated: for if Rome occupied fifteen centuries in her fall, it was less owing to her constitution and puissance than to the tenacity of the epithet, which was inherited successively by Goths and Vandals, Turks and Slavs, and tribes who knew and cared nothing for the cradle of the Roman race, called themselves Romans, and arrogated to themselves the name and prestige of Rome.

It is a curiosity of nomenclature that there should have arisen in one of the great Commonwealths of the world popular doubt and uncertainty concerning its own national title.

Titles of great States, it is true, usually develop historically: the dominant faction gives its name to the entire people. On the other hand, they are occasionally the result of accident or of ignorance. China is not China to the Chinese. Germany is not Germany to the Germans, and Holland is no more Holland to the Netherlanders than the Netherlanders are the "Dutch."

It is worth observing that there has not been in continental Europe so careful a restriction of the term "America" to the republic as was formerly customary. Up to a very recent period the majority of Europeans, with scant appreciation of a distinction, which the peoples concerned have agreed to respect, between the national and continental designations, have been addicted to describing Canadians, Mexicans,

Nicaraguans, and indeed all other races inhabiting the Western Hemisphere as "Americans." But a study of America's genesis will show us that to be a native of "North America" no more constitutes an "American" than a common European origin and residence would be justification for branding a German as an Austrian, or a Frenchman as a Swede. "America" is a national designation of a single country;¹ "North America" is a continental designation, which includes several countries.

Prior to 1771 the term, we find, had a somewhat vague significance. The greater part of the continent was a *terra incognita*: Hearne, Mackenzie, and Vancouver had not yet penetrated into the North-west: the Mississippi Valley was as La Salle left it: the Pacific Ocean was supposed to begin where Deuver now stands. Yet vague as the continental definition then was, to Englishmen and their colonial kinsmen the terms America and American had long been applied almost exclusively to the thirteen colonies and the hinterland. Thus we find on the Louisburg medal of 1758 a rude outline of the Continent, with divisions inscribed "America" and "Canada," the former occupying the position of the English Colonies on the map.

But after the conquest of Canada we find a growing disposition on the part of the English colonists to claim the whole Continent for America. They naturally assumed, reckoning without their host, that Canada would be ready to throw in its lot with them in the struggle now impending with the Mother country, and that Spain would be forced to relinquish her hold on the south and west. Thus we see the rise of the term "Continental" as applied to the "Continental" Congress and the "Continental" Army. This had, however, but a brief vogue; the colonists were soon undeceived as regards Canada, which elected to continue a member of the British Empire.

¹ "Canada," said John Adams, "is still an appanage of the British Crown in North America." America, however, was independent. "Whereas, the delegates of the United States of America, in Congress assembled . . . in the second year of the independence of America."

Article I of the Articles of Confederation says, "The style of the Confederacy shall be 'The United States of America.'"

"Continent"¹ was dropped as applying to the revolting colonies, and the old term America began to have a still more restricted application to the Atlantic sea-board. When, in 1776, John Adams proposed to his friends Hancock and Jefferson the title of "The United States of America" for the thirteen seceding English Colonies, he was unaware that anything indefinite, inadequate, or contrary to accepted custom dwelt in such a title.

On the contrary, his idea clearly was that the brand-new unification of Colonies (or States) should boast the exclusive title of "America," the designation of the inhabitants thereof being Americans. We know that the colonists, in convention assembled at Philadelphia, fully understood and acquiesced in the title. It was free to them to choose any name, as other new peoples had done, and several such were proposed, but "America" was tacitly agreed upon.² We know, also, that in the English Parliamentary speeches of the time, Pitt, Fox, and Burke habitually refer to America as a country quite separate and distinct from Canada, Louisiana, Florida, California, or Mexico, contiguous countries at that period.³ In the early literature of the new country we rarely come across "United States" as meaning America, certainly not oftener than we encounter United Kingdom as implying Great Britain and Ireland. In the works of Irving, of Hawthorne, of Emerson, and of Thoreau, the phrase, America, occurs as frequently and

¹ Franklin, more enlightened than the rest, was one of the first to protest against the assumption that the English king's dominion "embraced the larger part of the Continent."

To realize the absurdity of confusing America, after 1776, with the Continent of North America, we have only to be told that America (*i.e.* the thirteen states) comprised only 820,680 square miles of territory, whereas the Continent possesses nearly 8,000,000 square miles.

When the Duc de Noailles, in 1778, delivered a declaration to the British Government acknowledging the treaty between France and the "United States of North America," the American envoy, Lee, called attention to the blunder. The erroneous phraseology also evoked comment in Congress, whose members were as well aware of the difference between America, the new nation, and North America, the continent, as that between North and South Carolina, or New York the city, and New York the state.

² "It is the avowed policy of Europe," wrote Jay, "to restrict America to a set of States." Vergennes, on behalf of France, continually refers to America, in contradistinction to Canada and Louisiana.

as spontaneously whenever either of these writers wishes to refer to his native country as it comes with rarity and reluctance in the American essayists and novelists after the Civil War.¹

The exact moment when our American cousin began to suspect his exclusive right to the term "America" is difficult to ascertain. Some would hasten to put it at the period of the Civil War, and the subsequent insistence upon the term "United States" in the national speech and literature as a flaunting in the face of those who would not have wept to see them *dis*-united. But it would seem as if the real significance of "America" as a national epithet, as national as Brazil to the Brazilians, or as "Deutschland" to the Germans after 1870, had passed out of people's minds in the republic, they dwelling more on the word or phrase which described their federate character than that more important word which denoted their country on the map. For the South Carolinians, the Virginians, the Mississippians and the rest, when they came, in 1860, to the task of creating a separate nation, ventured no farther afield in the way of national title than "Confederate States of America," a distinction which is not to Europeans much clearer than if, as a result of civil war in these islands, a "Confederated Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" should rise in opposition to the one at present happily existing. It is significant that the critical period coincided with the growth of our American cousins' continental neighbours, Canada and Mexico.²

Probably the reason why the term was in abeyance for so long a period after the Civil War was the great expansion of the republic. A shoal of new States being added, all of which

¹ Thus, Hon. John Jay (in opposition to Winsor, who erroneously uses the term) invariably employs the current phrase, as, "Vergennes argued that the fisheries America had renounced with the British Crown . . . Vergennes had ulterior reasons for keeping America out of the fisheries, the nursery of seamen, for he did not wish America to become a naval power.—See "Winsor," vol. vii. p. 90.

² Certainly since the writing of his national anthem, whose title is "America," and which begins—

"My Country, 'tis of thee,
Sweet land of Liberty,
Of Thee I sing!"

took pride in being added to the Union. For to the people of the territories, it was a reproach not to belong to "the States." There were no States between Missouri and the Rocky Mountains, so that one can understand how the custom of speaking exclusively of the United States became general in the West.¹

Then again the terms for the Continent and the country are undoubtedly confusing.² Those familiar with manners and colloquialisms in the States are aware that for some thirty years prior to 1898, while the adjective "American" has been in general use, the noun "America" has been extremely rare. Surprising as it may be to Englishmen to be told the fact, one might, up to that *annus mirabilis*, have travelled five thousand miles and read a hundred books and newspapers without ever having once come across it; "United States" being almost invariably the term employed by the American for his own country whether at home or abroad.

In times past the phrase "United States" in its application to America has lain open to the charge of deep, and even humiliating obscurity. It is not so long ago that "United States" received rather a rude shock. An American tourist presenting himself at the Vatican with an intimation that he hailed from the "United States," was asked by an official of the Papal Court—

"Columbia, Mexico, Brazil, America, or Chile?" a collection of names and nationalities not flattering to Yankee³ pride.

Their amiable conceit in persistently referring to their country as "the Republic," as though there was no other

¹ In those days when west of the Rocky Mountains, and even east, there were no "States" but only "territories," the inhabitants of those regions not yet admitted to the full privileges of the Union always spoke of going east as going to "the States."

² There are those who continue to speak of the "American Continent." Which is it? Surely they do not mean to apply the term to both Continents.

³ The popularization of the term "Yankee" amongst the Americans, east and west, north and south, is another result of the Hispano-American conflict. The Spaniards threw it at the Americans as an insult; the latter, even the Southerners, accepted it with the best grace in the world. *Yankee* is, of course, an Indian corruption of *Anglais*.

republic, has already been likened by M. Paul Bourget to the Chinese failing in speaking of "the Empire" as though there were no other empires. The Chinese, indeed, in their arrogance, have never found any need for any particular national designation for themselves, "China" and "Chinese" being terms of Occidental invention. Since the war with Spain, the best speakers and writers in the States have employed with freedom a term which, though long familiar and frequent in these isles, the Americans themselves have very carefully avoided.¹

¹ Having thus awakened to the fact of their exclusive title, it is amusing to note the alacrity with which they laid hold of it, and how quick Americans are to resent the imputation that they have no distinctive name amongst the nations.

In the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament in 1902, reference was made not to "America," or "The United States of America," as is usual, but to "United States" *tout court*. This, one would have supposed, would have been taken by Americans as a compliment. Nevertheless one alert American could not suffer this to pass unchallenged, but wrote to Mr. Balfour in this strain—

"SIR—

"Will you permit me to inquire on behalf of a number of American citizens, resident in London, and admirers of England and English institutions, why, in the King's Speech of yesterday, the name of *America* was pointedly omitted in referring to our country?

"Is it not recognized that *America* is our national designation: North America and South America being the titles of *Continents*?

"The use of the full title in the case of Brazil renders the omission all the more significant.

"I am, Sir, etc.,

"A. D. ENDICOTT."

Mr. Balfour replied as follows:—

"Downing Street,

"June 25th, 1902.

"DEAR SIR,

"I have read your letter of the 17th with some surprise, as it seems to imply that the omission of the words 'of America' from the King's Speech was intended to be derogatory to your country. I need not say that this is a complete delusion. The words 'United States' taken by themselves, without further qualification, have, with us, invariable reference to the great republic of which you are a citizen. There may be, and are, other 'United States,' but *that* is the United States *par excellence*.

"Yours faithfully,

"ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR."

On the heels of this Dr. F. Pinto do Luz wrote to *The Times* to deprecate a growing practice in this country, which he asserted is extremely offensive to

Nevertheless, United States of America will probably continue to be with us, the United States *par excellence*, as the British Premier says.

The American Government have given their own proper national title slender official countenance; nor has the term figured for several decades in the messages of the United States Presidents to the United States Congress. President Roosevelt, in its writings, having made a practice of using the term America,¹ before he was driven by virtue of his office to employ the official Federal title, which is, only after all, inadequate when addressing foreign nations.²

Brazilians, of employing the term United States as if it referred solely to the republic of the United States of America. "The Federal designation—United States—was (he says) adopted by us in 1889 without any apprehension that it would thereby confuse the general titles previously assumed by the republics of America and Colombia. I trust it is not too late to point out to Englishmen—and to all Europeans—that such Federal designation—United States—is merely intended for local and domestic purposes in each of the republics named, and not the *national title*, certainly not the exclusive possession, of a single one abroad."

¹ Thus, he writes, "America will become greater than any empire," etc.—"The Strenuous Life," 69.

² Yet the difficulties under which the legal authorities have been labouring, owing to this misapprehension of nomenclature, are numerous. Take a recent decision of the Supreme Court (1901), where it is declared that the existing Federal constitution was made for the United States, by which term we understand the *States*, whose people *united* to form the Constitution, and such as have since been admitted to the Union upon an equality with them. Had the counsel of Hamilton been followed, and the term "America" been officially used, how much more comprehensible would be the situation?

APPENDIX II

THE NEW TRUSTS AND THEIR MAKERS

IF the physiology of the Trust is yet far from being thoroughly understood, the personality and methods of the Trust makers is less so. Of the Trust system generally, it may be said that, despite the many powerful and plausible arguments used in its defence, these have hardly dispersed the many misgivings in the minds of publicists concerning a system which offers one of the sternest problems which the future has in store for the United States of America.

Not the least significant or interesting feature of the Trust movement has been the rapidity with which it has developed from comparatively moderate beginnings thirty years ago to its present position to-day, when the industrial combinations in America represent a capital of one billion two hundred millions sterling; while during the single year 1899 Trusts were formed to the extent of two billion dollars, which is a sum in excess of the total currency in circulation amongst seventy millions of people.

But the end is not yet, although the first stage of Trust development may be said to have concluded; it now remains for the Trusts, which have swallowed up all separate industries and destroyed competition, to devour themselves—in other words, for the “consolidations” to consolidate. The goal of this movement, if not checked by some obstacle one cannot yet foresee, would appear obviously to lie in the direction of an industrial monarchy or oligarchy, in which one man or a handful of men will control, not as now a million and a half or two

millions of artisans, but the entire labour, skilled and unskilled, of the State; and from this stupendous position be able to dictate both prices and wages to the inhabitants of the republic. Mr. Carnegie once himself admitted as much, although apprehending the intrusion of a factor, imperceptible as yet, which would modify and perhaps totally prevent such a result.

But that, in the present conditions, such a result is neither remote nor fanciful, has this very year been demonstrated by the formation of a Steel Trust whose authorized capital of a billion dollars embraces no fewer than nine separate Trusts, which have enjoyed monopolies in various districts by the complete absorption of competitive enterprises. The effect of this novel tendency of which the United States Steel Corporation is an example, will be nominally to reduce the number of Trusts, indeed, but, at the same time, to render the greater aggregations of manifold power, and it may be a source of manifold danger to the future of the Commonwealth. Of the one hundred and thirty organizations which to-day are classed as Trusts in America, if the process of amalgamation continues, as it threatens to do, scarce a dozen will exist in as many years; each combination being in control of the entire output of steel, iron, oil, sugar, tobacco, furniture, cottons, woollens, etc., of the country, instead of as now a large State or district.

The Trust system, which sprang into being early in the "seventies," owed its foundation and origin to Mr. J. D. Rockefeller. Yet the consolidation of the oil-refining interests which then took place was probably less the result of machinations and manœuvring on the part of this capitalist than a natural perception on the part of the well-owners and refiners, of the manifest advantages which would attend such an amalgamation of the now industry which followed the discovery of the western Pennsylvania oil-wells. They would thus be better able to resist the aggression and overcharge of the railway companies, which were doing their best to throttle commerce in that day. By first threatening and afterwards, on numerous occasions, actually fulfilling their threats to build lines of their own for the transportation of their product, the railways were soon brought to terms. The methods subsequently adopted by Mr.

Rockefeller, at the head of the Standard Oil Company, were deep and far-reaching, making competition virtually impossible then, by underselling any rival who had the hardihood to oppose them; and less possible now than ever when the capital of the Trust stands publicly at six hundred millions of dollars. From dealing merely in oil it has branched out in correlative industries, until it now manufactures its own tanks, cases, and cans; besides owning its own railways, steamboats, trucks, and delivery-vans, and directly managing the transportation of its oil on all the railway lines of America.

In addition to all the huge mass of labour and enterprise which is thus centralized in a single group of men—or, more properly, a single man—this Trust has probably not less than twenty millions sterling invested in the manufacture of by-products and proprietary articles well known to the English as well as the American consumer. It is known to possess some fifty millions sterling invested in railway securities, banking deposits, and other forms of active capital. The power which the Standard Oil Trust wields, industrial, financial, political, in America, is one of the most astounding features of transatlantic social and political economy. The head of this Trust is, beyond dispute, the richest individual in the world, boasting an annual income of certainly not less than five millions sterling.

As for the Steel Trust, with its capital stock of \$850,000,000 and a bonded indebtedness of \$304,000,000, it stands nominally as the superior of the Standard Oil Company, and perhaps really is so. The leading spirit and organizer of this gigantic combination of the steel interests is Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, the New York financier, for whose services in connection therewith he has received three millions sterling in shares. That these services have not been overpaid, if one chooses to regard the transaction from the standpoint of a director of this Trust, may be judged by the moral and financial responsibility entailed upon Mr. Morgan during the critical moment when the Trust was in process of formation. The stock of the various steel companies had not been all acquired and might without warning be converted into a weapon to lower the market value of

the acquired stock, and so ruin the promoter of the Trust. But the great power in the money market which Mr. Morgan has for some years possessed, enabled him to carry out the deal successfully; and the sum of twenty million dollars which he had on deposit effectually frustrated the attempts of rival financiers to thwart the Trust.

The presidency of the consolidation falls to Mr. C. M. Schwab, who has succeeded Mr. Carnegie in the Steel Company bearing the latter's name. It would be difficult to quote a more striking instance of the rewards which good fortune, accompanied by shrewdness and ability, often receive in America than Mr. Carnegie's, unless it were that of his former employee, Mr. Schwab. This new Trust magnate was born and bred in an obscure Pennsylvanian town, and beginning as a wage-earner at the age of fifteen, was given employment in the Carnegie works in 1880. As an engineer he exhibited such intelligence and skill as to earn Mr. Carnegie's approval and his promotion to the post of chief engineer seven years later. In the mean time Mr. Schwab had directed his attention to the study of metallurgy and chemistry, and was soon able to introduce several improvements in the manufacture of steel plates. At the age of thirty-seven, or less than six years ago, he was appointed to the chief control of the Carnegie Company at a salary of twenty thousand pounds sterling, with forty thousand workmen under his command. By the retirement of Mr. Carnegie and the formation of the new Trust, he acquires fifteen million dollars worth of stock and the presidency of a combination employing not less than half a million of men and over two hundred millions sterling of capital.

At the head of the Sugar Trust stands a well-known figure in Mr. H. O. Havemeyer, President of the American Sugar-refining Company. It is this vast concern which, controlling the gross output of refined sugar in the country, and regulating the quality and price to the consumer, is prominent amongst those Trusts persistently denounced as most inimical and even dangerous to the interests of the community. The Trust was formed several years ago by its present head and his brother, the late Theodore Havemeyer; all its refineries are under the

superintendence of a single chemical expert, who is paid a salary of fifty thousand dollars a year to devise "waste-saving" contrivances, which, with the alleged consequent deterioration of the product, affords one an insight into a cardinal rule in the policy of the Trust.

Another combination, in importance perhaps next to the Sugar Trust, is that whose president is Mr. J. B. Duke, and which controls the tobacco commerce of America. In this case, although there are nominally two great companies, each with a capital of over eighty-five millions, in reality it is a single concern, with a common president and board of directors, and a common plan of offence and defence against competition. The origin of this important trust is due to Mr. Duke himself, who, in 1882, purchased, for less than £10,000, the controlling interest in a cigarette factory, established by his father in North Carolina. At that time the competition amongst the New York cigarette manufacturers was very strong; the sum of a million dollars annually spent upon advertising alone sufficing to consume the profits. Mr. Duke undertook to confer with the various leading manufacturers, with the result that these agreed to consolidate their interests; the success of this initial Trust leading to the present further amalgamation of the tobacco manufacturing interests.

Apart from the Trusts which deal in and affect the necessaries of life and the commodities of modern domestic use, there is the consolidation of interests in such appliances as the telegraph and telephone. The Telephone Trust, of which the late Mr. J. E. Hudson was the head, is a very thorough monopoly in the district it covers, and had its organizer lived a few months longer, its operations would have embraced a much wider field and been itself of such far greater magnitude as to cause the telephone system to be subordinate to the telegraph and cable interests.

The Trust system began in the conception of a single man; and the Trusts are really in the hands of a much smaller group of men to-day than would appear except by an examination of the holdings in the several combinations; and this group is, as we have said, continually growing smaller. They have, for the

most part, risen from the ranks, and keep their own position and maintain the status of the Trusts by sheer force of character, financial knowledge, and unflagging energy. For, it is to be observed, that the great power they wield is not to be transmitted to another in the ordinary course of inheritance or bequest. The heads of the Trusts are paid great salaries for the work they perform, inasmuch as they are the actual managers as well as chief shareholders and figure-heads, and those salaries may be said to be the fair reward of extraordinary commercial ability.

But the initiative in the formation of Trusts, or the extension of Trusts, lies, in the greater number of the newer instances of combination, less with the heads of the Trusts, or the manufacturers and producers of a commodity concerned, than with certain speculators, who may be termed outsiders, who, noting the tendency of the times and the opportunities offered for amassing a vast fortune at a coup, have made it their business to cast about in all directions of the industrial compass for opportunities for acting as the mediums of amalgamation. Mr. Leiter, for example, whose failure two or three years ago in his attempt to form a Wheat Trust, was a speculator pure and simple. And to this category must also belong one of the most prolific and successful Trust organizers of the day, Mr. Morgan, as well as Mr. W. H. Moore of Chicago, and Mr. A. N. Brady of New York.


It is this new phase, and the existence of these new factors, which constitutes the danger; because it is a forced and artificial process, one not naturally arising, which perhaps never would arise, out of natural trade conditions. It is a fiscal ability, and the speculative instinct grafted upon the best talent for trade and commerce.

It also, but in a remoter sense, may be held to constitute the safeguard against a commercial despotism; because it will soon grow as profitable to unmake Trusts as to make them. A Trust is, in its essence, a tyranny; but a plurality of tyrants is incompatible with serious danger to the State. And, besides, it may safely be assumed that in a republic like America not even the strongest and most compact combination will altogether



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prevent merit from forcing its way through the barrier which has thus been erected ; while, again, the burden to the consumer can never be too great for his endurance if the monopoly of the strongest Trust is not backed by Statute ; and if foreign competitors are not included in the sphere of the Trust's operations or excluded by a too exalted protective customs tariff.

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